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Currencies and the Commodification of
Environmental Law
James Salzman* and J.B. Ruhl**
The success of several environmental trading markets (ETMs) has led to
proposals for broader use of ETMs in environmental and resource management
policy. The successful ETMs all share a basicfeature-they exchange units of

trade that arefungible, such as tons ofsulfer dioxide orkilos offish. Thisfeature
of trading promotes resource allocation efficiency while advancing
environmental protection. But most commodities exchanged in current and
proposed ETMs, such as wetlands and endangered species habitat, exhibit
nonfungibilitiesacross the dimensions of type, time, and space. Using ETMs to
trade these commodities is no longer trading "environmental apples for apples,"
and thus the rationalefor using ETMs is called into question.
In this article, the authors develop a comprehensive analytical framework

for evaluating ETMs from the perspective of commodity nonfungibility and
explore the challenge presented by trading environmental apples for oranges.
They argue that by focusing on nonfungible commodities and their currencies we
can better explain the design ofETMs, their rules of exchange, andprovisionsfor

public participation.
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INTRODUCTION
Two major, integrally related trends define U.S. environmental law at the
millennium. The first trend is to bring presently unregulated risks under the
control of the regulatory system. The second trend ... is toward bigger
bubbles-toward broader and broader trading among pollutants and even
among various types of risk reduction . ...

Picture a playground where children in business suits trade environmental
protection like baseball cards. The front sides bear slick images of endangered
species, drops of acid rain, and vanishing habitats. The flip-sides show all the
statistics-population remaining, acreage consumed, who benefits from the
wetlands, who is harmed by the pollution. And the kids sit huddled round in an
excited circle, busily swapping cards. To snag Jamie's prized cattail wetlands,
Ben must part with his cherished saltwater marsh.
There are differences, of course, between this imaginary playground and a
market in real environmental commodities. A "bad trade" in baseball cards is
in the eyes of the beholder and, at worst, damages only a child's ego. When
parties trade environmental protection, though, what seems a good trade
looking at the pictures may lose its appeal once we take a closer look at the
statistics and the effects of the trade on the environment itself.
Over the last decade there has been a sea change in environmental law and
policy, marked by growing interest in market-based instruments of
environmental protection. In particular, approaches that explicitly commodify
environmental impacts by creating markets for their sale are on the rise. These
environmental trading markets (ETMs) now operate in a range of regulatory
settings where parties exchange credits to emit air pollutants, extract natural
resources, and develop habitat.2 In fact, every major environmental policy
review in the last five years has called for even greater use of ETMs.3 Markets

&

1. E. Donald Elliott & Gail Chamley, Toward Bigger Bubbles, F. FOR APPLIED RES.
PuB. PoL'Y 48 (Winter, 1998) [hereinafter Elliott & Chamley].
2. First proposed in the 1960s, ETMs have been championed by legal and economics
scholars as superior to traditional command-and-control regulatory approaches. Proponents
claim that by allowing parties to weigh the marginal costs of actually reducing impacts
againstpurchasingthe rights of reduced impacts elsewhere, trading should provide the same
or better environmental protection at less cost. Assuming that compliance monitoring,
information, and transaction costs are low, in theory a trading regime should be more
efficient than regulatory standards when polluters have heterogeneous cost abatement
schedules. Using pollution as an example, parties can gain emission credits by paying those
with cheaper marginal abatement opportunities to reduce their pollution further as well as
encouraging regulated entities to select among a range of compliance options. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE

E. OATES,

THE THEORY OF ENvIRONMENTAL POLICY

177-

89 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing for marketable emission permits as an alternative to effluent fees).
3. The President's Council on Sustainable Development, a high-level stakeholder
advisory group assembled by President Clinton, produced a consensus report on the future
direction of environmental policy. One of its key recommendations was to: "Make Greater
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for environmental commodities represent the new wave of environmental
protection and, despite critiques both subtle and shrill, they are still building.
ETMs have provided an enormously fertile area for scholarship. Articles
have explored the mechanics of trading programs, 4 debated the advantages of
trading over command-and-control regulation,5 and, most recently, assessed the

Use of Market Forces. Sustainable development objectives must harness market forces
through policy tools, such as emissions trading deposit/refund systems and tax and subsidy
reform. This approach can substantially influence the behavior of firms, governments, and
individuals."
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE
AMERICA: A NEW CONSENSUS FOR THE PROSPERITY, OPPORTUNITY AND A HEALTHY
ENVIRONMENT FOR THE FUTURE 26 (1996).

The "Next Generation Project," sponsored by Yale with experts from academia such as
Carol Rose and Don Elliott, also called for much greater use of market mechanisms such as
ETMs. Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty, Introduction to THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE

11 (Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty
eds., 1997); Robert Stavins & Bradley Whitehead, Market-Based EnvironmentalPolicies, in

NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NExT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 105 (Marian

R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997).
Enterprise for the Environment, a consensus panel bringing together influential
environmental policy figures such as former EPA administrators Bill Ruckelshaus and Bill
Reilly, concluded that "[e]missions trading programs hold great promise as cost-effective
methods for achieving environmental goals and encouraging technological innovation.
Trading can be a useful policy tool with or without a cap on total emissions.... Greater use
of this method could help solve a number of persistent environmental problems."
ENTERPRISE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
TRANSITION: TOWARD A MORE DESIRABLE FUTURE 39 (1998).

PROTECTION SYSTEM IN

&

While many policy recommendations have encouraged greater use of market
instruments generally, it is worth noting that "when market-based systems are implemented,
tradable permitting schemes generally prevail over alternatives such as emissions taxes."
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Emissions Allowance Trading Under the Clean Air Act: A Model for
Future Environmental Regulations?, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 352, 358 (1999) [hereinafter
Hirsch]. This shows that, within the calls for greater use of market instruments, ETMs have
been much more important than fees or taxes.
4. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Roger G. Noll, Environmental Markets in the Year
2000, 3 J. OF RISK & UNCERTAINTY 351 (1990) (examining prospects for and design of
marketable emissions permits); Tom Tietenberg, Ethical Influences on the Evolution of the
US Tradable Permit Approach to Air Pollution Control, 24 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 241, 243
(1998) [hereinafter Tietenberg I] (explaining how emissions reduction credits may be stored
and spent).
5. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (1985) ("The current system does not in fact 'work' and
its malfunctions ... will become progressively more serious . . . ."); Bruce A. Ackerman
Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market
Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 172 (1988) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart,
DemocraticCase] ("A reform relying on market incentives is just plain better, in terms of all
relevant public values, than the status quo."); Richard B. Stewart, Modelsfor Environmental
Regulation: Central Planning Versus Market-Based Approaches, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 547 (1992) (arguing for the use of market-based incentives rather than "command-andcontrol regulation); see also Dallas Burtraw, Cost Savings, Market Performance, and
Economic Benefits of the U.S. Acid Rain Program (Resources for the Future Discussion

Dec. 2000]

CURRENCIESAND COMMODIFICATION

611

application of ETMs in the international sphere.6 Within this wealth of
literature, however, a basic aspect of trading has largely escaped attention.
Perhaps because it is so obvious, there has been scant consideration of the
simple question-what is actually being traded?
If one compares trading programs, they all seem to share a basic feature.
The CFC, fisheries, and proposed greenhouse gas ETMs, for example, all
exchange commodities that appear to be fungible. One molecule of CFC, kilo
of halibut, or ton of carbon dioxide seems much the same as another, both in
terms of identity and impact. It is trading apples for apples (or pork bellies for
pork bellies). Thus ETMs are considered a type of commodity market, where
environmental credits go to the highest bidder. And for good reason, since the
Chicago Board of Trade now sells rights to emit sulfur dioxide alongside pork
bellies, orange juice, and grain futures.7
Indeed ETMs must assume fungibility-that the things exchanged are
sufficiently similar in ways important to the goals of environmental
protection-otherwise there would be no assurance that trading ensured
environmental protection. While the precondition of fungibility may seem selfevident, this core assumption turns out to be more problematic than it first
appears.
As an example of why fungibility matters, consider wetlands mitigation
banking. This policy permits developers, once they have taken steps to avoid
and minimize wetland loss, to compensate for wetlands that will be destroyed
through development by ensuring the restoration of wetlands in another

Paper 98-28-REV, 1988) (arguing that the acid rain program has induced innovation); Byron
Swift, The Acid Rain Test, ENVTL. F., May-June 1997, at 16 (arguing that the acid rain
program has allowed utlities to take advantage of cost-saving opportunities). But see David
M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the
Command and Control/EconomicIncentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 289 (1998)
[hereinafter Driesen I] (arguing that trading offers few advantages compared to traditional
permitting); Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, ForcingDemocracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
300 (1995) [hereinafter Heinzerling] (arguing that emissions trading does not promote
democratic deliberation).
6. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in a
Transnational Context, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2000) (examining international allowance
trading); David M. Driesen, FreeLunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions TradingIdea and the
Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Driesen II]
(suggesting limits to international emissions trading programs); Jonathan Baert Wiener,
Global EnvironmentalRegulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677,
798 (1999) [hereinafter Wiener] ("Global environmental protection should, therefore,
presumptively favor quantity-based tradeable allowances, unless other policy attributes ...
persuasively overcome the presumptive advantage .... ").
7. See Implementation ofthe Acid Rain Provisionsofthe Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Clean Air and NuclearRegulation of the Comm. on
Env't and Pub. Works, 103d Cong. 23-25 (1993) (statement of Patrick Arbor, chairman,
Chicago Board of Trade).
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location. 8 The regulations mandate trades that ensure equivalent value and
function between destroyed and restored wetlands. In practice, however, most
trades are valued in units of acreage. Within very loose guidelines, trades
between productive (though soon to be destroyed) wetlands and restored
wetlands are approved on an acre-for-acre basis. More sophisticated banks
require ratios, trading development on one acre of productive wetlands for, say,
restoring four or five acres of wetlands somewhere else. Counting acres may
make for easy accounting, but it is poor policy.
Why? The social value of the habitat is absent from the transaction. The
ecosystem services provided by the wetlands-positive externalities such as
water purification, groundwater recharge, and flood control-are largely
ignored. Opinions may differ over the value of a wetland's scenic vista, but
they are in universal accord over the contributions of clean water and flood
control to social welfare. 9 Trading acres for acres provides an inadequate
measure to capture what is really being traded of significance. To be sure, such
a simple metric allows trades, but other important, unaccounted trade-offs are
occurring. The program can suffer from a lack of accountability (or, more
accurately, a lack of countability).
In fact, upon close inspection, it turns out that most ETMs involve
commodities and trades that exhibit a range of fungibilities. Legal trades can
range from relatively straightforward kilos of surf clams to trades involving the
exchange of different types of habitat (that may provide very different social
benefits). To achieve the optimal outcome from ETMs, we need to understand
and account much better for the qualities being traded. To do so requires
careful consideration of the measure of exchange-the currency-since in the
final analysis the currency forms the very basis of the transaction. The trading
currency superficially makes the commodities fungible, determining what is
being traded and, therefore, protected.
Many of the currencies employed by ETMs present trades of an acre of
wetland here for an acre of wetland there, or a ton of emissions here for a ton
there, as a basic exchange of apples for apples. In reality, though, this is a
8. This example is explored in detail in Part III.A.
9. "Processes which occur in wetlands (plant production, bacterial decomposition,
nutrient recycling, etc.)... contribute to functions in the landscape that have ecological
significance (i.e., trapping nutrients and sediments, supporting bird and mammal
From these functions, one can derive values that have social
populations, etc.).
significance." The Status of Wetlands Science: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Envtl.
Protectionof the Senate Comm. on Env't andPub. Works, 102d Cong. 36 (1991) (statement
of Mark M. Brinson), quoted in Virginia C. Veltman, Banking on the Future of Wetlands
Using FederalLaw, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 654, 655 (1995) [hereinafter Veltman]; see also
Katherine C. Ewel, Water QualityImprovement by Wetlands, in NATURE's SERVICES 329-44
(Gretchen C. Daily, ed., 1997) (explaining the services provided by wetlands); Oliver A.
Houck, Land Loss in CoastalLouisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TutL. L.
REv. 3, 78-80 (1983) (describing studies that value the water purification service of Barataria
Basin wetlands at $5.6 to $23.6 million per year).
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misleading description. More times than one might think, we are trading
Macintoshes for Granny Smiths, apples for oranges, and, in some cases, apples
for Buicks. Put simply, we can end up trading the wrong things.
Within the vast literature on ETMs, important and insightful work has
explored the related issues of hot spots and the nature of tradable rights, 10 but
none has focused explicitly on the central role that currency selection plays in
the structure and effectiveness of ETMs.1 1 In this article, we reconceptualize
the debate whether ETMs promote environmental protection and social welfare.
By exploring efforts to promote nonfungible trading-trading environmental
apples for oranges-we undertake a rigorous examination of environmental
commodities and the currencies we use to trade them. We argue that
nonfungibilities and currencies drive the structure of ETMs, directly
influencing their construction, rules of exchange, and provision for public
participation. In short, we contend that a more complete understanding of the
root issues of commodity and currency provides a previously unlaid and strong
foundation to understand better the potential and design of ETMs.
By breaking down the problem of ensuring environmental protection in the

&

10. Anyone familiar with air pollutant trading is familiar with the hot spots issuewhere the effects of pollution are concentrated in a small geographic area. As a result,
nitrous oxides and aromatic hydrocarbon molecules aren't completely fungible because the
marginal impacts of emission depend on where (and when) they're emitted. In programs
that trade habitat, the problem of nonfungibility becomes even more accentuated because the
parcels have unique landscape characteristics. For examples of hot spots scholarship, see
Hirsch, supra note 3, at 373-75, 393 (discussing the hot spots issue in the sulfur dioxide
trading program); Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do Market-Based
EnvironmentalReforms ExacerbateEnvironmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 111,
129 (1999) [hereinafter Johnson] (explaining environmental justice scholarship on hot
spots); Robert Mendelsohn, Regulating Heterogeneous Emissions, 13 J. ENVTL. ECON.
MGMrr. 301 (1986) [hereinafter Mendelsohn] (discussing the heterogeneity of emissions);
Tietenberg I, supra note 4.
The nature of the property right is clearly related to the currency; it explains what you
can do and fundamentally determines the right's value, but the currency serves as the actual
medium of exchange. See Robert Hahn, Trade-offs in Designing Markets with Multiple
Objectives, 13 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1, 1-6 (1986) [hereinafter Hahn I] (examining how
to define an emissions permit); Carol Rose, Property in the Global Environmental
Commons: Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowances to Old-fashioned Common
PropertyRegimes, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL. F. 45 (1999) [hereinafter Rose]; Richard B.
Stewart, Economics, Environment, andthe Limits ofLegal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv.
1, 16 (1985) [hereinafter Stewart] (describing an ETM's need for a quantifiable common
measure of pollution, environmental degradation, or risk).
11. A number of articles on specific ETMs have pointed out the importance of
currencies, but none have analyzed how they are determined and their central role in
determining the ultimate structure and operation of the ETM. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW INsTITUTE, WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING 77-94 (1993) [hereinafter ELI-WETLAND]

(examining the definition of credits in wetland mitigation banking); Royal C. Gardner,
Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 IowA L. REv.
527, 531 (1996) [hereinafter Gardner I] (discussing the value of mitigation credits).
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face of nonfungibilities, we create an analytical framework that can inform the
assessment of any ETM. The structure flows from three distinct stages of an
ETM's operation. Currency adequacy involves selection of the currency
unit-can the metric capture the significant values exchanged or do some
important features remain external to the trades? Part I of the article sets out
the theoretical issues underlying a currency's adequacy, examining the
technical issue of how trading programs establish what the metric of exchange
shall be and why many ETM currencies remain crude, that is, unable to account
for important nonfungibilities across space, type, and time.
Exchange adequacy addresses construction of the exchange market-in the
face of a currency that fails to capture significant values, how can the market be
structured to ensure trades support environmental protection? Part II explores
regulators' use of exchange restrictions to compensate for inadequate
We postulate an inverse relationship between currency
currencies.
sophistication and intensity of market constraint. If an ETM relies on a
comprehensive currency, there is little need for exchange controls; conversely,
and more often the case, crude currencies will result in tightly constrained
trading schemes if the market maker desires to restrict environmental
externalities. As with currency adequacy, however, equally strong pressures
counsel loosening of trading restrictions.
In Parts III and IV we shift our focus to habitat ETMs, where the latent
nonfungibilities found in all trading markets are greatly exacerbated. To test
our analytic framework empirically, Part III applies the model developed in
Parts I and II to a case study of a major habitat ETM-wetlands mitigation
banking. As our framework predicts, regulators have responded to the reliance
on a crude currency (usually acres) with the imposition of market constraintslimiting the kind of wetlands that can be traded, the locations of the traded
wetlands, and the timing of trades. These restrictions on free trade minimize
the opportunities for exchanges that might harm the environment, but they also
limit the actual number of trades. In the face of pressures to "thicken" the
market, regulators have loosened these restrictions, leading to trades that fail to
promote environmental protection.
Part IV analyzes review adequacy-the institutional mechanisms for
reviewing trades. If, in practice, neither currency nor exchange adequacy will
often be achieved, then even trades of nonfungible commodities that fully
comply with the ETM's rules will occasionally, perhaps systematically, fail to
increase social welfare. We argue that when currency and exchange adequacy
are not ensured, the model of exchange transforms from a commodity market to
a barter market, from anonymous trading of generic commodities to individuals
haggling over goods and services with unique attributes. In this setting, to what
extent should we be willing to let owners of nonfungible environmental
features strike deals which the rest of us cannot evaluate through any common
medium of exchange and which many of us might not strike? Put more
generally, who should determine the equivalency of such trades?
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The rise of nonfungible trades creates significant concerns over protecting
public interests. Our discussion explores measures that regulators can take to
"police" ETMs when the combination of inadequate currencies and inadequate
exchange procedures leaves the door open to trades that lead to a loss of social
welfare. Breaking from what has effectively become a passive ex ante model
for trade approval in most ETMs, we call for greater use of ex post approval
measures, in part to ensure meaningful valuation of the public goods exchanged
and in part to counteract the agencies' and trading parties' institutional biases to
encourage nonfungible trades. We further argue that it is inappropriate to
continue to use the conventional environmental permitting process to carry out
nonfungible trades. In exploring this challenge, we analyze options for new
institutional designs of a "permit-plus" system for habitat and similar ETMs.
ETMs can provide, and have provided, an important policy tool to achieve
effective, efficient environmental protection. As a result, support for the use of
ETMs to achieve environmental protection will surely continue to grow.
Increased trading, however, necessarily requires application in an even broader
spectrum of environmental contexts. 12 The best settings for ETMs-where
currencies serve as effective proxies for environmental values, markets are rich
with supply and diversity, and policing is straightforward-have largely been
developed. 13 As trading programs continue to move into settings in which
environmental commodities are increasingly heterogeneous, currency,
exchange, and review adequacy will become increasingly difficult to satisfy.
This article explains why. More important, it explores the basic challenges of
program design in the face of nonfungibilities that ETM proponents have
neither fully addressed nor, in some cases, considered.

12. See generally Elliott & Charnley, supra note 1, at 48 (identifying a trend toward
broader trading among pollutants and types of risk reduction); J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity
Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of FederalLaws Regulating NonfederalLands:
Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U. CoLo. L. REv. 555, 661-69 (1995)
(suggesting a free standing statute for biodiversity conservation); David Sohn & Madeline
Cohen, From Smokestacks to Species: Extending the Tradable Permit Approach From Air
Pollution to Habitat Conservation, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 405, 450-51 (1996) [hereinafter
Sohn and Cohen] ("Ultimately, implementing a well-designed market scheme may provide a
mechanism for ongoing habitat conservation and land-use management that can survive
independent of the ESA's fate."). The Framework Convention on Climate Change and
subsequent Kyoto Protocol's provisions for joint implementation and the Clean
Development Mechanism may create the possibility for a range of innovative trades of
greenhouse gases and sequestration projects. See Wiener, supranote 6, at 710-13.
13. As Bill Pedersen describes, "trading is best suited to broad environmental
problems where the same emissions have about the same effect everywhere, where the
'pollutant' being traded is relatively easy to measure, and where the market is restricted to a
limited number of large sources that can bear the transaction costs." William F. Pedersen,
Jr., The Limits of Market-Based Approaches to Environmental Protection, 24 ENVL. LAW
REP. 10,173, 10,174 [hereinafter Pedersen]; see also Jaime Larmann, ComparingApples to
Oranges? EPA FacesDifficulties in Bringingto Fruitionan Emissions TradingProgramfor
NOx, 6 ENvTL. LAW. 603 (2000).
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I. CURRENCY ADEQUACY: SELECTION OF THE CURRENCY INSTRUMENT

A.

The Mechanics ofMarketablePermits

Before examining currency selection within ETMs, it is worthwhile to set
out their basic operation. Dating from the first trading program in 1974, ETMs
have reduced emissions of a wide range of pollutants,1 4 managed fisheries and
lobster harvests, 15 and channeled habitat development.1 6 Despite the myriad of
14. The EPA has implemented trading markets for acid rain, codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (2000), chlorofluorocarbons, 40 C.F.R. §§ 82.5, 82.12 (2000), auto
fuel efficiency standards, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2002, 2003 (repealed), leaded gasoline, 40 C.F.R. §
80.20(d) (repealed), and other pollutants. Most emissions trading under the Clean Air Act
has been in the form of netting, offsets, and bubbles. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Gordon
L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessonsfor Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361,
368-76 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn & Hester, Marketable Permits] (describing these practices
and their performance); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets
Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989)
[hereinafter Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go?] (describing offsets, bubbles,
and netting in ETMs); James T.B. Tripp and Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional Guidelinesfor
DesigningSuccessful TransferableRights Programs,6 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 385-86 (1989)
(describing some of the problems with EPA's bubble policy). The EPA endorsed the use of
ETMs in its 1986 Emissions Policy Trading Statement. General Principles for Creation,
Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 FED. REG. 43,814 (Dec. 4, 1986)
(emissions trading policy statement). The Clean Air Act and its 1990 amendments provided
further authority for the EPA and states to control air pollution through tradable allowances.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671(q) (2000). California has created trading programs for nitrogen
oxides, sulfur oxides, and VOCs. See Matthew Polesetsky, Will a Market in Air Pollution

Clean the Nation's Dirtiest Air? A Study of the South Coast Air Quality Management
District'sRegional Clean Air Incentives Market, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 359 (1995) (examining
the marketable permit program in the Los Angeles Air Basin). Trading markets have also
been created to address international environmental problems. The Montreal Protocol
permits trading of production rights among member countries and within regional economic
integration organizations. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
Sept. 16, 1987, arts. 2(5), 2(8), 26 I.L.M. 1550, 1553 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989)
[hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
While less common than markets for air pollutants, several states have created markets
to control point and nonpoint source water pollution. See generally, Hahn & Hester,
MarketablePermits, supra note 14, at 391-96 (describing trading of water pollution rights in
Wisconsin).
15. Individual transferable quotas, known as ITQs, have become a common
management tool for fisheries in Canada, New Zealand, Iceland, and other countries. See,
Kirsten M. Batkin, New Zealand's Quota Management System: A Solution to the United
States' FederalFisheriesManagement Crisis?, 36 NAT. REsOURCEs J. 615, 626-31 (1996);
Shi-Ling Hsu & James B. Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996 Sustainable
FisheriesAct, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799 (1997); Alison Rieser, Prescriptionsfor the Commons:
EnvironmentalScholarship and the Fishing Quotas Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 393
(1999); Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisheries:
Contractingforthe Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813 (1997).
16. Tradable Development Right (TDR) programs have enabled local and state
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ETMs and the many differences among them, their basic structure is simple.17
The basis for trading environmental commodities is a regulatory proscription of
behavior followed by regulatory permission of the behavior under controlled
conditions. 18 In establishing a market, the government first creates a new form
of property-legal entitlements to emit pollutants, catch fish, develop habitatand then imposes a set of rules governing their exchange.1 9 In the typical "cap
and trade program" for pollution, policymakers establish a socially desirable
level of aggregate emissions for a given pollutant. Regulators then determine a
formula for initial allocation of emissions among sources and issue permits to
members of the regulated community that entitle each bearer to emit a given
quantity of that pollutant. In sum, the total quantity of emissions allowed by
those permits should equal the aggregate level set by policymakers. Similarly,
in the context of scarce natural resources, permits cap the bearer's right to take
a specified amount of the resource and the total quantity of permits is equal to
the aggregate extraction or harvest level set by policymakers. All trading
programs therefore take place within carefully constructed markets. Absent
legal restrictions on pollutant emissions, fish landings, or wetlands
development, and the creation of alienable entitlements to these activities, few
if any trades would take place.
In practice, permits are exchanged through three types of trades. Air
pollutant trades typically take place when the government allocates or sells
transferable credits to A to pollute (see Figure 1). Once A has a credit, A can
governments to direct development in order to protect landmarks and conserve open space
and other sensitive areas. See, e.g., Robert M.L. Bellandi & Robert D. Hennigan, The Why
and How of TransferableDevelopment Rights, 2 REAL Esr. REv. 60 (1977); Arik Levinson,
Why Oppose TDRs?: TransferableDevelopment Rights Can Increase OverallDevelopment,
27 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. EcoN. 283 (1997); James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek,
Institutional Guidelinesfor Designing Successful TransferableRights Programs, 6 YALE J.
ON REG. 369, 378-82 (1989); Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE
L.J. 338 (1972).
17. See generally Richard E. Ayres, Developing a Market in Emission Credits
Incrementally: An 'Open Market' Paradigmfor Market-BasedPollution Control, 25 ENVTL.
REP. 1522 (1994) (describing the differences between open market, hybrid command-andcontrol, and closed market systems).
18. See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11, at 7 (1993) ("Demand for compensatory
[wetland] mitigation exists only because it is a government-imposed condition on wetland
development."); Royal C. Gardner, Federal Wetland Mitigation Banking Guidance: Missed
Opportunities, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,075, 10,077 (1996) ("[U]nlike typical markets,
regulatory agencies control both the supply of and demand for [wetlands] mitigation.")
[hereinafter Gardner II].
19. David Driesen argues that the usual description of ETMs creating a legal "right" to
pollute or destroy is inaccurate since holders of these rights may still face common law
liability for pollution damages, absent preemption (and the acid rain program specifically
states that no property right is created, 42 U.S.C. § 765lb(f) (2000)). He describes ETMs as
"allowing evasion of imposed limits in exchange for compensating improvements elsewhere.
Overcompliance by some actors is traded for undercompliance by others." Interview with
David Driesen, Assistant Professor, Syracuse University College of Law (Dec. 16, 1999).
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use it or sell it to B. B may then use the credit to pollute. In environmental
terms, the benefit of A's foregone impact is traded for B's impact somewhere
else. 2 0

20. It is assumed that the avoided environmental cost by A not causing an impact is
equal to or greater than the cost of B's impact. The same structure is used for many fishery

ETMs.
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Figure 1
Traditional "Cap-and-Trade" ETM
EPA
750 tons

1250 tons
1000 tons

A

1000 tons 250 tons

B

* EPA assigns 1000 tons pollution credits to A and B
" A uses only 750 tons-has 250 tons to sell
" B needs to emit 1250 tons-buys A's 250 tons on market

Figure 2
Wetlands Mitigation Banking ETM
Corps

Permit

Approval

PROJECT

$

5ac
S

WETLANDS
MITIGATION
0
S
S

BANK
Corps grants Project permit to fill 25 acres of wetlands
Corps and Project negotiate permit condition-restore 50 acres elsewhere
Corps has approved Bank as having restored wetlands
Project and Bank negotiate price of 50 acres of Bank's wetlands
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Figure 3
Habitat Mitigation As Permit Condition
FWS

Permit
100 ac

25 ac

$
PROJECT

MITIGATION
PROPERTY

CONSERVATION

ENTITY

" FWS grants Project permit to destroy 25 acres of species habitat
" FWS and Project negotiate permit condition-restore 100 ac elsewhere
" Project locates and purchases suitable parcel in open market and transfers
to conservation entity

Proponents of trading programs argue that such arrangements increase
efficiencies. In the case of air pollutant trades, for example, by letting the
market rather than regulators determine individual actors' impacts, profitmotivated agents who can control pollution at low cost will reduce more
emissions than needed to comply with permit limits. They can then sell surplus
allowances at a profit to higher-cost agents. Thus, the greatest share of
reductions will come from agents who can do so at the cheapest cost, allowing
each polluter to weigh the marginal cost of abatement against the cost of
buying credits and make an efficient individual decision. If the cap is set
appropriately, marketable permits achieve the same level of protection as
command-and-control alternatives at a lower cost.2 1 Such a process, trading

&

21. ETMs can thus promote increased production efficiency (similar levels of
protection as command-and-control but at less cost) and allocational efficiency (best
distribution of costs). See Vivien Foster & Robert W. Hahn, Designing More Efficient
Markets: Lessons from Los Angeles Smog Control, 38 J.L. & ECON. 19, 21 (1995)
(estimating savings from the ETM in Los Angeles); Don Fullerton, Shaun P. McDermott
Jonathan P. Caulkins, Sulfur Dioxide Compliance of a Regulated Utility, 34 J. ENVTL. ECON.
& MGMT. 32 (1997) (showing that regulatory rules can double the cost of compliance). In
1997, EPA estimated that 5.1 million allowances were traded on private markets. Hirsch,
supra note 3, at 387-88.
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supporters argue, should also be more democratic than traditional commandand-control regulations because it forces regulators and elected officials to
deliberately consider environmental goals and to discuss explicitly the
appropriate level of pollution.22 The net result thereby delegates power from
the government to actors held accountable in the marketplace, allowing the
regulated community to select appropriate control strategies and encouraging
innovative practices and technologies.2 3
The trading scheme challenged in the classic Chevron case presents a case
in point.24 Bubbling allowed the regulated facility to allocate emissions within
its bubble (a form of internal trading) to maximize efficient production while
meeting the emissions cap. 25 The acid rain trading program has also been
regarded as a success story. Trading of allowances has been very active, and as
a result, facilities have overcomplied with the reduction requirements. In 1995,
utilities emitted forty percent less sulfur dioxide than permitted. 26 Economists
estimate the compliance costs to achieve such reductions were up to forty
percent lower than would have been the case under the existing command-andcontrol requirements.2 7
These enthusiastic claims have not gone unchallenged, however. Recent
scholarship has contended that in many cases trading has not delivered the
same or better protection at less cost, and has proven overly complex to
administer and enforce.2 8 Strong normative critiques contend that trading

22. Ackerman & Stewart, Democratic Case, supra note 5, at 172 ("A reform relying
on market incentives is just plain better, in terms of all relevant public values, than the status
quo."). But see Driesen I, supra note 5, at 329; Heinzerling, supra note 5, at 343 ("[I]n
deciding whether to adopt a trading program... 'democracy' cannot be counted on the side
of pollution trading.").
23. Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is This Thoroughbred
Hobbled?, 13 CoLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 217, 219 (1988) ("The bottom line is that the successes
of emissions trading cannot be denied."); Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptionsfor
Environmental Problems:How the PatientFollowedthe Doctor's Orders, 3 J. EcoN. PERSP.
95, 96 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn II] ("One instrument which has been shown to supply the
appropriate incentives ... is marketable permits.").
24. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984).
25. Elliot & Charnley, supra note 1, at 49. Bubbling refers to the practice of treating
multiple sources of air pollution at a single site as if they were covered underneath a large
bubble, i.e., as a single source.
26. Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance:An Analysis of
the Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Program, 26 ENvrL. L. REP. 10,411 (1996) [hereinafter
Burtraw & Swift].
27. Id.; Richard Schmalansee, Paul L. Joskow, A. Denny Ellerman, Juan Pablo

Montero & Elizabeth M. Bailey, An Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions
Trading, 12 J. EcON. PERSP. 53, 64 (1998) (estimating savings between $225 and $375

million per year).
28. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control
Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative
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programs legitimize pollution, weakening the environment's special claim to
public protection. 29 And both environmental justice and economics scholarship
clearly recognize that certain air pollutant trading may lead to hot spots and
distributional inequities. 30
The respective merits of ETMs versus command-and-control regulation,
while an extremely important debate, lies beyond the scope of this article. In
practical terms, there is undeniably strong and growing support for increased
use of ETMs to achieve environmental protection. Assuming that trading will
continue, what are the implications of trading nonfungible commodities?
B.

Measures ofExchange

The basic goal in any trading system is to move toward a pareto-efficient
outcome, allowing sufficient exchanges such that each party reaches a point
where it is worse off by engaging in further trades. The key question, though,
is how can "worse off' be measured? 3 1 Whether we can confidently trade x for
y depends on what we are trying to maximize and on our standard of
measurement. And that turns on the currency of exchange. 32

Regulatory Regimes for EnvironmentalProtection, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 887 (1999) (arguing
the benefits of command-and-control regulations); Driesen I, supra note 5, at 311-22
(assessing the performance of bubbling and the lead and acid rain ETMs); Ann Powers,
Reducing Nitrogen Pollution on Long Island Sound: Is There a Place for Pollutant
Trading?, 23 CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 140-41 (1998) [hereinafter Powers] (listing
problems to date of ETMs-thinness, high transaction costs, uncertainty over security of
property rights).
It is important to note that many of these critiques have come from strong proponents of
trading. Dudek and Hahn are big supporters of trading but they have also been leading
critics of some trading programs in practice. See, e.g., Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 23,
at 241 (noting industry's hesitation to trade); Alex Farrell, Robert Carter & Roger Raufer,
The NOx Budget: Market-Based Controlof Tropospheric Ozone in the Northeastern United
States, 21 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 103, 112 (1999) (showing sources of uncertainty and
potential problems with the NOx ETM); Hahn II, supra note 23, at 98-101 (describing
performance of ETMs).
29. STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES?: ECONoMISTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

(1981) (discussing ethical concerns with trading pollution rights); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
On the Expressive Function ofLaw, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996) (examining the function
of law in "making statements"); Tietenberg I, supra note 4, at 253 ("The environmental
community ... argued that the air belongs to the people and it, as a matter of ethics, should
not become private property."). Commensurability issues are discussed, infra, note 64.
30. See, e.g., Eileen Gauna, Federal EnvironmentalCitizen Provisions: Obstacles and
Incentives on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 Ecology L.Q. 1, 72-74 (1995)

(discussing environmental justice issues); Tom Tietenberg, TradablePermitsfor Pollution
Control When Emission Location Matters: What Have We Learned?, 5 ENVTL. & REsoURCE
ECON. 95 (1995) [hereinafter Tietenberg II].
31. And worse off for whom? If the two trading parties are better off but third party
interests are ignored, the trade may well end up being pareto-inferior.
32. We use the term, "currency," to refer to the denomination of the exchange, the

Dec. 2000]

CURRENCIES AND COMMODIFICATION

623

Unfortunately, environmental law lacks a common unit of exchange. We
tend to think of environmental protection simply in terms of reducing physical
impacts on the environment-less pollution and less development means more
Most observers, though, (and most of our laws) value
protection.
environmental protection through the anthropocentric view-that is, how those
reduced impacts directly relate to human quality of life, whether that be
reduced health risks, clearing the haze in the Grand Canyon, or conserving
biodiversity. 33 From this vantage, the ideal currency would likely be a measure
of social value. In the context of trades among greenhouse gases, the ideal unit
would be marginal cost to society from the emission's contribution to climate
change. However, such measures of utility cannot be calculated with any
certainty so we rely on a proxy-in this case the emission's global warming
potential. 34
Indeed, environmental law relies almost entirely on proxy measures. In the
case of power plant emissions, for example, what we care about is the
environmental and consequential social impact of acid deposition, but we do
not regulate or trade units of acid rain impact. Instead we use the proxy of tons
of sulfur emitted, which is assumed to be a sufficient indicator of potential
impact on social welfare. 35 Regulating at the source of emission is less

measurement metric. Thus the currency of money would be dollars, not the dollar bills
themselves. In the acid rain trading program, the currency would be tons of sulfur, not the
actual allowance stating this.
33. We appreciate that this is explicitly an anthropocentric approach, quite at odds with
deep ecology or land ethic norms, but we believe it describes accurately the perspective of
most citizens. It certainly explains the broad resonance we find when teaching Bill Baxter's
classic utilitarian argument of People or Penguins in our environmental law classes.
WILAMi F. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION (1974); see

also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens: The Uncertain Search for
Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1127, 1127-30 (1999) (describing the continuing
relevance and influence of Baxter's book). Indeed with the exception of the Endangered
Species Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and minor provisions of other statutes, the
fact that our environmental laws take an anthropocentric perspective, focusing on protection
of human health and the human environment, seems an unobjectionable description.
34. Global warming potential is a measure that compares different greenhouse gases'
relative contribution to global warming (i.e., the capacity to trap heat in the atmosphere).
The global warming potential of carbon dioxide is set at 1. Note that this does not directly
correlate with increasing temperatures, rising sea levels, or other physical impacts of climate
change.
35. One can equally describe this as identifying the optimal point of regulation. In the
pollution context, ideally one wants to regulate based on units of risk to individual receptors.
This is technically too difficult and expensive, however. Short of that, we should seek to
regulate the level of exposure to classes of receptors (accepting that individuals have
different sensitivities), then the ambient concentration (realizing that airsheds and wind
patterns are not uniform), and finally at the level of particular emission sources (the site we
actually do regulate). At each step further from the ideal point of regulation, the currency
less accurately reflects what we care about. As Carol Rose has observed,
[E]ntitlements must be created in

resource

features that can be identified, measured and
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environmentally meaningful than at the point of impact, the receptor, but cost
and technological constraints force our hand. 36 Hence, if our proxy for impacts
of acid deposition is sulfur emissions, the currency will necessarily be some
variant of tons of sulfur. It is vital, then, that we get the proxy right, for it
determines the currency for both the medium of trading and the goal of
environmental protection.
To express this in a simple example, let's consider the ideal case of
fungibility where variance across space, type, and time are eliminated. Here,
trades of homogeneous commodities simultaneously take place in a small,
discrete location-small blue marbles traded at the same time across a kitchen
table. If we are trading identical blue marbles, the number of marbles may
serve as a perfectly adequate metric. If we are trading blue and yellow marbles,
the number and color of marbles are adequate currencies. If, however, some
marbles are highly radioactive and others are not, the simple currency metrics
of color and quantity fail to capture an important variable.37 If the currency
cannot incorporate the environmental values we care about, these become
external to the exchange and, as a result, trades may actually worsen the
environment or natural services delivered. Inadequate currencies allow
externalities to bleed out of the trading market. We may end up with a nice pile
of marbles that glow in the dark. 38 In the extreme case, the currency can
monitored, but careful management of those features does not necessarily overlap with the

best protection for the resource in question.

For example, tradable sulphur dioxide

allowances are calculated in tons of emissions, because emissions by weight are relatively
easy to measure and monitor. But, because of wind and weather conditions, emissions in

some places cause more damage to forests and lakes than do emissions in other places.
Trading in the wrong direction, as it were, from emitters in downwind or forested areas to
upwind emitters, thus has the potential to create greater damage rather than would be the case
if rights could not be traded and moved about.

Rose, supra note 10, at 60-61.
Note that even though the ultimate point of regulation is quite far downstream from our
ultimate concern (in this case the impacts of acid deposition), it still may be optimal once
technological limitations and costs are taken into account if a close correlation exists
between a source's emissions and the risk to individuals, trees, or aquatic life. Hence
complex modeling is used to justify state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act.
36. Proxy choice is not solely a challenge for ETMs. We do the same for traditional
command-and-control regulation. The emissions from coal-fired utilities, for example, are
limited in terms of tons of sulfur, not by the net impact from their release.
37. To take another example, knowing that one car costs $20,000 and another costs
$80,000 tells me a great deal about the cars and that consumers value one more than the
other; but if I need to buy a car that can haul a trailer the currency of dollars is inadequate. It
fails to capture an important value and express it. Or, to introduce a market dynamic,
assume that apple trees in an orchard produce two types of apples, pretty and ugly, but that
both taste the same. Farmers currently sell apples by the bushel. A supermarket will pay a
higher price per bushel than a canning factory but only wants to buy pretty apples. In this
case, there is a market incentive to develop a grading system (a more sophisticated currency)
so the values important to the supermarket are meaningfully captured and communicated.
38. In the above example, the currency must capture color, number, and, hopefully,
radioactivity. Note, however, that a similar result may occur even if the currency does
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actually encourage environmentally harmful behavior. 39
Nonfungibilities can arise across three dimensions-space, type, and
time-and depending on the market an effective currency may need to capture
all three. 40 Chart 1 gives practical examples across different ETMs. It is
important to note that all three types of nonfungibilities may be present in the
same ETM.

capture radioactivity. This will happen if the parties are indifferent to this value. In such a
case the disjunction between between private and public interests in trading can result in a
loss of social welfare.
Choosing the wrong currency increases the chances that environmental protection will
suffer, but one might argue that serendipity can work both ways on a case-by-case basis and
may, on occasion, lead to environmental improvements. Part IV explains why, in the case of
habitat ETMs, trades will generally not result in environmental benefits.
39. [W]ith respect to fishing allowances, a [tradable environmental allowance] may employ
a relatively simple measure, as would be the case where an individual fishing quota is
measured in pounds or tons of a particular target fish. But fishermen know that bigger fish
bring more at the market than smaller ones, and this can induce them to "high-grade,"
keeping the bigger fish and simply discarding the smaller (and now dead) specimens, with
potentially disastrous effects on the fish population as a whole.... [T]he quest for simplicity
in [tradable environmental allowances] has feedback effects on what actually gets preserved.

Rose, supra note 10, at 60.
40. Writing about trading bubbles, Elliott and Charnley identify four dimensions:
"geographic, inter-temporal, inter-pollutant, and inter-risk." Elliott & Chamley, supra note
1, at 49.
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Chart 1
Examples of nonfungibilities in ETMs

Environmental

Nonfungibility of

Nonfungibility of

Trading Market

Space

Type

Nonfungibilit% of
Time

Rule 1610:
Program allows
trading of reduced
vehicle volatile
organic emissions
for increased
refinery volatile
organic emissions
emissions

Vehicle emissions
are geographically
diffused versus
"hot spot" of
concentrated
refinery emissions

Vehicle emissions
may be less
carcinogenic than
refinery emissions

Vehicle emissions
fluctuate in regular
patterns over 24hour periods
whereas refinery
emissions
experience irregular
peaks

Wetlands
Mitigation
Banking: Corps
of Engineers
permit allows
destruction of
wetlands in return
for contributing to
wetlands
restoration project
located elsewhere

The lost ecosystem
services may have
been delivered to
many people
whereas the
services of the
restored wetlands
may be delivered
to few

The destroyed
wetlands may have
had a higher capacity
of service provision
compared to the
restored wetlands

The permit may
allow destruction of
the wetlands before
the quality of the
restoration of other
wetlands is known

Habitat
Conservation
Plans: Fish and
Wildlife Service
permit allows
destruction of
endangered species
habitat in return
for securing
preservation of
another parcel of
the habitat located
elsewhere

The lost habitat
may have been
part of a
contiguous habitat
system for the
species, whereas
the preserved
habitat may be
isolated and thus
of less overall
value

The lost and
preserved habitats
may have provided
functional values to
different populations
of the species, and
we do not know
which population is
more important to the
overall viability of
the species

The lost habitat may
have been of ideal
vegetative maturity
for the species,
while the preserved
habitat may require
time to achieve that
state
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Chart 1
Examples of nonfungibilities m ETMs

(Cont'd)
Environmental
Trading Market

Nonfungibility of
Space

Nonfungibility of

Nonfungibility of

Type

Time

Alaska Halibut
Individual
Transferable
Quotas:

One fisher may
catch in halibut
breeding area,
while other may

Tons of halibut does
not account for
bycatch, highgrading
or size of fish

One fisher may
catch halibut during
breeding season,
while other catches

Permits to catch
Alaska Halibut are
traded among

catch fish in nonbreeding zones

(juvenile instead of
mature)

out of breeding
season

fishers to avoid
derby pressures in
fishery

1.

Nonfungibilitiesofspace.

Because most ETMs trade commodities from different locations, spatial

nonfungibilities can easily arse. ETMs for carbon dioxide and CFCs do not
raise spatial concerns because the compounds mix m the upper atmosphere
independent of the site of emission. But once the trading area exceeds the area
of harm or benefit, affected populations are no longer indifferent to the
trades. 4 1 Rather than simply allocating among parties for greatest efficiency,
there are now clear winners and losers. Concentrations of pollutants such as
volatile orgamc compounds (VOCs) and air toxics, for example, can elevate
health risks through the creation of local hot spots. Indeed, Dales' seminal

41. "Pollutants also vary in their dispersion factors with some pollutants detoxifying
quickly or settling rapidly into a less harmful medium. The location of a source of emissions
is important because dispersion from different points will result in varying exposures to
sensitive populations." Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 301.
"[A]s quality becomes scarcer in an area, people care very intensely about additional
damage. Additionally, concentrating damages raises serious equity considerations, since one
group (possibly lower-income people or others with relatively little political power) will
suffer the damages while others are free of them." Glona E. Helfand & Jonathan Rubm,

Spreading Versus Concentrating Damages: Environmental Policy in the Presence of
Nonconvexities, 27 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGmT. 84,90-91 (1994).
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discussion of ETMs specifically noted the problem posed by hot spots.4 2 This
problem has been well recognized both in practice and in the literature and, not
surprisingly, the vast majority of ETM scholarship addressing nonfungibilities
has focused on spatial nonfungibilities.4 3
The most illustrative recent example of spatial nonfungibility concerns Los
Angeles' attempt to trade VOC emissions between cars and oil refineries.4 4 In
its Rule 1610 program, California's South Coast Air Quality Management
District program allows VOC emitters to purchase old polluting cars and scrap
them in exchange for VOC reduction credits.4 5 The large polluters (primarily
oil refineries) can avoid lowering their actual emissions or installing new
equipment to satisfy permit standards if they can purchase and retire enough
cars, thereby gaining sufficient emission credits. The net result, proponents
claim, is overall reduction of VOC emissions in the Los Angeles airshed at
least cost, since taking old polluting cars off the road may prove cheaper than
pollution control retrofits. Despite retiring over 17,000 cars, this program has
been sharply criticized by environmental justice groups who claim that the bulk
of trades were carried out by four refineries operating in close proximity to two
latino communities.4 6 Diffuse vehicular emissions formerly spread across
12,000 square miles, they charge, effectively have been exchanged for refinery
emissions concentrated across only twenty square miles.4 7 This presents a
42. J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRicEs 79 (1968) ("[I]t is immediately
pointed out that a ton of any particular kind of waste will do much more damage in some
places than in others ... ").
43. "Given local and long distance dispersion and the distribution of human and
nonhuman populations, it is clear that the damage from emissions varies dramatically across
space.
Treating all areas alike completely ignores these spatial considerations."
Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 309; see also, Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 5, at 1350
(arguing that established regional boundaries do not take into account spatial
considerations); Tietenberg I, supra note 4, at 249-50 (addressing spatial issues with
tradeable permits); Note, Technology-Based Emission and Effluent Standards and the
Achievement of Ambient Environmental Objectives, 91 YALE L.J. 792, 810-14 (1982)
(Professor Richard Revesz's student note proposing a zoned permit solution to hot spots).
44. VOCs are regulated because of their role in creating tropospheric ozone, better
known as smog.
45. The operation of Rule 1610 is set out in detail by Richard Toshiyuki Drury,
Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn & Sihpra Bansal, Pollution Trading and Environmental
Injustice: Los Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y
F. 231, 252 (1999) [hereinafter Drury]; see also Lily N. Chinn, Can the Market be Fair and
Efficient?: An Environmental Justice Critique of Emissions Trading, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 80
(1999).
46. Johnson, supra note 10, at 131.
47. Drury, supra note 45, at 252-54. In fighting this program, Citizens for a Better
Environment and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund challenged the auto-scrapping program
claiming it violated civil rights laws and had not been approved under California's State
Implementation Plan. In response, the South Coast Air Quality Management District has put
the program on hold and adopted a ten-point plan aimed at preventing toxic hot spots in
minority communities. Johnson, supra note 10, at 166 n.108; (complaint on file with
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classic, though far from unique, hot-spot problem.
2.

Nonfungibilities of type.

The most basic, and obvious, currency unit is type. Apples are traded for
apples, not oranges. Under the acid rain program, a tradable allowance provides
regulatory "permission" to emit a ton of sulfur, not nitrogen, not carbon, not
hydrocarbons. Nonfungibility of type may seem obvious for pollutants, but as
one moves into habitat trading, clear delineations of type begin to blur as the
units become increasingly nonfungible. Habitats are inevitably heterogeneous,
both in biophysical terms (their soil, flora and fauna, hydrology, climate) and as
a result of the services they provide. Yet a simple currency of acres will never
capture these differences.4 8
Even trades among the same pollutants, upon closer inspection,
demonstrate that simple metrics of type can mask significant differences.
Article 5(3) of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, relies on the currency of global
warming potential to convert six greenhouse gases into a carbon equivalent
index.4 9 However, each of the gases has different monitoring and, as a result,
different enforcement uncertainties associated with it. For example, we know
much more about the sources and emissions of hydrofluorocarbons than we do
about methane. As a result, by bundling these different gases together in the
same currency, the Convention is camouflaging oranges to appear as apples. 50
VOCs are treated the same way. The category of VOCs comprises more than
600 different compounds. Many have differing reactivities and some, such as
benzene, are serious carcinogens. ETMs, however, treat VOCs identically and
fail to differentiate on the basis of toxicity or reactivity.5 1 Indeed the Rule
1610 ETM, described above, has come under its harshest criticism for this very

authors).
48. See Part IIl. B. In a similar example from British Columbia described by Professor
Jody Freeman, the Ministry of Forests calculated how much land to set aside for ecosystem
preservation and reforestation purposes when allocating timber in the annual allowable cut.
The Ministry's goal was to preserve two percent of the total stock-regardless of where it
comes from, regardless of its suitability as habitat, regardless of how productive it would be
for reforestation efforts. In practice, then, the Ministry would set aside random parcels that
weren't even connected. One might ask how the bear population is supposed to cross from
one section of their habitat to another ten miles away, but the Ministry's simple currency of
acres could not account for these important considerations. Interview with Jody Freeman,
Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law (Feb. 15, 2000).
49. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22. The gases are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.
50. Interview with Tom Tietenberg, Professor, Colby College (Apr. 20, 1999).
51. VOCs are treated as a single, uniform class of compounds by command-andcontrol regulations under the Clean Air Act as well. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2000)
(requiringreformulated gasoline that reduces ozone-forming VOCs).
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reason. Not only does the program concentrate VOCs, critics charge, but it
effectively trades less carcinogenic VOCs (car emissions) for more
carcinogenic ones (refinery emissions). 52
3.

Nonfungibilitiesof time.

The last dimension of fungibility is time. Trades may involve disparate
benefits over time periods, also resulting in winners and losers. This is clearest
in the case of habitat trades, discussed in Part III, where timing problems can
lead to significant gaps in environmental values. For example, if we allow a
party to destroy mature forested wetlands in exchange for engaging in a
seedling planting restoration project in another location, even if the restoration
project is vastly larger in size we will experience a temporary net loss of habitat
values.
Time nonfungibilities occur not only as uncertain future events but also
seasonally. Smog formation, for example, requires sunlight, still air, nitrogen
oxides (NOx) and VOCs. Depending on local or seasonal conditions, either of
the chemical compounds can prove the limiting factor for the reaction. Thus, at
times when NOx is scarce, additional VOC emissions contribute nothing to
tropospheric ozone formation; yet when NOx is abundant, marginal VOC
emissions cause smog formation. Depending on when they are emitted, VOCs
can have very different impacts on air quality. 53
C.

Currency DesignStrategies

The test of a currency's effectiveness lies in how well it captures these
different dimensions. In assessing the practice of VOC trading under Rule
1610, for example, the currency of tons fares poorly. In regard to space, it tells
us nothing about where, within the airshed, the VOCs were emitted and the
likelihood of hot spots.5 4 While a measure of tons certainly tells us the general
type and number of molecules exchanged, it does not distinguish the more
hazardous from less hazardous VOCs.5 5 Nor, ultimately, does it indicate the
52. See Drury, supra note 48, at 255-57 (claiming that cancer risks from refinery
emissions (including benzene) are greater than the risks from vehicular emissions and that
refinery emissions have more toxic co-pollutants than exhaust emissions from a car's tail
pipe).
53. Described more technically,
a marketable emissions allowance system that regulates the cumulative emissions of sources

over a fixed period may have a difficult time controlling a secondary pollutant like ozone
because both precursor emission rates and the rate at which precursors are transformed into
ozone change from hour to hour and day to day.

Farrell, supra note 28, at 109.
54. To do so would require a currency that had a spatial component identifying the
location of the emission.
55. To do so would require separate currencies identifying discrete classes of VOCs
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likelihood that VOC emissions over a given time could contribute to smog
formation. 56 Thus, VOC trading can involve significant nonfungibilities,
leading to increased or concentrated impacts in the name of environmental
protection. One VOC molecule may well not be the same as another. And, as
Chart 1 demonstrated, upon further investigation this holds true for most
trading programs.
A key issue to recognize at this point is the importance of explicitly
constructing the ETM around defined environmental protection goals. To
rephrase the question posed in the Introduction: What should we actually be
trading? Bruce Ackerman and Dick Stewart have argued that trading is a more
democratic process than command-and-control approaches because it requires
determining the total level of allowable emissions or, more broadly, of
environmental impact. 57 Our analysis builds on this argument by contending
that ETM design requires focusing on not only the quantitative level of
environmental impact but also the qualitative goal of the ETM. If our principal
objective in wetlands protection is conservation of open space, then acres may
be an adequate currency for a wetlands ETM. If the goal is conservation and
delivery of services, then acres fare poorly. Put another way, focusing on
currencies forces us to consider what we should be protecting, not simply how
much. Absent this clear articulation of qualitative goals, the currency cannot be
adequately determined.
Assuming the goals have been articulated, though, how can currency
design capture the important variance across nonfungible commodities?
Consider three basic strategies: simple currency, universal currency, and
comprehensive currency.
1.

Simple currency.

The first strategy keeps the simple currencieswe currently employ-acres
for wetlands, tons for VOCs-and lives with their shortcomings, muddling on
as best we can. After all, nonfungibilities exist in every ETM. The main issue
is whether they matter. While upon close inspection one might find we really
are trading Granny Smiths for Macintoshes, the differences may not be
meaningful because it still amounts to apples for apples. And, in some key
respects, simplicity does have its virtues. While obvious, it needs to be
recognized that ETMs with simple currencies function.5 8 Simple currencies
ensure that all the parties to the transaction, as well as those outside, understand

grouped by carcinogenicity.
56. To do so would require a currency that identified the time (or season) of emission.
57. Ackerman & Stewart, DemocraticCase, supra note 5.
58. "Markets work best under simple trading rules. That gives those who design
markets an incentive to oversimplify environmental problems to make their market
mechanisms more workable." Pedersen, supra note 13, at 10,175.
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the commodities exchanged and can clearly communicate with one another.
Developers, local politicians, and environmental groups all understand trades
for acres better than trades for services. Moreover, successors in interest know
the rights they have acquired. 59
2.

Universalcurrency.

Second, one could rely on a universal currency, such as money or risk.
Indeed the problems posed by currency adequacy-the challenge of accounting
for trades of nonfungible commodities-seem remarkably similar to those
faced by practitioners of cost-benefit analysis and comparative risk assessment.
After all, the idea of exchange is basic to any policy decision since it will
necessarily involve tradeoffs, often of nonfungible units. Banning the use of
CFCs, for example, decreases the risk of skin cancer from ozone depletion but
may increase threats from climate change. 60 Improving vehicle fuel efficiency
may lessen the risk of climate change but increase traffic fatalities. 6 1 These are
often characterized as risk-risk dilemmas, but can just as easily be characterized
as trading one type of risk for another.
When the same impact is shared by alternate activities, comparisons are
relatively straightforward. Seatbelt laws may save some lives but endanger
others by increasing reckless driving; yet in both cases the common measure to
assess the outcomes is the same-traffic injuries. But for heterogeneous harms
(such as skin cancers versus climate change), the comparisons must be indirect.
Similarly, monetizing costs and benefits is relatively straightforward when the
significant variables are all exchanged in markets.6 2 Once one takes into
consideration nonmarketed goods, such as human lives and scenic vistas,
valuation turns to shadow pricing techniques to provide a common monetary
unit for comparison. 63

59. See Rose, supra note 10, at 59.
60. The common replacement for CFCs, compounds known as HFCs and HCFCs,
while not strong ozone depleters, do unfortunately act as strong greenhouse gases. To a
certain extent, the choice between CFCs and their replacements is a choice between
contributing to ozone depletion or to climate change. See DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN
& DURwOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 551 (1998).
61. Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887, 949 n.237
(1994) ("Efforts to conserve gasoline with greater automobile fuel efficiency may cause as
many as 20,000 additional deaths from smaller cars.").
62. Once you have a common currency that captures the values of different
commodities through a common unit (e.g., gin and pork bellies expressed in dollars), it
allows trading of different things and society can move from a barter economy to a market
economy. The prerequisite, though, is a market mechanism through which meaningful
valuation will occur.
63. Shadow pricing techniques, such as contingent valuation or hedonic pricing,
attempt to create a market where none exists through polling people's willingness to pay or
observing the premium people pay to benefit from certain environmental amenities. See
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Both methodologies seek to reduce disparate, seemingly nonfungible
features to a common currency, whether it be dollars or deaths per 100,000
people. Such common units could, in theory, embrace a wide range of
and justify trades in seemingly different, perhaps
externalities
incommensurable, commodities.6 4 While admitting that the calculations are
inexact, risk assessment and cost-benefit analysts seek to reduce the uncertainty
by improving methodology and process. For example, Don Elliott and Gail
Charnley, two of the major proponents of ETMs, have called for greater use of
trading among different pollutants in cases where the benefits of reduced risk
are clear. 65 As John Graham and Jonathan Wiener have suggested,
But it is chiefly our lack of methods of comparison-of ways of seeing

James Salzman, Valuing Ecosystem Services, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 887, 893 (1997) [hereinafter

Salzman].
64. An important question in the context of cost-benefit analysis, and with implications
for ETMs, centers on the issue of incommensurability-the legitimacy of trading
nonfungible commodities at all. The literature on incommensurability does not provide a
commonly agreed upon definition of the term. See Richard Craswell, Incommensurability,
Welfare Economics, and the Law, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1419, 1421 (1998). In the context of
trading, though, its application is straightforward. Apples cannot legitimately be traded for
oranges, one might argue, because there is no meaningful basis to compare the goods.
Some go farther and argue that it is immoral to reduce certain things to monetary
currency (e.g., value of a human life) and, therefore, trading is inappropriate. Others contend
that reducing certain features to commodities creates spill-over effects. We will be
conditioned to think about nature differently, for example. As Cass Sunstein has described,
"emissions trading has damaging effects on social norms by making environmental
amenities seem like any other commodity: a good that has its price, to be set through market
mechanisms." Sunstein, supra note 29, at 2046; see also Michael J. Sandel, It's Immoral to
Buy the Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIwEs, Dec. 15, 1997, at A23 (discussing the argument put
forth by some developing countries that an international emissions trading program would
allow developed nations to buy their way out of reductions). But see Martha Nussbaum, The
Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, J. LEGAL STUD.
(forthcoming) (arguing that assigning monetary values to goods does not necessarily mean
that our values, as well, have been changed).
For our purposes, the first criticism is most relevant. While tradeoffs clearly must be
made for society to function, in deciding which tradeoffs to accept there may be no objective
way to come up with a single scale to rank them, no defensible way to combine or aggregate
assessment across different dimensions of value. One could choose between policies by
counting the number of letters in each proposal, of course, but the result is meaningless.
This is where concerns over nonfungibility and commensurability mesh, and it is a key issue
in Part IV's discussion of institutional review of trades.
65. In response to the criticism that one cannot measure risks accurately enough to
trade, Elliott and Charnley argue that although one cannot measure exactly, one can still
assess the relative magnitude of the options. Thus "easy trades" between seemingly
nonfungible options are entirely appropriate if the magnitude of differences between the two
risks is large enough with little uncertainty. As they note, "It is undeniably correct that we
cannot make risk comparisons when we have many alternatives to compare; the uncertainties
and debatable value judgments are simply too large in those cases. But we can nevertheless
make valid comparisons among different environmental risk reductions in many cases."
Elliott & Charnley, supra note 1, at 51.
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commonality among these risks-that makes these risks seem dissimilar or
noncomparable, not an inherent incommensurability. As we improve methods
of risk analysis, the idea of calculating the "net risk" of a risk portfolio, or the
66
change in a net risk due to a risk tradeoff, may become more meaningful.

Thus one might argue that in analyzing the trading of nonfungible
commodities one need look no farther than the cost-benefit and risk debates.
While these insights do inform our analysis, it is important to note that in
practice neither money nor measures of risk have often been used as trading
The first concerns fit.
Many
currencies for three basic reasons. 67
environmental trades, particularly those involving habitat management, are not
amenable to measures of risk. As one moves from regulation of pollutants to
habitat, the risk paradigm becomes awkward because the loss of habitat may
have little bearing on human health.6 8 The second reason concerns efficiency.
It is one thing to undertake detailed cost-benefit and risk analyses over several
months (or years) to evaluate regulatory initiatives, poring over the data to craft
policy instruments. It is quite another to determine prices for pork bellies on
the Chicago Board of Trade or barter goods on the town square. Put simply,
currencies in regulatory and trading settings must satisfy very different
institutional requirements. The conversion of environmental commodities to
dollars or units of risk will often simply take too long or be too expensive to be

66. John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RisK
VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENvIRONMENT 33 (John D.

Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995). There is a large and growing literature on the
merits and practice of such valuation, and whether such dollar figures or risk statistics are
usefully accurate. See generally, Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking CostBenefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999) (defending the use of cost-benefit analysis by
government agencies in project evaluation).
67. Some habitat ETMs do allow monetary payments in exchange for permits (often
on a per acre basis), known as "in-lieu fees," either to a habitat bank or the government. The
assumption is that the funds will be spent by the relevant agency or group for equivalent and
appropriate habitat or for other purposes that presumably offset the permitted impacts.
Royal Gardner, Moneyfor Nothing, 19 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 1 (2000). Unstructured in-lieu fees
in general, and all in-lieu fees in wetlands mitigation banking, are disfavored. See, e.g.,
Branhaven Plaza, L.L.C. v. Inland Wetlands Comm'n, 740 A.2d 847 (Conn. 1999) (holding
that Commission could not accept monetary and in-kind contributions from permittee in
mitigation for wetlands damage because the use of the funds was unspecified); see also
Gardner I, supra note 11, at 583; David T. Urban & John H. Ryan, A Lieu-Lieu Policy with
Serious Shortcomings, NAT. WETLANDS NEwSL. (Envtl. L. Inst., Washington, DC), JulyAug. 1999, at 5, 9-10.
68. Establishing monetary values for many ecosystem services is infeasible, as well.
"Wetland functions provide a wide range of services and products with economic benefits
that accrue primarily off-site. Most of these are not reflected in markets, or at least not in
markets directly linked with wetlands, and cannot be captured as income by the owners of
wetlands." Dennis King, The Dollar Value of Wetlands: Trap Set, Bait Taken, Don't
Swallow, NATL. WETLANDS NEWSLETTER (Envtl. L. Inst., Washington, D.C.), July-Aug.
1998, at 9.
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useful in an active trading setting.69 Finally, proper risk assessments and costbenefit analyses provide a range of estimates reflecting data uncertainty and
assumptions.7 0 For a trading program to operate, it goes without saying that
the price and quantity must be specific, not estimates within one standard
deviation.
3.

Comprehensive currency.

A third currency design strategy is in some respects the most obviousdevelop a comprehensive currency to ensure the trades are equitable. To return
to the blue marbles example, the currency should capture not only the number
of marbles and their color but their radioactivity as well. In a more familiar
setting to those contemplating marriage, diamonds are not assessed simply by
the number of carats. Diamonds are also differentiated by gradations in quality.
This more precise approach to pricing increases the transaction costs
(particularly the information costs) associated with buying and selling
diamonds, but those additional transaction costs obviously are worth it to the
buyers and sellers. Similarly, in the wetlands context one could imagine a
currency that captured acreage, provision of key services (biophysical capacity
for nutrient filtration, floodwater retention, nursery habitat), and delivery of
services (size of local population affected). 7 1

69. "For a variety of reasons, there is a growing perception within the field of
economics and elsewhere that estimating the overall value of specific habitats in dollar terms
is impractical.... The authors of several recent reviews of habitat valuation have reached
this conclusion." JAMEs BOYD, INDICATORS of ECOSYSTEM VALUE (1999) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author).
Determining values for ecosystem services will be especially difficult because a number
of shadow pricing methodologies assume that the polled people have a sufficient knowledge
of functions provided by nature to give meaningful responses. See Salzman, supra note 63,
at 895. As the costs of these methodologies drop, however, some of this criticism will be

mooted.
70. Interview with Kip Viscusi, Professor, Harvard Law School (Feb. 8, 2000); see

also Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for
Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J. 729, 731-32 (1991) (describing the wide
uncertainty range in risk assessments).
71. Wetlands ecologist Dennis King has developed an analytical method that accounts
for these dimensions. The model takes into account the biophysical capacity of the site to
produce services, the opportunity that services will be actually delivered to a population, the
scarcity and demand that would make these services valuable to the population, and equity
concerns over which populations are gaining and which are losing in a wetlands trade. The
method does not attempt to convert these measures into a common unit but, rather, provides
a series of scales through which to evaluate particular aspects of the trade. Needless to say,
this is a complex undertaking. An EPA study, for which one of the authors is the principal
investigator, is applying this method to evaluate a current wetlands trade to see if it can be
applied in practice. See Lisa Wainger, Dennis King, James Boyd & James Salzman,
Wetland Value Indicators For Scoring Mitigation Trades, STAN. ENvTL L. J. (forthcoming).
One could equally imagine the use of a "currency vectors" approach, where the
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While theoretically an attractive solution, merely recommending that we
tailor the currencies more precisely conflicts with the goal of efficiency.
Accounting meaningfully for nonfungibilities across type, space, and time
imposes a heavy information burden on those designing and supervising the
trading regime. 72 As the cost goes up, parties (both to the transaction and third
parties) become less likely to participate and, at a certain point, may reach a
state where no trading takes place.7 3 Recall that the prime attraction of trading
programs is their efficiency. As transaction costs increase, potential efficiency
improvements are lost. Thus the policy instrument's viability rests on a
balance. 74
currency captured both basic measures (such as acreage) and the direction of the trade
(improved flood controls, decreased waterfowl habitat, decreased nutrient filtration, reduced
service delivery to populations, etc.). Though less precise than the COPE model, such a
currency would provide meaningful information across the range of nonfungibilities. Of
course, in some cases even a comprehensive currency will be inadequate to achieve certain
policy goals. As Alison Rieser has noted in discussing ITQs,
ITQs alone do not create an institutional framework within which fishermen must work with
other groups and individuals who depend upon and are concerned with a healthy, functioning
marine ecosystem. In this way ITQs may run counter to the trend in environmental policy
generally and, in particular, the new mandates of the Sustainable Fisheries Act that require
fisheries management to take account of the inter-relatedness of species and their habitats, as

well as the ecological ramifications of heavy fishing pressure on increasingly lower trophic
levels. These changes in the law, which reflect the growing global concern for preserving

biological and ecological diversity, may mean the ITQ with its emphasis on achieving
efficiency is already an obsolete policy instrument.
Alison Rieser, Prescriptionsfor the Commons: EnvironmentalScholarship and the Fishing
QuotasDebate, 23 HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 393, 417 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
72. Not only does an efficiency target make it necessary to track the physical relationships
underlying the emission, transport, and chemical reactions of the polluting substances, it also
requires calculating the degree of exposure to those substances and relating that exposure to
physical and, ultimately, monetized damage (both human and nonhuman). Each of these
steps is subject to data limitations and uncertainty. ... In principle, tradeable rights could be
more closely calibrated to location, but in practice, such closer refinements would be likely to
make rights considerably more complex and hence less easy to define, trade and monitor.

Tietenberg II, supra note 30, at 96.
73. The experience of the Grand Parkway Association, the group responsible for
development of Houston's third outer loop highway, provides an analogous and illustrative
example. In order to evaluate development alternatives, the Association created a matrix
with 49 different criteria (such as presence of endangered species, type of wetland habitat
impacted, effect on dark skies, cemeteries, etc.). Diane Schenke, the Executive Director of
the project, described the net result as paralysis by analysis. They were faced with too many
variables to reach a consensus. Interview with Diane Schenke, Executive Director, Grand
Parkway Assoc. (Apr. 28, 2000).
74. Transaction costs can, of course, arise from a number of sources, such as
information collection, negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement. This problem has been
studied in depth by both economists and law professors. As Bob Hahn has succinctly
observed, "There is an unavoidable trade-off that must be entertained-the relative efficacy
of a market and the degree to which environmental quality objectives will be met." Hahn I,
supra note 10, at 10; see also John P. Dwyer, The Use ofMarket Incentives in Controlling
Air Pollution: California'sMarketable Permits Program, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 103 (1993)
[hereinafter Dwyer] (demonstrating the importance of transaction costs to active trading);
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In the context of wetlands mitigation banking, regulators have sought to
develop and employ more comprehensive currencies. But the net result,
described in Part III, has been Gresham's Law in practice-just as bad money
drives out good money, simple currencies drive out complex ones. Thus, of the
three currency designs to satisfy exchange adequacy-simple currency,
universal currencies of dollars and risk, or comprehensive currency-the first
has been overwhelmingly adopted by trading programs. Relying on a simple
currency, though, may create important externalities to the trade. In response,
and in an effort to minimize these externalities, ETMs often restrict exchanges
of environmental commodities, which we now turn to in Part II.
II. EXCHANGE ADEQUACY: CONSTRUCTING THE EXCHANGE MARKET

When the condition of fungibility is imperfectly satisfied and the currency
does not adequately capture important values, how can the market be structured
to minimize externalities and ensure that trades promote environmental
protection? Currency imperfections do not, in and of themselves, present an
insurmountable barrier to efficient use of trading mechanisms in effectuating
environmental policy. As in any market context, if the externalities caused by
poor currency design can be identified, then the rules of the market itself can be
manipulated to close the holes. Indeed, since environmental trading markets
are creatures of regulatory construction in the first instance, further refinements
of the market can be carried out directly through regulatory fiat.
In practice, the problems posed by currency shortcomings have been
addressed through restrictions of market exchange-limiting who can trade,
where they can trade, when they can trade, and what the exchange rate of the
currency should be.75 In fact, we argue that ETMs demonstrate an inverse
correlation between currency adequacy and the intensity of market constraint.
As Figure 4 demonstrates graphically, comprehensive currencies reduce the
need for exchange controls; conversely, crude currencies will often result in
tightly constrained trading schemes because the market maker desires to
minimize environmental externalities. The danger of engaging in aggressive
market construction to restrict the currency's application, though, lurks in the
very real potential for market-design errors to compound or replace the
currency shortcomings with more deeply rooted problems. Indeed, these
second-level market imperfections-arbitrage and thin markets-may be more
difficult to detect and correct without completely undermining the advantages
Juan-Pablo Montero, Marketable Pollution Permits With Uncertainty and Transaction Costs,
20 REsoURCE & ENERGY EcON. 27, 29 (1997) (modeling the effects of transaction costs and
uncertainty on ETM efficiency); Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradeable
Permits, 29 J. ENvT[. EcoN. & MGMT. 133 (1995) (describing the importance of transaction
costs in ETM design).
75. See, e.g., Hahn I, supra note 10, at 8-9 (listing the range of rules limiting
exchanges within state emissions trading programs).
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of trading that motivate the experiment in the first place.

Figure 4
Currency adequacy versus Exchange Restrictions

Currency
Adequacy

N,

Exchange
Restrictions

A.

Market Refinements Across Space, Type, and Time

Nonfungibilities of space are neutralized by restricting the area of
exchange. While there are sound environmental reasons to encourage trading
within a large area, 76 when the location of sources counts and space
heterogeneity is high, emissions of the same type can cause different impacts.
For example, a recent market was established among water treatment plants in
the Long Island Sound to reduce nitrogen discharge loads causing hypoxia
(oxygen depletion) conditions.7 7 The program quickly ran into the problem
that ecological effects of nitrogen discharges are not uniform throughout the
Sound. Because of complex flow and circulation patterns, the areas of greatest
hypoxia occur in the western end of the Sound, near New York City. Nitrogen
discharged anywhere in the Sound contributes to hypoxia in the western end,
albeit in varying degrees depending on location, as well as to local hypoxia.
Hence, the basic unit of currency for the trading-nitrogen discharges-failed
to capture the spatial concentration of hypoxia impacts. It failed the standard of
currency adequacy. To compensate for the inadequate currency, those studying
the viability of the trading program proposed a market construction

76. [I]nterest in trading remains strong at the federal level, and in some localities. This
interest is stimulated in part by the growing recognition that some water quality problems can

be addressed only on a large geographic scale. A federal policy shift toward increasing
emphasis on watershed management coincides with, and perhaps encourages, consideration
of trading schemes.

Powers, supra note 28, at 142.
77. See id. at 197-206.
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alternative-divide the Sound into different discharge zones corresponding to
different effects on western end hypoxia levels, assign each zone a "value"
based on proportionate impact using the zone with the highest impact as value
"1.0," and use the relative values to establish nitrogen discharge trading ratios
between zones.7 8
Beyond using coefficients to weigh currencies, it is useful to consider not
only what the currency is but, equally, how and when it may be spent. Thus
some currencies effectively become legal tender based on where they are traded
in order to minimize distributional inequities.7 9 Unrestricted trading of air
pollutants across airsheds therefore is allowed for CFCs (which mix in the
upper atmosphere independent of the site of emission) but not for NOx or
VOCs.8 0 Opponents of the Rule 1610 program described in Part I have called
Some local
for banning trades by sources located near hot spots. 81
governments have banned distant trades and others, lacking this authority, use
creative incentives to reduce spatial nonfungibilities. 82
Some programs appear to gloss over spatial nonfungibilities, using
currencies regarded, rightly or not, as reliable indicators of true environmental
impact. The sulfur trading program, for example, assumes that a ton of sulfur
dioxide emitted in the Midwest has the same potential for acid rain as a ton
emitted on Long Island, and therefore permits trades between New York and
Ohio utilities. 83 This freedom to trade freely across airsheds, however, is
78. Trading ratios are found in other ETMs, including wetlands and air emissions. The
Air Quality Management District for the San Francisco Bay area, for example, sets offset
ratios of 1.1:1 for trades within 2 miles, 1.2:1 for trades from 2-15 miles, and 2:1 for trades
over 15 miles. Tietenberg II, supra note 30, at 107-08.
79. Some ETMs rely on restricting trades within a pre-defined zone. See Tietenberg I,
supra note 4, at 249-50 (describing the Ozone Transport Commission's restrictions on
trading of nitrogen oxides along the Eastern seaboard). The 1990 Clean Air Act
amendments also control ozone through categories. Offsets must come from areas with
equal or more nonattainment, and the most severe nonattainment areas can sell, but not
purchase, offsets. The South Coast Air Quality Management District divided the L.A. basin
into 38 zones, only allowing sale of emission credits to downwind partners. Tietenberg II,
supra note 30, at 107.
80. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7671f(a), allowing trading of CFCs, with 42 U.S.C. §
7503(c), limiting inter-airshed trades of criteria pollutants in nonattainment areas.
81. Citizens for a Better Environment has called for a prohibition on trades of toxic
substances, trades into overburdened communities (determined by using a cumulative risk
threshold), trades that will have adverse impact on environmental justice, and cross-pollutant
trades if the traded pollutant is less hazardous than those emitted. In accordance with the
National Environmental Justice Advisory Committee (NEJAC) Guidelines, it would allow
community review and comment on proposed trades. See Drury, supra note 45, at 283-87.
82. Lake County, Illinois, for example, requires that all wetlands mitigation take place
in the county. Another town in Illinois, while lacking authority to ban certain types of
trades, leveraged its stormwater permitting authority to require a wetlands mitigation ratio of
1:1.5 within the town limits and 1:3 outside the town. Interview with Mark Burkland,
Attorney, Knight & Holland (Apr. 28, 2000).
83. In response to the acid rain trading program, for example, a spokesman for the
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curtailed by a series of regulatory restrictions on where the currency may be
used. 84 Whether such restrictions are efficient or effective remains a topic of
debate. 85

Adirondack Council stated that "[t]he trading program didn't take into consideration where

the pollution would fall after it was traded.

...

We have Lilco [a Long Island utility], whose

pollution will go out to sea, trading to the Midwest, whose pollution will fall on us." James
Dao, A New, UnregulatedMarket: Selling the Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIEs, Feb. 6, 1993, at
Al. "Several state attorneys general, from New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and
Rhode Island, have criticized the amendments for not focusing on areas most affected by
acid rain. While they failed to get the EPA to prevent hot spots, the attorneys general and the
Adirondack Council, an environmental group, sued the EPA for refusing to allow states to
block allowance trading when running permit programs under the CAA." Hirsch, supra note
3, at 393. In the same vein, the New York legislature recently passed a law penalizing New
York utilities that sell pollution credits to coal-burning power plants in the Midwest and the
South. Raymond Hernandez, Albany Battles Acid Rain Fed by Other States, N.Y. TuEs,
May 2, 2000, at Al.
The program designers were aware of these potential problems, but "preimplementation
modeling showed that the expected reductions from an unrestricted trading system would
take place in precisely the areas that would be targeted for greater control by a more
complicated system. Therefore the gains from implementing a more complicated system
appeared small in comparison to the administrative cost." Tietenberg II, supra note 30, at
98. Another factor that may be in play is the level of emissions reduction. That is, the deep
reductions mandated in the ETM may also alleviate the problem of spatial nonfungibilities.
While certain areas might receive more emissions than others, hot spots might still occur, but
as a result of net reductions over the entire trading area, the local concentrations are not very
hot-we may not need to care about heterogeneity of distribution.
84. This is known as regulatory tiering. Thus, in the acid rain trading program, sulfur
allowances may be traded nationally but may only be used in locations where they satisfy the
state implementation program and the national ambient air quality standards. Tietenberg II,
supra note 30, at 103. According to the EPA's Emissions Trading Policy Statement,
published in the federal register in 1986 and reflected in several rules, emission trades must
be environmentally equivalent. Thus distant trades are only supposed to be approved
pending a demonstration of air quality equivalence. 51 FED. REG. 43,814 (Dec. 4, 1986).
Skeptical that these guidelines will restrict ETM activities, some states have taken the
issue on themselves. "[E]nvironmental concerns have prompted New York to consider
restricting allowance sales to midwest utilities upwind from New York's Adirondack
Mountains. According to some midwestern and New York utilities, this possibility has
diminished their inclination to trade with one another because of the threat that the trades
could be overturned in the future." Sohn & Cohen, supra note 12. New York has told Long
Island Lighting that it can't sell its allowances to anyone upwind. Raymond Hernandez,
Lilco Is to Stop Selling Credits to Upwind Producers,N.Y. TIMES, April 30, 1998, at Bl.
Some ETMs also require detailed modeling before allowing trading. Hahn I, supra note 23,
at 7.
85. A number of commentators believe spatial restrictions on trades are misguided. In
writing about the nitrogen oxide trading program, Farrell et al. write:
[A]n analysis of the effects of restricting the allowance market by geographic zones to
prevent wrong-way trades shows that such restrictions would be expensive but have little, if
any, environmental effect. Similarly, preventing sources from banking excess allowances
from one year to another also has significant costs while it is not clear there are any

environmental benefits from doing so.
Farrell et al., supra note 28, at 121-22.
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Nonfungibilities of type are neutralized by explicitly restricting exchanges
to the same commodity. In the pollutant context, heterogeneous trades are rare.
Under the Clean Air Act, there are separate trading programs for sulfur,
nitrogen oxides, hazardous air pollutants, CFCs, etc.86 Both Congress and EPA
have emphatically declared that toxics trading is unacceptable. 87 The Clean
Water Act's TMDL (total maximum daily loads) program also restricts such
trades, allowing BOD for BOD, COD for COD, albeit from different types of
sources. 88 These restrictions ensure that we trade apples for apples, not apples
for oranges. This restriction is loosened in some cases by the use of ratios for
trades between point and nonpoint sources or habitat.89

Environmental justice advocates, on the other hand, argue that the spatial restrictions
are not tight enough. As Stephen Johnson relates,
Critics might argue that the concerns about toxic hot spots are inflated. Trading schemes are
often coupled with command and control standards, so that an industrial source must meet
certain technology-based standards before they can trade for pollution rights. ... Thus, there

are limits on the amount of pollution that will flow to a toxic hot spot. This criticism is
flawed for several reasons. Technology-based standards are not necessarily designed to
protect human health or the environment. ... Thus, if several sources are emitting pollution
into the air or water at levels that meet technology-based standards in a toxic hot spot, those
standards will not necessarily protect the health or environment of the surrounding

community. Although states may impose more stringent limits on sources in those toxic hot
spots in order to meet health-based or environmentally-based water quality standards or air
quality standards, the health-based or environmentally-based standards do not necessarily
protect the health and safety of communities because the standards are set based on risk
assessments that do not address the cumulative or synergistic impacts that pollution can have

on persons.
Johnson, supra note 10, at 130 n.97.
86. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7671f (CFC trades); 42 U.S.C. § 7651b (sulfur trades); 42
U.S.C. § 7511a(g)(4) (ozone trades); 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c) (criteria pollutants and precursors
in nonattainment areas).
87. In a letter to Congress at the time of the acid rain trading program's passage, for
example, EPA Administrator Bill Reilly made clear that toxics would not be part of an ETM.
Letter from John Sununu, White House Chief of Staff, and William Reilly, Administrator,
EPA, to Tom Foley, Speaker, House of Representatives (May 22, 1990), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 2846 (1993) (setting
out the features of the bill and stating that toxics would be controlled by technology
standards); see also 59 FED. REG. 15,504 (Apr. 1, 1994) (considering only trades within the
same facility for hazardous air pollutants).
88. BOD stands for biochemical oxygen demand; COD stands for chemical oxygen
demand. See EPA Office of Water, Draft Frameworkfor Watershed-Based Trading, EPA
800-R-96-001 at 2-10, App. B-2 (1996) ("EPA does not currently envision a situation in
which 'cross-pollutant' trading could work under current regulatory conditions and technical
limitations.").
89. "Much of the success of a trading program, as measured by improvements in water
quality, rests with the difficult decision of choosing an appropriate trading ratio. A trading
ratio acts as the exchange rate that equates the environmental impact of point and nonpoint
source loadings. It is the amount of nonpoint source control that a point source discharger
must undertake to generate a unit of credit at the point source." Esther Bartfeld, PointNonpoint Source Trading: Looking Beyond Potential Cost Savings, 23 ENVTL. L. 43, 67
(discussing ratios for water pollutant trading). We discuss the use of ratios for wetlands
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Temporal nonfungibilities may be neutralized by restricting trades to
narrow time periods. Bubbling and offsets require simultaneous trades. 90 In
more complex schemes, the currency's value can be restricted by issue,
compliance, and expiration dates. 9 1 In the wetlands program, mitigation is
supposed to occur only when the restored habitat is fully functional.9 2
Sometimes, though, the time window is made more flexible. Under the Clean
Air Act's prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) program, the EPA
allows trading of contemporaneous emissions, but "contemporaneous" is
generously defined as a five-year period. 93
B.

Market Fragmentation,BackgroundMarkets, and OtherDesign Pitfalls

1.

Arbitrage.

Notwithstanding their effectiveness in reducing externalities, there is a
danger that imposing additional market restrictions to compensate for currency
shortcomings can create second-order problems. Few constructed markets can
operate hermetically sealed from external free-market conditions. Thus in
financial markets, absent draconian restrictions, official currency exchange
rates must coexist with private currency trading markets, and price control
regimes must coexist with private goods trading markets. Private market rent
seekers, more commonly known as arbitrageurs and black marketeers, will seek
out and take advantage of any imperfections in the constructed market. To an
economist, these effects are simply evidence of "the market" at work, weeding
out inefficiencies in any market setting, constructed or not, so as to maintain a
true market equilibrium.
There is no reason to believe that environmental trading programs are
immune to these market-driven forces. Consider the following situation
depicted below in Figure 5, an acre-based habitat trading program established
using the following market restrictions: Two types of habitat, type A and type
B, are protected through a regulatory program that requires compensatory
habitat mitigation whenever habitat is destroyed (i.e., a developer can trade
destroyed habitat in exchange for mitigation habitat). Moreover, although
types A and B can be traded for each other, because of general habitat function
differences, one acre of type A habitat is deemed to be worth five acres of type

trading in Part III.
90. See 40 C.F.R. § 51.165 (1999).

91. Dale A. Carlson & Anne M. Scholtz, Designing Pollution Market Instruments:
Cases of Uncertainty, 12 CONTEMP. ECON. PoL. 114, 121-22 (1994) (proposing "staggered"
ETM credits).
92. See Part III.
93. Elliott & Charnley, supra note 1, at 49-50.
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B habitat. The conservation goal for the area is to achieve a balance of the two
habitats that favors conservation of type A habitat because of its superior
habitat value, and which is relatively consistent throughout the area so as to
maintain overall ecological function. 94 A trading program, it is thought, will
let "the market" most efficiently decide which acres are developed within this
hoped-for pattern.
Once this habitat trading market is set in motion, however, it necessarily
coexists with the background real estate markets operating within the defined
trading area. The real estate market, of course, reflects values relevant to
developers and consumers of developed habitat. The trading market, by
contrast, is designed to capture values of habitat function, albeit crudely
reflected in the acre-based currency. Yet the imposed habitat value exchange
rate between type A and B habitats cannot ignore the real estate market's
exchange rate between the two types. When the constructed habitat value
system is overlaid on the relatively unconstrained real estate market, it is easy
to see how "mistakes" in trading valuation can undermine environmental
protection values.

Figure 5

A=$10,00ac

A=$10,00tac

B =$3,000/ac

B = $5,000/ac

Real Estate Market I

Real Estate Market II

Trading Area

For example, the 1:5 trading ratio between type A and type B habitat is
intended to reflect the superior habitat function value of type A habitat. But in

94. This last requirement is an important condition. Consistent habitat distribution
both provides corridors for species to range throughout the area and may be necessary for
species that depend on the two habitat types (e.g., for nesting and feeding).
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real estate Market I, type A habitat is worth only three-and-one-third times as
much as type B. In real estate Market I, therefore, a developer could develop 5
acres of type B habitat and mitigate with either five acres of type B habitat at a
cost of $15,000, or one acre of type A habitat at a cost of $10,000. Easy
decision. Thus, the result of using the 1:5 habitat value exchange rate in the
long term could be widespread depletion of type B habitat throughout the
trading area and extensive conservation of type A habitat, which may not
promote the original conservation goals of the trading program.
Another problem could arise if the trading area is defined too broadly. As
depicted in Figure 5, there may be more than one real estate market
encompassed within the trading area. Say developers in the trading area
believe that type A habitat is undervalued in the real estate market and in fact
presents a more profitable development profile than Type B habitat, so that
they wish to develop type A habitat and use type B habitat to mitigate. Type B
habitat is worth the same in habitat value throughout the trading area, but is
worth more in real estate value in Market II than in Market I. As a result,
developers in real estate Market II can practice a form of arbitrage by reaching
into real estate Market I for cheaper type B conservation acres to compensate
for development in Market II, facilitating more development of type A acres in
Market II. Once again, we may wind up with a distribution of developed and
conserved acres within the larger trading area that is inconsistent with the
conservation goals of the trading program.
To an economist, this is simply evidence of market efficiency at work.
Indeed, as the economist would predict, over time the real estate market price
of type B habitat will rise if it is demanded for mitigation of type A
development, and price disparities in type B acres within the trading area will
dampen as demand for the cheap acres increases. That is market efficiency.
But it may not be environmentally acceptable to let that market dynamic play
out-by the time the real estate market adjusts, the conservation goals of the
trading program may have been irrevocably undermined. Design defects in the
constructed market can therefore create externalities that exist independent of
the currency design deficiencies. 95
Regulators detecting this problem would have a number of solutions. In
the arbitrage scenario, for example, the original trading area could be split into
several trading areas corresponding to the two real estate markets, thus making
arbitrage between real estate markets impossible. Or type B habitat could be
divided into several types corresponding to price differential ranges and the
exchange rates between the reconstituted habitat types could be altered. For
example, if the cheap type B acres were redefined as type C and new exchange
rates between it and types B and A habitat were defined, the arbitrage

95. Despite the goal of creating an even distribution of habitat types, market
participants have no incentive to abide by that goal and feel no cost when they ignore it. It is
external to the transactions.
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opportunity can be foiled. In short, any constructed market defect can be
corrected with additional market constructions.9 6 The challenge is in detecting
the defect and its externality and designing market-procedure corrections that
solve the externality without creating a new one.
2.

The inevitable tradeoffbetween fat and sloppy or thin and bland.

Recall the idealized trading situation, where parties exchange identical
goods simultaneously in a small area. In this case, there are few, if any,
externalities to the trade but, unfortunately, there are few, if any, trades, as
well. The temptation to add market refinement on top of refinement to ensure
exchange adequacy, to reduce nonfungibilities, must be tempered by the need
for nonfungibilities. The point of using trading as an environmental policy
instrument lies precisely in its ability to take advantage of market commodity
heterogeneity and different trader utility preferences. People who feel exactly
the same about small blue marbles will not trade small blue marbles among
themselves if the marbles are indistinguishable (i.e., perfectly fungible). To
have a trading market, we have to include differences in the marbles,
differences in the way people feel about those differences, and have enough of
the marbles and marble lovers to engage in active trading. 97
This is no less true in environmental trading markets. Someone willing to
buy twenty acres of mitigation bank wetlands in return for authorization to
destroy ten acres of wetlands five miles away from the bank has made a
decision that the trade is worth it, and so have the regulatory entity approving
the trade and the wetland bank selling the bank acres. The project developer
weighed the trade based on the dollar investment return potential, as did the
wetlands bank, and the agency weighed it based on the conservation return
potential. The trade could only occur because the acres were in different

96. Equally, the ratio between type A and B habitat could be changed to act as an
insurance buffer against further development of type A habitat. Wetland mitigation trades
often employ ratios (e.g., giving up one acre of wetland for two acres of restored wetlands).
This essentially discounts for the expected failure rate and uncertainty in restored wetlands.
This decision making under uncertainty, though, may be one of false precision since, in any
particular case, a 2:1 or 3:1 ratio might be no better than 1:1 if the currency fails to capture
important measures.
97. If there is no difference in costs of control among sources under a bubble, there will be
no advantage to market trading.... Thus, the power of bubbles to improve efficiency and
save costs is a function of how broadly they can be extended in time and space and across
risks.

Elliott & Charnley, supra note 1, at 50; see also Powers, supra note 28, at 198 ("A rational
basis for trading exists only if there is a substantial difference among dischargers in
controlling a given amount of pollution."); Frank S. Arnold, SO2 TradingSuccess Not Easily
Replicable, ENVrL. F., May-June 1999, at 11 ("The situations that are tailor-made for
tradable permit systems are those in which many sources with substantially different
abatement costs all contribute to create an environmental problem, but polluters' locations
and other characteristics have no effect on the damages.").
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locations and the developer, bank, and agency had different utility preferences
for those acres. In short, for environmental policy to tap into the advantages of
market trading efficiency, there must be markets within which to trade and
traders willing to engage in trades.
In highly constructed environmental trading markets, however, the market
may become too "thin" to accommodate a meaningful volume of trading. In
the previous habitat trading arbitrage scenario, for example, if in our quest to
root out the arbitrage we subdivide the original trading area too finely, we are
left with many small geographic markets within which there is no arbitrage but,
equally, no trading. Or, if trades are allowed only between like habitat types,
supply deficiencies may make trading difficult and limited in scope and
duration. The smaller the trading zones, in any of the three dimensions of type,
space, and time, the fewer the trading opportunities.9 8
Therein lies the fundamental tradeoff in environmental markets that rely on
exchange restrictions to compensate for crude currency design. Markets
require heterogeneity of goods and participants (over type, space, and time) and
an ample supply of each. The success of an ETM is a direct function of the
parties' variance across important dimensions. A "fat" or thick market would
impose loose or no restrictions on those market dimensions, posing no
transaction costs to traders besides complying with the rules. This is fine if
currency adequacy is achieved-if the currency can meaningfully capture these
differences and allow informed comparisons. But in the absence of effective
currency design, heterogeneity also carries with it the potential for externalities.
Fat markets are sloppy. We can attempt to plug the externality holes by
constricting the type, space, and time heterogeneity of the market, but in so
doing we weaken the market's trading potential. 99 Thin markets are bland.
Until we develop more refined currency instruments, therefore, a significant
policy choice in constructed environmental trading markets will be how fat or
thin to make the market; that is, how much externality potential we are willing
to tolerate in order to take advantage of the perceived efficiency qualities of

98. [A] system that limits the number of likely traders or that segments the market into
distinct subgroups increases the risk that the number of buyers and sellers will be inadequate
to support a thick market. The two-phase approach of the SO program, the geographic
segmentation in the offset and banking programs, and the separate treatment under the offset
In contrast, the lead
program of new and existing sources all illustrate this effect.
phasedown's success stems at least partly from its uniform regulation of relatively
homogeneous entities.

Sohn & Cohen, supra note 12, at 432-33; see also, Tietenberg II, supra note 30, at 106
(describing how small zones reduce trading opportunities); Hahn I, supra note 10, at 6
(stating that in thin markets price-taking behavior can no longer be assumed, even as a rough
approximation).
99. Clearly, not all exchange restraints cause excessively thin ETMs. There exists a
continuum along which restrictions become increasingly burdensome for trading parties. The
point at which the marginal loss of trading parties creates markets that are too thin will
depend on the particular ETM and the type of restriction.
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markets.1 00
This is not a trivial dilemma. When the adequacy of a currency is impeded
by lack of information, technology, or money, market design can step in to take
over the job of dampening externalities in the market. But when the market
commodities are nonfungible in terms of type, space, or time and the currency
remains crude, attempting to solve all the problems through market
construction techniques runs into the same problem as complex currencies-it
may be at the limit of our knowledge and technological capacity. And even
where knowledge and technology are available to perfect trading currencies,
the expense associated with valuing the traded goods may so increase the
transaction costs that no willing traders come forward. 10 1
The combination of sloppy currencies and fat markets thus may be the
most expeditious way of encouraging trading in the environmental policy
context, at least until cheaper ways of perfecting currency design and goods
valuation are developed. But then what about the externalities? Clearly, if the
goal of increased social welfare is to be preserved in such trading systems,
some method of policing individual trades will be required in order to exclude
trades that cause unacceptable externality problems. We explore this issue in
Part IV's discussion of review adequacy. To make that analysis more concrete,
and further explore the dynamic between currency selection and market
constraints described in Parts I and II, we narrow our focus in Parts III and IV
to habitat ETMs. While the lessons we raise hold true for other ETMs, the
problems of nonfungibilities are clearest, and most difficult, in the contexts of
wetlands mitigation banking and habitat conservation plans.

100. As a result, economists often argue to keep markets fat and deal with
nonfungibility problems on an ad hoc basis. Professor Tom Tietenberg, for example, argues
that it's better to implement a basic system around emission permit trades and deal with
severe hot spots on a case-by-case basis rather than create rigid zones or wholesale trade
restrictions.
Economic models of the trading process formulate the problem as searching for the lowest

cost solution subject to the constraint that trading equilibrium can result in the violation of an
ambient concentration constraint. The control authority rules which govem the trades of

nonuniformly mixed pollutants are usually not consistent with this formulation for the simple
reason that they disallow any trades which unacceptably increase the concentrations in any
subportion of the region even if those trades do not result in a violation of the ambient
constraint. The failure to accept those trades can increase the cost of pollution control

considerably.
Tietenberg I, supra note 4, at 254; see also Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 312 (arguing that
dense central cities should be treated as separate markets, while rural and suburban counties
should be combined under a single standard).
101. See, e.g., Hahn II, supra note 23, at 97-98 (recounting the history of the Fox River
Water Permit system in Wisconsin, where the system's complexity and uncertainty over
property rights led to only one trade in the first six years of the program); see also Arnold,
supra note 97, at I1 ("Clearly, when the same emissions from different sources cause
different amounts of harm, the modeling efforts and administrative costs necessary to
implement a trading program that will reliably achieve the environmental improvement
target are far greater than for sulfur dioxide and similar cases.").
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III. CURRENCIES AND MARKET CONSTRAINTS iN THE REAL WORLDWETLANDS MITIGATION BANKING

The success of ETMs in the sulfur dioxide and similar pollutant trading
programs has buoyed efforts to expand trading into other environmental
contexts where nonfungiblitiy is more acute, most notably habitat protection.
For example, after leaving it dormant for almost a decade, the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) recently discovered the so-called "habitat
conservation plan" (HCP) provision of the Endangered Species Act10 2 and
leveraged it as a way of allowing land development that degrades endangered
species habitat by preserving or enhancing endangered species habitat
elsewhere. In other words, a developer can swap acres of endangered species
habitat here for acres of endangered species habitat there. 103 This program,
with vigorous official support,1 04 is gaining tremendous momentum and has
already accounted for hundreds of thousands of acres swapped.1 05 But there
may be good reason to question whether the trading success of the sulfur
dioxide program can easily be duplicated in the habitat context. Can a trading

&

102. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2). Although Congress added the HCP provision to the ESA
in 1982, it was not until the early 1990s that FWS began issuing any appreciable number of
HCP permits. By 1992, for example, FWS had issued only 12 HCP permits, whereas it had
issued 225 by October 1, 1997. See DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, FRAYED SAFETY NETS vi-xiii
(1999). For background on these developments and the HCP program in general, see Eric
Fisher, Habitat Conservation PlanningUnder the EndangeredSpecies Act: No Surprises
the Quest for Certainty, 67 U. COLo. L. REv. 371 (1996); Shi-Ling Hsu, The Potential and
the Pitfallsof Habitat ConservationPlanning Under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 29 ENvTL.
L. REP. 10,592 (1999); Albert C. Lin, Participants'Experiences with Habitat Conservation
Plans and Suggestionsfor Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 369 (1996); J.B.
Ruhl, How to Kill Endangered Species, Legally: The Nuts and Bolts of EndangeredSpecies
Act "HCP"Permitsfor Real Estate Development, 5 ENVTL. LAw. 345 (1999); Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Takings & Incentives, 49
STAN. L. REV. 305 (1997).
103. See Hsu, supra note 102, at 10,594-600 (describing the HCP negotiation process
between agency and permitee, and concluding that HCPs may provide environmental
benefits when "valuable habitat and low-quality development land is exchanged for valuable
development land and low-quality habitat"); Ruhl, supra note 102, at 391-96 (describing the
HCP mitigation negotiation process).
104. For example, FWS has published a lengthy handbook describing the steps
required to obtain an HCP permit. See FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE & NATIONAL MARINE
FISHERIES SERvICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK
(1996) [hereinafter HCP HANDBOOK]; see also Hsu, supra note 102, at 10,594-99
(describing various official statements in favor of HCP permitting).
105. For an excellent statistical summary of the 208 HCP permits that FWS had issued
nationally by August 1997, including acreage statistics, see NATIONAL CENTER FOR
ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS & AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES,
USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS (1999), at http://vww.nceas.ucsb.edu/

projects/hcp. HCP permits cover areas within which swapping takes place that vary widely
in terms of size, with some covering a few acres while others cover in excess of 1.6 million
acres. Id. at 19-20.
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market for habitat be so easily established? Should the currency be acres, or
something more refined such as a measure of functional value of the acres?
And if the currency turns out to be imprecise, how easy will it be to weed out
externalities through market constrictions without making the market too thin?
The fact that these questions have been relatively easy to solve in some
pollutant trading contexts does not necessarily mean that HCPs and other new
wave habitat trading programs will have the same experience.
Indeed, an example of how the HCP and other habitat trading programs
may fare under the trend toward aggressive use of ETMs in environmental
policy is provided through the wetland mitigation banking experience, a habitat
trading program that has been in existence, and thus "field tested," for over a
decade. 10 6 In wetlands mitigation banking, a "bank" of wetlands habitat is
created, restored, or preserved and then made available to developers of
wetlands habitat who must "buy" habitat mitigation as a condition of
government approval for development. Building off the purported success of
the wetlands program, current habitat trading proposals have increasingly been
packaged as mitigation banking constructs. 107 Proponents of using mitigation
banking in HCP contexts, for example, argue that "[d]eveloping intelligent
policy for endangered species mitigation banking should not take as long as it
did for wetland mitigation banking." 10 8 That assumes, of course, that wetland
mitigation banking has developed into an intelligent policy and that replicating
the wetlands model in endangered species habitat banking also would be an
intelligent move. We question both assumptions, and thus have chosen
wetlands mitigation banking as a case study to explore the lessons it offers for
the use of ETMs when trading involves significant nonfungible environmental

106. For a comprehensive analysis of the wetlands mitigation banking concept and its
history, see ELI-WETLAND, supra note 18 (also available in substantially the same form at
ROBERT BRUMBAUGH & RICHARD REPPERT, WATER RESOURCES SUPPORT CENTER, INSTITUTE
FOR WATER RESOURCES, U.S ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, NATIONAL WETLANDS
MITIGATION BANKING STUDY: FIRsT PHASE REPORT (1994)); Gardner I, supra note 11.

107. See Michael J. Bean & Lynn E. Dwyer, Mitigation Banking as an Endangered
Species Conservation Tool, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,537, 10,537 (2000) ("Today, mitigation
banking for endangered species is much like wetland mitigation banking nearly two decades
ago."); ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, MITIGATION BANKING AS AN ENDANGERED SPECIES
CONSERVATION

TOOL

(1999),

at

http://www.environmentaldefense.org/programs/

Ecosystems/ SafeHarbor/pdf/mb.pdf (providing an overview of the wetland mitigation
banking program and describing how it can be employed by analogy in the endangered
species habitat context) [hereinafter EDF-ENDANGERED SPECIES]; NATURAL HERITAGE
INSTITUTE, WHERE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND BIODIVERSITY CONVERGE: LESSONS FROM
EXPERIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING 26 (2000) ("Mitigation banking can

achieve habitat goals in an economically efficient manner and can reconfigure habitat in
ways that traditional HCPs cannot.").
108. Bean & Dwyer, supra note 107, at 10,537 (emphasis added). For criticism of the
trend toward ETMs in the endangered species protection context, see Nancy K. Kubasek, M.
Neil Browne & Michael D. Meuti, Cross-Examining Market Approaches to Protecting
EndangeredSpecies, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10721 (2000).
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features.
A.

Establishingthe Wetlands TradingMarket

Like any other ETM, the basis for wetlands trading is a regulatory
proscription of behavior followed by regulatory permission of the behavior
under controlled conditions. 109 In this case the behavior is filling of wetlands.
Thus, although section 311 of the Clean Water Act broadly prohibits "the
discharge of any pollutant by any person," 1 10 which as defined would prevent
filling of wetlands, section 404 of the statute authorizes the Secretary of the
Army to "issue permits, after notice and opportunity for public hearings for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters at specified disposal
sites." 111 These permits, administered principally through the Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) and known ubiquitously as "404 permits," "wetland
permits," or "Corps permits," are the cornerstone of federal protection of
wetland resources. 1 12 The permitting program, however, admits of many
exceptions and nuances, complicating whether a permit is required for a
particular fill activity and how to get one. 1 13 The point for our purposes is that

109. See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 11, at 7 ("Demand for compensatory [wetland]
mitigation exists only because it is a government-imposed condition on wetland
development."); Gardner II, supra note 18, at 10,077 ("[U]nlike typical markets, regulatory
agencies control both the supply of and demand for [wetlands] mitigation."); Jennifer Neal,
Paving the Road to Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 161, 181
(1999) ("The market for mitigation bank credits depends upon the demand for credits,
which, in turn, depends upon governmental regulation mandating compensatory mitigation
for unavoidable wetlands loss.") (citation omitted).

110. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
111. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). EPA has the power to veto Corps permits if it finds the
discharge would have an unacceptably adverse effect on environmental resources. Id. §
1344(c). EPA has exercised this power infrequently. See U.S. EPA, EPA's Clean Water Act
Section 404(c) Veto Authority (2000) ("EPA has completed only 11 'veto' actions out of an
estimated 150,000 permit applications received since the regulations went into effect in
October 1979") available at http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/wetlands/facts/fact14.html; see
generally S. Scott Burkhalter, Oversimplification: Value and Function: Wetland Mitigation
Banking, 2 CHAPMAN L. REv. 261, 267 (1999); Gardner I, supra note 11, at 536 n.48.
112. With respect to federal Corps jurisdiction under the 404 program, early in the
program's history judicial interpretation required the Corps to extend its reach to tidal
wetland areas. See Natural Resources Defense Counsel v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686
(D.D.C. 1975) (declaring that the term "navigable waters" as used in Clean Water Act is not
limited to the "traditional tests of navigability"). Since then the courts have upheld Corps
efforts to extend its jurisdiction even further inland. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985) (upholding regulation of wetlands "adjacent to
the waters of the United States"). But see Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 640, _ U.S. _ (2001) (Corps
jurisdiction does not extend to isolated nonnavigable waters such as ponds and mudflats).
113. For a concise description of the section 404 permitting process, see Burkhalter,
supra note 111, at 267-74; Margaret N. Strand, Wetlands: Avoiding the Swamp Monster, in
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many routine land development activities require and receive 404 permits.
Along the way, permit applicants and the Corps often must confront the issue
of "mitigation."114
The Corps' guidelines for mitigation provide that 404 permit applications
should be reviewed using a "sequencing" approach. 11 5 The first preference is
to require the applicant to avoid filling wetland resources, followed by
minimization of adverse impacts to those wetlands that cannot reasonably be
avoided, followed by the least desirable option of providing compensatory
mitigation for those unavoidable adverse impacts that remain after all
minimization measures have been exercised. 116 With respect to compensatory
mitigation, moreover, EPA and the Corps traditionally have preferred on-site to
off-site locations for the mitigation activity,11 7 and have preferred in-kind
mitigation to mitigation that uses a substantially different type of wetland (thus
neutralizing nonfungibilities of space and type).118 Finally, regardless of
location, EPA and the Corps value measures that restore prior wetland areas as
the highest form of mitigation, followed by enhancement of low-quality

ENVIRoNMENTAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONs 720-56 (James B.

Witkin ed.,

2d

ed. 1999).
114. For a survey of environmental laws using mitigation techniques to achieve
compliance with regulatory requirements, see Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Richard B. Stewart,
The Role of Mitigation And Conservation Measures in Achieving Compliance with
Environmental Regulatory Statutes: Lessons from Section 316 of the Clean Water Act, 8
N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 237 (2000). Schoenbaum and Stewart define mitigation generally as any
measure "aimed at reducing or eliminating the adverse environmental stresses imposed by a
facility, project, or activity." Id. at 237. They divide mitigation into "source-based"
methods designed "to achieve this objective by imposing technology-based controls or other
regulatory requirements on the source of the stress," and "ecosystem-based" methods that
"reduce or eliminate source-imposed stresses by enhancing the affected ecosystem or
providing replacement or substitute resources for those affected." Id.
115. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b). Section 404 does not mention a mitigation requirement for
permit issuance. Rather, this provision of the statute directs EPA, in conjunction with the
Corps, to develop guidelines that the Corps must apply in deciding whether to authorize the

fill disposal at a wetlands site.
116. See Memorandum of Agreement Between Department of the Army and the
Environmental Protection Agency Concerning the Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1)

Guidelines, 55 FED. REG. 9210, 9211-12 (Mar. 12, 1990) [hereinafter Memorandum of
Agreement].
Section 404 thus uses both source-based mitigation (avoidance and
minimization) and ecosystem-based mitigation (compensation). For background on the
agencies' sequencing requirement, see ELI-WETLAND, supra note 18, at 19-22; Gardner I,
supra note 11, at 535-39.
117. See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 116, at 9211. For background on the
agencies' preference for on-site mitigation, see ELI-WETLAND, supranote 18, at 30-32, 5657.
118. See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 116, at 9211. For background on the
agencies' preference for in-kind mitigation, see ELI-WETLAND, supra note 18, at 58-59.
Wetland ecologists generally divide wetlands into seven major types, within which there is
tremendous variation from region to region in terms of physical characteristics and
functions. See id. at 25-29.
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wetlands, then creation of new wetlands, and, least-favored of all, preservation
of existing wetlands. 119 To take an extreme example, if compensatory
mitigation is deemed appropriate for a project involving fill of mangrove
swamp wetlands in Florida, on-site restoration of an area of prior mangrove
swamp wetlands would be a favored mitigation strategy, whereas off-site
preservation of existing cranberry bog wetlands in Maine would be leastfavored.
Notwithstanding its official status as the least-favored alternative behind
avoidance and minimization in the agencies' sequencing pecking order,
compensatory mitigation has been the oil allowing the 404 program to move
forward because it greases the skids of permitting. Compensatory mitigation
frees up highly valued wetlands for more comprehensive and flexible
development.1 20 Building a shopping center around an avoided wetlands site,
presumably on choice commercial development land, obviously presents more
design constraints and development expenses than transferring the wetlands to
some less desirable portion of the property. The developer is in the best
position to evaluate these economic efficiencies and knows when the
compensatory land swap is superior in that respect to the avoidance strategy.
Compensatory mitigation thus has taken some of the "sting" out of 404 permits
and reduced the frequency of incidents when 404 permitting is portrayed as

unreasonably obstructive. 12 1

While attractive in theory, the project-by-project compensatory mitigation
approach has been widely regarded as having failed miserably in terms of

119. See Memorandum of Agreement, supranote 116, at 9211. For background on the
agencies' mitigation type preferences, see ELI-WETLAND, supra note 18, at 53-55. Another
variation of compensatory mitigation is to dispense with the identification of mitigation
habitat, whether on-site or in off-site banks, and simply allow the developer to pay a fee that
can be used later to finance habitat restoration, creation, enhancement, or preservation. For a
thorough discussion of these so-called "in-lieu fee" methods, criticizing their use in wetland
protection contexts, see Royal C. Gardner, Money for Nothing? The Rise of Wetland Fee
Mitigation, 19 VA. ENV L. L.J. 1 (2000).
120. The economics are very straightforward. As Dennis King describes,
The market value of an acre of dry land can be as high as a few hundred thousand dollars per

acre, even a few million dollars per acre in some prime coastal areas. If the land is a wetland
but is "permitable," its market value might be slightly less because developing it would
require draining and filling as well as some "compensatory mitigation." The same wetland,
if it had no hope of being permitted for development, could have a market value as low as a
few thousand dollars per acre.
King, supra note 68, at 7.
121. See Gardner I, supra note 11, at 586 ("The federal retreat from strict sequencing
is an attempt to provide regulatory relief to small landowners and small businesses."). One
study of commercial wetlands mitigation banks concluded that "it is the practice of
regulators to relax the first two sequencing requirements-avoidance and minimization of
wetland impacts-if the wetland that will be impacted is of low to mid quality," thus
creating a market for mitigation. Shirley Jeanne Whitsitt, Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 3
ENVrL. LAW. 441,463-64 (1997).
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environmental protection.1 22 Whether on-site or near-site, the piecemeal
approach complicated the Corps' ability to articulate mitigation performance
standards, monitor success, and enforce conditions. 123 Many developers went
through the motions of so-called "landscape mitigation"-planting what was
required or regrading where required to meet the minimum letter of the
permit-then moved on. 124 As several commentators have observed, "[t]he
success record for isolated mitigation projects has been spotty, and few
regulators believe that these projects will succeed." 125
In light of these problems, the Corps and EPA (supported by many
commentators) started shifting compensatory activities from on-site to off-site
mitigation, thus opening the door to the wetlands mitigation banking technique.
This approach, its proponents argued, would prove advantageous both in terms
122. See, e.g., Bean & Dwyer, supra note 107, at 10,538-39 ("The track record of
traditional, project-by-project wetland mitigation is dismal."); Gardner I, supra note 11, at
540 ("The failure of compensatory mitigation is wetland regulation's dirty little secret.");
Virginia C. Veltman, supra note 9, at 670 ("The California State Coastal Conservancy
sponsored a review of fifty-eight permits issued for creation and restoration projects in the
San Francisco Bay Area between 1978 and 1983. The report found that only two of the
fifty-eight projects could be deemed successful.").
123. See Michael S. Rolband, Antoinette L. Pepin, Chris Athanas & Ineke Dickman,
Wetlands Banking for Sound Mitigation? Yes, Virginia, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., MayJune 1999, at 4 ("Off-site non-bank mitigation, authorized by individual project permits, is
difficult to administer, monitor, and enforce.").
124. As one wetlands restoration expert has put it, "it is easier and cheaper to hire, say,
a landscaper who will design and build something that looks green and wet . .. than hire a
restoration expert." Keith Bowers, What Is Wetlands Mitigation?, LAND DEvELoPMENT,
Winter 1993, at 28, 33.
125. Lawrence R. Liebesman & David M. Plott, The Emergence of Private Wetlands
Mitigation Banking, 13 NAT. RESOURCEs & ENV'T 341 (1998) (discussing a Florida state
agency study finding a 27 percent success rate of such projects); Gardner I, supra note 11, at
540-42 (discussing the Florida study); see also ELI-WETLAND, supra note 18, at 31
(discussing the dismal record of piecemeal on-site mitigation projects); CHESAPEAKE BAY
FOUNDATION, MARYLAND NONTIDAL WETLAND MITIGATION: A PROGRESS REPORT 30-39

(1997) (discussing independent study finding poor record of compensatory mitigation). It is
also worth noting that while compensatory wetland mitigation policies relying primarily on
wetland creation can result in no net loss of wetlands, they are likely to result in overall loss
of habitat since the land being converted to wetlands usually is already open space. That is,
the net result is less undeveloped land than before. Compensatory mitigation that relies on
enhancement or preservation of existing wetlands is likely to produce a net loss of wetlands.
See Alyson C. Flournoy, Preserving Dynamic Systems: Wetlands, Ecology, and Law, 7
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL. F. 105, 128-29 (1996). Under any compensatory approach, of
course, there is no guarantee that the mitigated site would have remained undeveloped
indefinitely, but even in this sense the compensatory mitigation approach can present a
baseline problem. Wetlands are dynamic systems. By considering only existing wetlands in
deciding what should be protected, compensatory mitigation stifles the process of wetlands
creation (e.g. the hardening of coastal shorelines). The result is an "invisible loss of
wetlands" that are not naturally created and will never have the chance to become so.
Interview with Alyson Flournoy, Professor, University of Florida School of Law (Apr. 28,
2000).
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of efficiency and ecological benefits, aggregating small wetlands threatened by
development into larger restored wetlands in a different location. 12 6 Defined
generally as "a system in which the creation, enhancement, restoration, or
preservation of wetlands is recognized by a regulatory agency as generating
compensation credits allowing the future development of other wetland
sites," 127 wetlands mitigation banking allows a developer who has mitigated
somewhere else in advance of development to draw from the resulting bank of
mitigation "credits" as the development is implemented and wetlands are filled.
The concept has progressed beyond this personal bank model, however, as
large commercial and public wetlands banks, not tied to a particular
development, sell mitigation credits to third-party developers in need of
compensatory mitigation.1 28
Wetland mitigation banking now resembles a commodity market, with
freewheeling, entrepreneurial wetlands banks offering for sale (and profit)
finished off-site wetlands as "credits" to anyone who is in need of mitigation
for their 404 permits.1 2 9 It is precisely this technique that the Corps and EPA
126. Veltman summarizes the rationales cited for shifting from on-site to off-site
mitigation locations and from small to large scales of mitigation sites:
[O]ffsite mitigation provides a greater selection of hydrologically and ecologically favorable
locations, thus increasing the opportunity for a well-functioning replacement. Additionally,
offsite projects can be joined into one large mitigation, which is beneficial because 'larger
wetland systems are generally more self-sustaining. They can provide habitat for more types
of species, a longer and more self-sustaining food chain, more habitat niches, and a wider
variety of habitat types-which, in turn, can better accommodate ecosystem succession,
migration, and change.' Thus, the presumption in favor of onsite versus offsite mitigation
often encourages, rather than prevents, poorly designed wetlands that will either fail or, if
viable, provide a nonequivalent replacement.

Veltman, supra note 9, at 673 (citations omitted); see also Michael Rolland, The Systemic

Assumptions of Wetland Mitigation: A Look at Louisiana's Proposed Wetland Mitigation
and Mitigation Banking Regulations, 7 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 497, 510-11 (1994) (noting also
that on-site mitigation "puts the mitigation for wetlands loss in the hands of a sometimes
hostile developer").
Notwithstanding these oft-cited benefits, replacing many small "postage stamp"
wetlands with large contiguous mitigation projects is not necessarily always a desirable
approach, as research indicates that some systems of small isolated wetlands provide more
biodiversity value than a large contiguous wetland of the same type. In sufficient abundance
and proximity, small isolated wetlands provide greater variability of conditions, insurance
against natural perturbations, and source-sink population dynamics than can a contiguous
wetland of equal total size. Moreover, the desirability of either kind of wetland habitat will
depend on the particular species in mind, thus a policy favoring large contiguous wetlands
necessarily disadvantages species that depend on systems of small isolated wetlands. See
Raymond D. Semlitsch, Size Does Matter: The Value of Small Isolated Wetlands, NAT'L
WETLANDS NEwSL., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 5.
127. See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 18, at 3.
128. See Gardner I, supra note 11, at 581-87; Jonathan Silverstein, Taking Wetlands to
the Bank: The Role of Wetland Mitigation Banking in a Comprehensive Approach to
Wetlands Protection,22 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 129, 145 (1994).
129. There are over seventy such commercial mitigation banks operating in the United
States today. See Liebesman & Plott, supra note 125, at 341.
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officially endorsed in their 1995 FederalGuidancefor the Establishment, Use
and Operation ofMitigationBanks (FederalGuidance), articulating a standard
review procedure for establishing and using wetlands banks in the 404 permit
With the support of federal agencies, as well as many
process. 130
environmental advocacy groups, 131 land development interests, 132 and
academics, 133 the wetlands mitigation banking program has blossomed since
the late 1980s. 134 In a wide range of fora, its advocates have contended that
off-site mitigation banking should be preferred over on-site or near-site
compensatory mitigation because of greater efficiency, scale effects, and
environmental protection. 135

130. See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation
Banks, 60 FED. REG. 58,605 (Nov. 18, 1995) [hereinafter Federal Guidance]. See generally
Gardner I, supra note 11, at 563-69. A prospective bank sponsor must submit a prospectus
to the Corps. The relevant federal and state agencies, known as the Mitigation Bank Review
Team, use the prospectus to evaluate the merits of the bank pursuant to the sequencing
approach and other preferences applicable to compensatory wetlands mitigation in general.
The agencies and the bank sponsor then negotiate a banking instrument outlining all the
details of bank objectives, ownership, operation, and enforcement. Finally, the proposed
bank instrument is submitted for public notice and comment before a final bank instrument is
implemented. A number of states have also provided statutory or regulatory frameworks for
using commercial wetlands mitigation banks in satisfaction of state wetlands protection laws.
See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 18, at 16-18; Gardner I, supra note 11, at 569-77; Rolland,
supra note 126, at 511-44.
131. See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 18, at 153 (concluding that wetlands mitigation
banking can offer ecological advantages to on-site mitigation in some instances and "can
also provide economies of scale and greater regulatory certainty").
132. See Liebesman & Plott, supra note 125, at 371 (touting wetlands mitigation
banking as "an innovative, market-based solution for many of the problems with the existing
wetlands regulatory system").
133. See Gardner I, supra note 11, at 557-62 (advocating the ecological and efficiency
benefits of wetlands mitigation banking).
134. Dr. Robert Brumbaugh, manager of the Corps of Engineers' Institute for Water
Research National Wetlands Mitigation Banking Study, reports that there were five banks in
operation in 1985, 40 in 1992, and more than 100 in 1995 with hundreds more in
development at that time. See Robert W. Brumbaugh, Wetland Mitigation Banking:
Entering a New Era, WETLANDS REs. PROGRAM BULL., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 3 & fig. 1, at
<http://www.wes.army.mil/el/wrtc/wrp/bulletins/v5n3/brum.html.
An annual national
conference on wetlands mitigation banking, now in its third year of production, has sponsors
including the Corps, EPA, and a wide variety of private and public entities and pitches itself
to mitigation bankers, landowners, developers, regulators, local government, suppliers,
nurseries, engineers, and a host of others interested in banking policy and methods. See 3rd
National Mitigation Banking Conference: Learn About Wetlands, Habitat & Conservation
Banking (brochure for May 17-19 conference, Denver, Colo.).
135. The Corps and EPA claim that:
Mitigation banks provide greater flexibility to applicants needing to comply with mitigation
requirements and can have several advantages over individual mitigation projects, some of

which are listed below:
1. It may be more advantageous for maintaining the integrity of the aquatic ecosystem to

consolidate compensatory mitigation into a single large parcel of contiguous parcels when
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If these arguments seem similar to those advanced on behalf of mainstream
ETMs versus the command-and-control model of regulation, it is no
coincidence. Notwithstanding the substantial expense and procedural rigor
associated with establishing a commercial wetlands mitigation bank, the
program, both conceptually and by official endorsement, has all the makings of
a habitat trading market. One commentator describes it as "akin to a
commercial paper transaction: Party A (the credit producer) informs Party B
(the regulatory agency) that the credits should be released to Party C (the entity
with mitigation requirements)." 13 6 The Corps succinctly describes this feature
of commercial wetlands banks as "an implicit move away from a rigid, onsite,
in-kind preference for piece-meal compensatory mitigation towards a broaderbased trading system that takes advantage of qualitative differences among
wetlands and that can use the potential economic profits from the development
of some low-valued wetlands (that may be doomed in any event)." 137
Indeed, the wetlands mitigation banking experience suggests that, like the
pollutant trading context, laws requiring mitigation of habitat destruction easily
can be adapted into laws allowing habitat trading. In addition to wetlands
mitigation banking, the Endangered Species Act HCP program now seems well
on its way to evolving into a full-blown ETM. Indeed, the Fish and Wildlife
Service has recently endorsed endangered species habitat banking as a new
method of satisfying HCP endangered species habitat mitigation
requirements. 138 Whether the HCP and similar habitat trading markets can

ecologically appropriate;
2. Establishment of a mitigation bank can bring together financial resources, planning and

scientific expertise not practicable to many project-specific compensatory mitigation
proposals. This consolidation of resources can increase the potential for the establishment
and long-term management of successful mitigation that maximizes opportunities for
contributing to biodiversity and/or watershed function;
3. Use of mitigation banks may reduce permit processing times and provide more costeffective compensatory mitigation opportunities for projects thatqualify;
4. Compensatory mitigation is typically implemented and functioning in advance of project
impacts, thereby reducing temporal losses of aquatic functions and uncertainty over whether

the mitigation will be successful in offsetting project impacts;
5. Consolidation of compensatory mitigation within a mitigation bank increases the
efficiency of limited agency resources in the review and compliance monitoring of mitigation
projects, and thus improves the reliability of efforts to restore, create or enhance wetlands for
mitigation purposes;
6. The existence of mitigation banks can contribute towards attainment of the goal for no
overall net loss of the nation's wetlands by providing opportunities to compensate for
authorized impacts when mitigation might not otherwise be appropriate or practicable.

See Federal Guidance, supra note 130, at 58,607. Banking also avoids the threat of takings
claims that may arise from exercising the avoid and minimize requirements of sequencing.
See note 209 infra. For a discussion of takings claims generally in the wetlands regulation
context, see Robert Meltz, Wetlands Regulation and the Law of Regulatory Takings, 30
ENVTL. L. REP. 10468 (2000).
136. See Gardner 11, supra note 18, at 10,075.
137. See Brumbaugh, supranote 134, at 4.
138. See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 104 at 3-21; see also Ruhl, supra note 102, at
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control for nonfungibilities as effectively as some of the air pollutant ETMs,
however, is a different question. Currency selection is the critical first step in
evaluating the degree to which a habitat trading market will face the nagging
problems of externalities and trades that reduce social welfare.
B.

CurrencyAdequacy

To ensure equivalent trades of wetlands, the currency must incorporate
important values provided by both the wetlands to be lost and the wetlands
used for mitigation. Of course, this begs the questions of what the relevant
values are, how we measure them, and how we reflect them in a conveniently
traded currency. 139 If all we care about in wetlands protection is acres of
wetlands, then the job is simple-identify wetlands and count up the acres. But
if we care about the delivery of the functional value of wetlands to the
environment and society, acres leave much to be desired as a currency for
Not all wetland acres are created equal-they are
trading wetlands.
nonfungible when their ecosystem service values are considered. 140
If mitigation banking encompasses trades between nonfungible wetlands
(i.e., involving different types of wetlands, wetlands in different watersheds,
and wetlands lost and restored in different time frames) the range of values
traded broadens and thus the need for a refined currency becomes more acute.
If the currency does not accurately capture the value sought to be measured
(e.g., the habitat service, the flood control service, the water filtration service)
we have less reason to be confident in the equivalency of trades. Developing
and using a wetland assessment methodology that measures these and other
relevant values, or some reliable indicia thereof, would thus be the critical first
step in developing a framework for wetland mitigation banking that allows
open trades based on a universally accepted currency.141

395-96.

&

139. The critical junctures at which currency selection must be incorporated into
wetlands mitigation banking decision making to efficiently regulate externalities are at the
wetlands assessment and wetlands trading stages. ELI describes these as the "[c]redit
definition and valuation" issues, and recognizes that they are the most complex issues in
mitigation banking. See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 18, at 77.
140. For an excellent description of why they are not fungible, see Dennis M. King
Luke W. Herbert, The Fungibility of Wetlands, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Sept.-Oct. 1997,
Indeed, research increasingly points to the fact that habitat qualities vary
at 10.
tremendously over geographic space, with some areas providing "hot spots" of biological
diversity far in excess of others. See Norman Myers, Russell A. Mittermeier, Cristina G.
Mittermeier, Gustavo A.B. da Fonseca & Jennifer Kent, Biodiversity Hotspots for
Conservation Priorities, 403 NATURE 853 (2000) (noting that 25 hotspots comprising 1.4
percent of the earth's surface house as many as 44 percent of all vascular plant species and
35 percent of all species in four vertebrate groups).
141. Wetland function assessment methods "attempt to establish, in either a qualitative
or quantitative fashion, the nature and extent of different services which a wetland may
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The Corps has granted broad discretion to state and local authorities to
select currencies. 142 Roughly forty different wetlands assessment methods
have been used, varying in terms of the type of habitats in which the method is
used, the basic targets of assessment, and the functional and social values
encompassed in the assessment. 14 3 Over half of the methods go beyond
assessment of habitat suitability to encompass some assessment of wetland
function, but many of these function-based methods are bounded by limitations
on type of habitat for which the method can be used (e.g., coastal wetlands
only) and limited in terms of the functions assessed (e.g., limited to avian
species functions).1 44 Moreover, the data requirements for these advanced
methods are significant.1 45
Given the specific focus and data-hungry
techniques of the more advanced assessment methods, the choice between
counting acres and conducting in-depth scientific research for each trade makes
currency selection in wetlands banking a critical threshold issue for the trading
program's structure.
Reviews of wetland assessment methodology theory and practice
conducted since banking sprang onto the scene in 1985 have categorized
assessment methods into three major types:
Simple indices are derived from quickly and easily observed characteristics of
a wetland, and usually serve as surrogate "indicators" of one or more
ecological functions [e.g., percent cover of aquatic vegetation].
Narrowly tailored systems attempt to measure directly a limited range of
wetland services, such as wildlife habitat, through a detailed procedure
focusing on that particular wetland service [e.g., percent duck habitat].
Broadly tailored systems examine a range of wetland functions covering a
number of observable characteristics. 146

Simple index methods, such as counting acres, make mitigation banking
easier and less costly, but "are often the least sensitive to wetlands values and
functions. Also, most simple indices do not take into account scale effects." 14 7
Clearly, it would be difficult to integrate ecosystem service valuation into

provide. Once those services are known, they may be translated into a 'currency' which can
serve as the medium of trade for a wetland mitigation bank." ELI-WETLAND, supra note 18
at 77.
142. "Because wetlands are complex and incompletely understood, it is difficult to
assign a quantitative number to their value. Instead of confronting this difficulty head-on,
the Corps-EPA Mitigation MOA provides broad guidelines for valuing wetlands, leaving
local permitting authorities with virtually unfettered discretion in determining whether a just
compensation for destroyed wetlands has been achieved." Veltman, supra note 9, at 673-74.
143. See CANDY C. BARTOLDUS, A COMPREHENSIVE REvIEW OF WETLAND
ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES: A GUIDE FOR WETLAND PRACTITIONERS (1999).

144. Id. at tbls. 1-3.
145. Id. at tbl. 3.
146. ELI-WETLAND, supra note
147. Id. at 89.

18, at 78.
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wetlands mitigation banking programs relying on simple index methods.
Similarly, narrowly tailored methods, such as those attempting to evaluate
habitat values, are generally focused on specific habitat types or species, and
thus can result in "mitigating to the test"-that is, driving the banking process
toward the favored habitat type or species. Also, "comparing cumulative
[habitat units] for different sets of species involves risks inherent in comparing
apples and oranges." 14 8 In other words, the narrowly tailored methods fail to
produce a currency that can be reliably used across nonfungible features of
assessment, suggesting that these methods will not successfully integrate all the
value measurements needed if the goal is to produce a currency applicable
across nonfungible biological, economic, and social factors. Thus, the
Environmental Law Institute (ELI) concludes, "[fjor wetland managers
concerned about the spectrum of functions provided by a wetland, there is no
substitute for a carefully considered, broadly tailored analysis." 14 9
In practice, however, these broader assessment methods tend to be
expensive and to produce reams of qualitative results which, for ease of
comparison, wetlands managers tend to reduce to quantitative value scores that
often mask the ecological rationales.150 Indeed, comprehensive reviews in
1992 and 1993 of wetlands mitigation banks in operation concluded that only a
small number employed a broadly tailored method (a comprehensive currency),
while among the rest "debiting and crediting transactions are based on two
basic currencies-acreage and functional replacement." 15 1 To determine
whether banks established after these studies have adopted more complex
currencies, we contacted new banks by telephone and e-mail. 15 2 We identified

148. Id. at 90. For example, if we measure habitat value based on what makes good
habitat for ducks, which for a variety of institutional reasons many of the habitat-based
indices use as the benchmark, we will wind up with more duck habitat and less habitat for
species that do not thrive in duck habitat. See id. at 36.
149. Id. at 90.
150. Id. at 91.
151. Writing in 1994, ELI found four banks used the Wetland Evaluation Technique
(WET), a broadly tailored method, and the rest were split between using acre counts (a
simple index) and the Habitat Evaluation Procedure (HEP) (a narrowly tailored method).
See ELI-WETLANDS, supra note 18, at app. B. Similarly, in its 1994 First Phase Report of
the National Wetland Mitigation Study, the Corps' Institute for Water Resources (IWR)
reviewed 44 banks existing in 1992. IWR's conclusions were consistent with those of ELI,
finding 12 banks used an inventory method (acres) exclusively, eight used a function
evaluation method (usually habitat units) exclusively, and the other banks used other
methods and combinations of methods. IWR counted none using what ELI would call a
broadly tailored index method. INSTITUTE FOR WATER RESOURCES, U.S. ARMY CoRPS OF
ENGINEERS, NATIONAL WETLANDS MITIGATION STUDY: FIRST PHASE REPORT 31-32 (1994).

152. This work was conducted under an EPA STAR grant with Jim Salzman as
principal investigator. Abridged results are published in, J.B. Ruhl and Juge Gregg,
Integrating Ecosystem Services Into Environmental Law: A Case Study of Wetlands
Mitigation Banking, STAN. ENvTL L. J. (forthcoming). For project summary, see supra, note

71.
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and were able to describe in detail thirty-six banks established after 1994.153
Overall, we found that simple currency methods continue to dominate. 154
For the most part, then, wetlands assessment methods in actual use in
wetlands mitigation banks have advanced very little from the beginning of the
decade, meaning that the trading currency has stagnated at the relatively crude
acre-based form. 15 5 Wetlands mitigation banking entities seem focused on
using the simplest and most expedient assessment method that the relevant
regulatory bodies will approve, and the regulatory bodies do not appear widely
to require or even encourage a more sophisticated approach.1 5 6 Trades based
153. Nineteen of these banks use an acre-based index; fifteen use one of the functionbased methods, and two use a "best professional judgment" approach. This split between
acre-based and function-based methods is consistent with ELI's and IWR's earlier findings.
See INSTITUTE FOR WATER RESOURCES, supra note 151, at 31-32 (providing pre-1994 data).
154. Indeed, the Corps has been criticized for being unwilling to engage in broad
functional measurement in other aspects of the 404 permit program as well, including
wetland delineation and permit approval and denial. See Michael J. Mortimer, Irregular
Regulation UnderSection 404 of the Clean Water Act: Is the Congress or the Army Corps of
Engineers to Blame?, 13 J. ENvTL. L. & LmG. 445, 460-73 (1998) (providing an empirical
study of Corps actions). Many state wetland protection programs are accused of suffering
from the same shortcoming. For example, Maryland has one of the most sophisticated
regulatory programs in place for wetlands protection yet it, too, relies on a simple currency.
As a Chesapeake Bay Foundation report described, the Maryland Department of the
Environment's method "to calculate the amount of mitigation required to compensate for
wetland impacts is replacement ratios. While this method considers acreage, vegetation, and
to a limited extent, uniqueness, it does not specifically consider wetlands functions gained or
lost." CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATION, supra note 125, at 10.
155. See Jack T. Chowning, In-Lieu-Fee ProgramsBelong Among Mitigation Options,
NAT'L WETLANDS NEwSL., July-Aug. 1999, at 9 ("Dating back to before 1990, an acre-foracre requirement for mitigation has been the most common starting point for wetland
mitigation, because a technical framework for decisionmaking has not been available.");
Veltman, supra note 9, at 675 ("Despite the availability of these [broad-based] valuation
techniques, permitting authorities most often choose to value wetlands purely on number of
acres."). One exception is Florida's recent legislative initiative requiring state and local
agencies engaged in wetland mitigation banking to adopt a uniform wetland mitigation
assessment method that "must determine the value of functions provided by wetlands and
other surface waters considering the current conditions of these areas, utilization by fish and
wildlife, location, uniqueness, and hydrologic connection." Fla. H.B. 2365, § 4 (2000)
(amending Fla. Stat. § 373.414(18)). For a discussion of the Florida wetlands mitigation
banking program within which this new assessment method will fit, see John J. Fumero,
Environmental Law: 1994 Survey of FloridaLaw-At A Crossroads in Natural Resource
Protection and Management in Florida, 19 NovA L. REv. 77, 101-08 (1994).
156. Others concur in this bottom line assessment:
Apart from gaps in scientific knowledge, do we have the funds, expertise, and time to carry
out relatively detailed and accurate assessment of wetland functions and values on a wetlandby-wetland or area-wide basis in regulatory or other management efforts? There is no
indication from the experience of any federal agency, state, or local wetland program that we
can.

Jon Kusler & William Niering, Wetland Assessment: Have We Lost Our Way?, NAT.
WETLANDSNEwSL. (Envtl. L. Inst.), Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 1, 11.
Although the MOA [Memorandum of Agreement] calls for a minimum 1:1 functional
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on gross wetland classes and fixed ratios (e.g., two acres of Type A are worth
three acres of Type B) dominate the wetlands mitigation banking practice.
And, so long as the regulatory framework accommodates that practice, there is
little reason for those in need of wetlands mitigation banking units to integrate
the more complicated, costly, and time-consuming tasks that a refined currency
would entail without evidence that it will improve their net trading position. As
the ELI report thus aptly concludes, a wetland mitigation bank currency must
be:
(1) simple to determine and to monitor, and (2) able to represent a sufficient
range of values and functions. None of the existing systems do both of these
things well. The multivariate systems are quite useful for onsite, or projectspecific, mitigation, but they lack the simplicity for use in banking. The
simple systems overlook critical functions. 157

In practice, the currency choice has been based on the path of least
resistance. A comprehensive currency is too expensive to mint158 and too
arduous to use. 159 Given these practical realities, it is no surprise that instead
of developing and refining valuation approaches for assessment and trades,
wetlands mitigation banking assessment methods have stagnated in the acrebased and narrow function-based approaches, resulting in the use of relatively
crude currencies for wetlands habitat trading purposes. 160
replacement, in practice, this has often been read to mean a precisely 1:1 acreage
replacement. This occurs as a result of the broad discretion given to permitting authorities to
select valuation methods and make compensation decisions.

Veltman, supra note 9, at 676.

157. ELI-WETLAND, supra note 18, at 91.
158. See Rolland, supra note 126, at 513 ("The more functions that are considered
when assigning credits, the more likely the exchange will be accurate; yet greater accuracy is
also more costly and difficult to determine.").
159. As one study concluded, "as wetland assessment techniques become more
complicated and couched in technical language ... the number of potential users
diminishes." Kusler & Niering, supra note 156, at 1, 11. Some advocates of wetlands
mitigation banking overlook this problem, suggesting the currency difficulties in wetlands
ETMs are simply a matter of the Corps' failure to mandate a particular assessment method
for all trades. See, e.g., Lisa M. Schenck, Wetlands Protection: Regulators Need to Give
Credit to Mitigation Banking, 9 DICK. J. ENvrL. L. & PoL'Y 103, 120 (2000) ("Since
regulators have so many valuation methodologies to choose from, they should select the
procedure or combination that provides the most accurate valuation and accounts for the
many different wetland types and functions.").
160. This problem is likely to be more acute in the endangered species habitat context.
As the Environmental Defense Fund has explained, "as a practical matter, our ability to
quantify precisely current survival probabilities and the impacts of helpful or harmful actions
is rudimentary to nonexistent." EDF-ENDANGERED SPECIES, supra note 107, at 31. Turning
to acre-based formulas is of little advantage because we "have no neat formula by which to
weight each of these many variables and produce a meaningful index value to assign to the
acre." Id. Hence, it is "the practical reality that the varied circumstances and needs of
particular species will inevitably produce different 'currencies' to define bank credits and
debits." Id.; see also Bean & Dwyer, supra note 107, at 10,548-49. The need to mint a
currency for each species may price most endangered species ETMs out of reach, or, more
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Exchange Adequacy

Because they fail to account for the significant environmental and social
welfare values across space, type, and time, it is difficult to evaluate the
environmental performance of an ETM that uses crude currencies. For
example, despite claims by the Maryland Department of the Environment that
the state had gained 122 acres of wetlands between 1991 and 1996, a
Chesapeake Bay Foundation study found that there had been a net loss of fiftyone acres of wetlands functions. 16 1 The analytical framework we propose in
this Article predicts that crude currencies, such as those derived from the
simple index measures of wetland qualities that prevail in wetlands banking
programs, will result in tightly constrained trading schemes if the market maker
desires to control for environmental externalities. By contrast, sophisticated
wetland assessment methods, such as ones that fully reflect wetland function
values, can be converted to currencies that limit externalities sufficiently to
allow the market maker to permit trades to be made regardless of type, space,
and time differences. The comprehensive currency, reflecting function and
service value, would make differences in type irrelevant, allow comparison of
impact to different locations, and allow discounting for purposes of timing
differentials. 162 The wetlands banking program, hamstrung as it is by its crude
currency forms, bears out this postulated inverse relationship between currency
sophistication and intensity of market constraint.
1.

Nonfungibility of type.

The preference the Corps and EPA demonstrate for in-kind compensatory
wetland mitigation reflects the substantial differences in rarity, time to
maturity, and functions that different wetland types exhibit. Because crude
currencies such as acres and habitat function fail to capture these complex
differences in wetlands, wetlands mitigation banking programs also are
reluctant to stray far from a strict in-kind policy. For example, the Federal
Guidance allows out-of-kind mitigation in banking only "ifit is determined to
likely, lead the ETMs to rely on simple acre-based currencies despite their shortcoming and
hope to control externality problems through exchange constraints.
161. See CHESAPEAKE BAY FOUNDATIoN, supra note 125, at i.
162. For example, when Florida recently enacted legislation requiring all state and
local agencies engaged in wetland mitigation banking to devise and adopt a uniform
functional assessment method, see supra note 155, it anticipated the type, space, and time
nonfungibilities inherent in the process. The assessment method thus must (1) "account for
different ecological communities in different areas of the state"; (2) "determine the value of
functions provided by wetlands ... considering ... location"; and (3) "account for the
expected time-lag associated with offsetting impacts." Fla. H.B. 2365, §4 (2000) (amending
FLA. STAT. §373.414(18)). The Florida Department of Environmental Protection has until
January 2002 to devise this all-encompassing currency for mitigation banking. We wish
them luck.
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be practicable and environmentally preferable." 163 Even when out-of-kind
trading is allowed, however, banks typically impose fixed trading ratios
between acres of the wetland types as a surrogate for more precise
measurements of comparative function value. 16 4 In short, as compared to open
or fixed ratio out-of-kind trading, "[i]n-kind mitigation requires less
understanding of tradeoffs because it is based on the assumption that certain
wetland functions ... will follow the wetland form." 165 The cost of this inkind requirement, however, is a thinning of the wetlands trading market from
all wetlands to the defined in-kind type.
2.

Nonfungibility ofspace.

The value of wetlands' services depends fundamentally on their landscape
context. 166 Even controlling for type, a bog wetland in Maine may not provide
the same function values as one in Oregon, or even one in the next county.
And even if it does, it certainly will not deliver the services of nutrient trapping,
flood control, or nursery habitat to the same parties. Obviously, however, the
preference for on-site mitigation the Corps and EPA have adopted for
compensatory mitigation in general cannot apply strictly to wetland mitigation
banking. Instead, the concept of a geographically defined "service area" is
imposed on wetlands banks to define the area "wherein a bank can reasonably
be expected to provide appropriate compensation for impacts to wetlands
and/or other aquatic resources." 167 In general, service areas should be no larger
than the watershed within which the bank is located, unless reaching beyond
that market is "practicable and environmentally desirable." 168 Coupled with an
in-kind constraint, this service area constraint could significantly further narrow
the potential supply of wetlands in the trading market. 169

163. Federal Guidance, supra note 130, at 58,611.
164. See ELI-WErLAND, supra note 18, at 92. Trading ratios also are often imposed to
adjust for different mitigation forms (e.g., restoration versus preservation) and for the
general uncertainty that the bank wetlands will exhibit as much acre-for-acre integrity as the
filled wetlands. See id.

165. Id. at 30.
166. See Salzman, supra note 63, at 896 ("The value of a wetland's nutrient trapping
services, for instance, depends on the location of its out-flow. Does it flow to shellfish beds
(high value) or a fast-flowing ocean current (low value)?"). In our EPA grant, we are
studying a trade in Florida of inland wetlands for wetlands located on a small island in a
river. Even if the two wetlands have the same biophysical capacity, the delivery, and
therefore value, of their services will differ significantly. See also ELI-WErLAND, supra
note 18, at 30 ("[M]ost wetland functions have value because of where they exist in the
landscape.").
167. Federal Guidance, supra note 130, at 58,611.

168. Id.
169. The spatial fungibility issue is even more complicated in the endangered species
context, where strategic siting of bank service areas must account for species movement,
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Nonfungibility of time.

One of the purported advantages of wetland banking programs is that the
bank has created the wetlands before the credits are drawn, so that the
mitigation is secured before the wetlands are filled. In general, therefore, the
Federal Guidance provides that "[t]he number of credits available for
withdrawal (i.e., debiting) should generally be commensurate with the level of
aquatic functions attained at a bank at the time of debiting."1 7 0 With large
commercial banks, however, the expense and time involved with establishing
functional wetlands, particularly those of types that require long maturation
periods, could make the banking cost prohibitive if credits could not be drawn
before the bank's wetland values are fully in place. The FederalGuidance thus
allows some leeway in the timing requirement, allowing credit withdrawal
before equal wetland values are established, if the bank possesses adequate
financial assurance and has exhibited a high probability of success. 17 1 In some
cases this policy results in lags of up to six years between the times of wetland
destruction and wetland replacement.1 72

habitat succession, and discontinuities in suitable habitat locations. See EDF-ENDANGERED
SPECIES, supra note 107, at 30-31; Bean & Dwyer, supra note 107, at 10,537.
170. Federal Guidance, supra note 130, at 58,611. Studies of wetland restorations
have found a remarkably low rate of success. The Florida Department of Environmental
Regulation found a success rate of forty-five percent for tidal wetlands creation, twelve
percent for freshwater wetlands creation. Veltman, supra note 9, at 669.
171. See Federal Guidance, supra note 130, at 58,611. Explaining the pressure to relax
time restraints, a Corps official has written:
Among the most critical issues that affect the financial success of commercial banks, and
thus the willingness on the part of the private sector to get involved in commercial banking,
is the timing of debiting versus accrual of credits in the bank. Ideally, mitigation banks are
constructed in advance of development projects that result in wetland losses and are seen as a
way of reducing uncertainty in the wetlands replacement process. However, virtually all
private commercial bank entrepreneurs argue that for their banking ventures to be
economically viable, they need to be allowed to sell credits before replacement wetlands are

fully functioning or self-maintaining. Allowing a bank to be debited before it achieves a
fully functioning stage involves a trade-off between ecologic and economic risks. The later
the bank may be debited (along a time continuum from planning through design,

construction, and operation), the lower the ecologic risk. However, delays in allowing
debiting increase the financial risk to the investor. The private sector generally needs some
level of immediate return to justify the financial risk or to supplement initial funding....
Private commercial banks implemented to date reflect the value of time. Regulators have
allowed debiting (generally to a limited extent) shortly after bank construction, during
construction, or even shortly before construction, if there was an approved site plan and
appropriate real estate arrangements and financial assurances (such as funds for remedial
work, if needed, and for long-term management).

Brumbaugh, supranote 134, at 4-5.
172. See Michael G. Le Desma, A Sound of Thunder: Problems and Prospects in
Wetland Mitigation Banking, 19 CoLuM. J. ENvM. L. 497,506 (1994).
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D. Fat and Sloppy Versus Thin and Bland
Our findings and those of others suggest that practical constraints on the
implementation of more sophisticated assessment methods designed to produce
a refined currency for trades-in terms of costs, time demands, and
complexity-have prevented wetland mitigation banking from ensuring
currency adequacy. Thus, wetlands banking has been forced into the next best
alternative-designing market constraints to plug up the holes that the crude
currency otherwise leaves open to externalities. Assessment methodology has
become the proverbial tail that wags the dog, keeping the wetlands program
from tapping the full benefit of market trading efficiency as the market makers
(EPA and the Corps) attempt to shore up the weak currency with market
constraints.
There is good reason to believe this problem will be endemic to habitat
trading programs in general until ecologists can deliver a cheaply calculated,
refined currency for habitat values. The cost of valuing the currency in the
sulfur dioxide program is low-a ton is a ton. But the cost of creating habitat
currencies is either very cheap-an acre is an acre-or, if we demand reliable
measures of environmental and social service values, very expensive.
Developers have an incentive to use the least expensive currency the
government will allow. The government has an incentive not to make the
currency too expensive to mint, or no one will use it and the trading program
will expire of its own accord. 17 3 Because of these agency and participant
incentives, as described in Part I, the net result has been Gresham's Law in
practice-simple currencies have driven out complex ones. Despite policies
mandating that habitat trading ensure equivalent value and function, 174 the
experience is that the programs are not administered this way. In practice, most
habitat trades to date in wetlands and HCP programs have been approved on
the basis of acres, in many instances ensuring equivalence in neither value nor
function. If parties have a choice between a complex (and expensive) currency
that measures equivalent function or a simple metric, and both deliver a 404
permit, simplicity will always win. Thus, given the choice in the habitat
context of acres or complicated measures of value, acreage has won.
Moreover, now that the Corps has committed to the mitigation banking
program as the ideal of compensatory mitigation, many believe that there is
pressure within the Corps to facilitate the program by easing the official avoidminimize-compensate
sequencing policy that has already eroded

173. For the public choice analysis of agency decisions, see Part 1V.B.
174. See Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 116, at 9212 (Wetland values shall
be determined "by applying aquatic site assessment techniques generally recognized by
experts in the field and/or the best professional judgment of Federal and State agency
representatives, provided such assessments fully consider ecological functions included in
the Guidelines.") (emphasis added).
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substantially.1 75 Avoiding wetlands and minimizing wetland impacts reduce
the demand for mitigation bank credits and thus thin the market. Predictably,
the pressures to adopt crude currencies and to keep markets thick combine to
allow the seepage of externalities from the wetlands mitigation banking market.
For example, a recent study of wetland banking in Florida found that
trades, even in the same watershed, have produced "a transfer of wetlands from
highly urbanized, high-population density areas to more rural low-population
density areas." 176 The same problem has plagued mitigation banking in
Virginia, where a recent study found that most mitigation banks are located in
rural areas while most wetland losses take place in urban and suburban
areas. 177 In other words, as can be expected from a market efficiency
perspective, developers want to develop wetlands where land is dear (urban)
and wetland banks want to locate where land is cheap (rural). The existing
wetlands mitigation banking framework lets them do so, or at least fails to
scrutinize the externality effects of the practice. The result is trades that move
wetlands out of areas where they may provide services to urban populations
and into sparsely populated areas. Should we be concerned about this "marketdriven 'migration' of wetlands across the urban-rural landscape,"1 7 8 even
though it is a reflection of the efficiency of trading? If we care about the equity
of who receives wetland services and their value, then the answer is yes, and
we should closely examine the redistribution of wetland service values within
the environment and between human populations.1 79 But if we care primarily

175. See Bean & Dwyer, supra note 107, at 10,550 ("[C]onservation interests worry
that the practical effect of the mitigation banks is to tempt regulators to skip rather lightly
past avoidance and minimization and proceed instead directly to compensation in the form of
purchasing credits from a bank.").
176. King & Herbert, supra note 140, at 11.
177. See Ann Jennings, Roy Hoagland & Eric Rudolph, Down Sides to Virginia
Mitigation Banking, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 9, 10. The Virginia study
also found an increasing trend toward the use of banks in one watershed to compensate for
losses in a different watershed. See id. at 9-10.
178. King & Herbert, supra note 140, at 11. In a similar example, our EPA project is
studying a mitigation banking trade in Florida where a wetland near a community was filled
in exchange for restoring a wetland on a small island in the middle of a river.
179. We are not suggesting that the shift from urban to rural wetlands is necessarily an
unwise policy in all cases. In some settings, the urban wetlands to be developed may be
comprised of many small, isolated wetlands of poor quality, whereas the rural mitigation
bank may produce a large, contiguous, high-quality habitat. We are suggesting, however,
that the shift between the human populations serviced may be significant and thus should be
considered in the evaluation of the mitigation banking policy, whereas the Florida and
Virginia studies show that it has not been. Moreover, research has revealed the importance
of small, isolated wetlands to maintaining biodiversity and habitat for some species, thus the
ideal of large, contiguous rural wetlands will not always provide superior environmental
value. See note 126 supra. There is also evidence that restoration of small urban wetlands
can yield significant ecological benefits both within the urban area and to distant aquatic
systems by controlling urban runoff. See Elizabeth H. Smith & Sandra Alvarado, Enhanced
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about keeping the wetland banking market thick, then the answer is no, for to
add another location restriction based on keeping trades within the same
"population-shed" would surely thin the market considerably.
Given this state of affairs, the aggressive integration of open trading
models into wetlands and other habitat contexts poses concerns for
Even the most developed habitat assessment
environmental protection.
methods presently in use are ill-prepared to produce reliable, inexpensive, and
ready measurements of a habitat's environmental and service values. Such
measurements require far more money and time to produce on a site-specific
basis than developers, habitat bankers, and the government seem prepared to
In the absence of such measurements, the government and
allocate.
environmental groups will likely require at a minimum constraints on habitat
trading markets (i.e., stronger exchange adequacy).
But even the current trading constraints are seen by many as too restrictive.
Observers have criticized the FederalGuidance for adhering too strictly to the
sequencing approach and other conditions applied generally to compensatory
mitigation, arguing that "this policy could prevent a banking market from ever
emerging."1 80 This is the inevitable pressure any regulated market faces when
externalities must be controlled through market constrictions rather than
through a refined currency-at some point the constraints threaten to swallow
the market. Surely a loosening of type, space, and time constraints would make
banking more flexible and economically attractive to entrepreneurs, but at what
price to the environment?
Indeed, the FederalGuidance invites further pressure to restrict the market
with its "practicable and environmentally desirable" standard for exceptions to
As commercial banking becomes more
the set of trading constraints.
widespread, it is likely that the criticisms bank sponsors have already lodged
against the FederalGuidance will intensify if the market for credits does not
swell. Moreover, to the extent mitigation banking is intended to replace the
project-by-project approach to compensatory mitigation in the regime of 404
permits, the Corps already feels pressure to ensure that the market does not
become too thin. And make no mistake, the Corps is feeling pressure to loosen
the timing restrictions of the Federal Guidance and other exchange adequacy
safeguards and has openly discussed relaxation of its restrictions. 181

Wetlands in Urban Landscapes: A Demonstration with the Corpus Christi Bay National
Estuary Program,NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 9-11.
180. Liebesman & Plott, supra note 125, at 342; see also Gardner II, supra note 18, at
10,075 (stating that the Federal Guidance "does not go far enough to encourage privatesector investment in the process of wetland mitigation"); William W. Sapp, The Supply-Side
and Demand-Side of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 74 OR. L. REv. 951, 981-90 (1995)
(arguing for relaxation of strict sequencing, on-site mitigation preference, and in-kind
mitigation preference in order to increase the demand for mitigation banking credits-i.e., to
thicken the market).
181. See note 171 supra.
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At the extreme, of course, land developers and bank sponsors most prefer a
nationwide bank of freely transferable credits, and have been pushing for this
and relaxation of other restraints. 182 Such relaxation of space, type, and time
restraints may seem reasonable if the Corps believes the existing crude
wetlands currencies are sufficient. If so, though, it will be banking on sheer
serendipity to believe that wetlands banking and other habitat trading programs
will produce consistently positive results for the environment. Where pressure
is high to keep the market thick and currencies simple, the alternative to leaving
matters to chance lies in integrating a mechanism into the market for reviewing
bad trades, which leads to the next section of our analysis.
IV. REVIEW ADEQUACY: DESIGNING APPROVAL AND INTERVENTION
MECHANISMS

Once an ETM has designed its currency and imposed trading restrictions to
compensate for externalities created by the currency's shortcomings, how does
the ETM assess trades? Unlike children trading baseball cards, when trading
involves the environment there are interests beyond those of the traders that
must be taken into account. The previous discussion demonstrated that
broadened use of ETMs in settings such as wetlands, endangered species
protection, and similar habitat-based programs where nonfungibilities run high
can result in exchanges that all but ignore environmental and social welfare
values important to the public at large. This does not necessarily mean that
ETMs should be avoided in such contexts. But it does suggest that they should
be implemented only when an efficient and effective institutional structure can
be grafted onto the ETM to protect the public goods involved.
This need to account for the public interest poses a fundamental, and
largely unrecognized, challenge for ETMs. Two competing views have
dominated in the quest for an environmental policy institution that best
represents the public interest. One view advocates the market, the other
politics.1 83 ETMs represent a shift from politics to the market as a means of
allocating environmental resources. But when the market lacks a currency to
measure commodity equivalence and exchange rules do not capture all
significant externalities, is fully relying on the constructed market sensible? If
it is not possible to meaningfully compare environmental features using the
crude currencies of many ETMs, how will anyone know if the market is serving
the public interest, i.e. increasing social welfare? It may behoove the public,
therefore, to retain some mechanism of market intervention to screen for and
correct ETM exchanges that reduce social welfare.
As Part IV explains, the provision of a meaningful review mechanism
182. See ELI-WETLAND, supra note 18, at 58.
183. See DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 35-69 (1999) (describing the
competing views).
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presents the most problematic design issue for ETMs trading in nonfungible
environmental features. Most ETMs effectively employ generic rules rather
than ex post review of individual trades, relying on the currency and exchange
restrictions to prevent trades that reduce social welfare. This might work fine
for a commodity market exchanging identical goods, where the traded habitat
or air pollutant is as fungible as pork bellies. But, as we argue in the sections
below, the commodity vision of habitat ETMs is inapt. The more appropriate
model is that of a barter market, where the goods exchanged are not generic. In
this setting, ex post review may be necessary to ensure equivalent trades.
We next examine the institutional incentives of the relevant parties, finding
that this, too, suggests the need for an ex post review of ETMs. Fundamentally,
trading parties seek not the conservation of wetlands but, rather, a development
permit and profit from the transaction. As a result, they will seek to maximize
nonfungibilities to drive down costs. Agencies, who are supposed to serve as
the check to ensure equivalent trades, have strong incentives to keep markets
thick. Thus on the margin neither the trading party nor the agencies will favor
rigorous (and therefore costly) review. Only those public interests that value the
public goods being traded have an incentive to demand a meaningful review
mechanism. While this analysis argues in favor of ex post review, it
complicates its design. The question thus boils down to how to satisfy the
public's demand for ex post review without bringing the ETMs to a halt.
In the last section of Part IV, therefore, we evaluate alternative institutional
review procedures based on how well they respond to the tension between the
needs for rigorous ex post review and a functioning market. This forces
consideration of the timing and form of intervention, the various interests that
must be taken into account to make intervention meaningful, and the process
through which trades are assessed once intervention authority is exercised. We
also focus on the current practice of wedging ETMs into traditional permitting
programs, revealing a potentially intractable conflict between the objectives of
government, the regulated industry, and the public. In the final analysis, we
have no perfect solution for an institutional design. Rather, we make what we
consider to be a reasonable demand-advocates of trading nonfungible
environmental features should bear the burden of producing a comprehensive
currency that works and is affordable, devising exchange restrictions that
minimize the opportunities for significant externalities, or creating institutional
mechanisms to ensure meaningful review of trading outcomes. When neither
currency, exchange, nor review adequacy is satisfied, ETMs risk losing much
of their credibility.
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Approval Strategies

1. Wholesale review.
Starting our discussion with an idealized ETM helps set out the significant
challenges of designing institutional approval mechanisms for trades. Assume,
then, an ETM in which the demands of currency and exchange adequacy are
fully satisfied. The ETM's currency captures all the relevant attributes of the
traded environmental goods in easily calculated units, and trading restrictions
compensate for any externalities created by the currency's shortcomings
without thinning out the market. It would be reasonable to expect that such a
trading regime could operate relatively free of government oversight because
"bad trades" would not take place. Beyond the initial allocation of rights and
the need to uncover cheating, there would simply be no need for government
intervention.
This idealized ETM scenario suggests at most the use of a wholesale
strategy of approval. Here the government sets the initial trading rules, grants
entitlements to private parties, stands back and acts as a referee. 184 The
government still needs to monitor compliance and undertake enforcement
efforts, much as the SEC does in regulating stock markets. Cheating is a
concern, but one might argue the situation is qualitatively no different than the
role the IRS or SEC plays in monitoring compliance with tax and security laws.
One could simply penalize cheating with a big fine after the fact. 185 The
government may have to step in and tinker with the rules or allocations to
perfect the market, much as central banks intervene to reduce high levels of
arbitrage by influencing foreign exchange rates. Beyond that, however, the
government sits back and contentedly observes exchanges, assuming the
commodities are fungible and environmental protection is assured, so long as
the trading rules are followed. Importantly, this model reduces uncertainty,
increasing the likelihood of thick markets. 186 Thus market advocates routinely

184. See, e.g., Sohn & Cohen, supra note 12, at 431-32 ("[I]n the lead phasedown
program, the regulatory authority only records and tracks credit ownership; trades require no
prior approval or public input."); Polesetsky, supra note 14, at 395-96 (describing the limited
administrative role under the RECLAIM credit trading regime).
185. This enforcement assumption of the passive model bears scrutiny. Unlike
monetary sanctions that can largely undo the harm caused by tax and securities fraud, habitat
destruction is irreversible. Saying "oops" after the fact has very different consequences with
ETMs than in traditional enforcement settings. Retrospective correction of environmental
errors cannot be assumed. Moreover, one might argue that the problem of monitoring ETM
compliance is far greater than the problem of monitoring income or securities, both because
of the relative cost of monitoring performance and the lack of checks within the system (e.g.,
both employers and employees report the employee's income, yet they do not share the same
interests in cheating).
186. One could theorize, a priori, that greater uncertainty over government approval of

Dec. 2000]

CURRENCIES AND COMMODIFICATION

671

call for a more passive approach without government oversight of each
transfer. 187 And, not surprisingly, generic approval serves as the status quo for
most ETMs.
2.

Retail review.

Many environmental reform proponents seem practically exuberant over
the prospects of using trading markets to shape environmental policy, reciting
the success stories of the sulfur dioxide and leaded gasoline ETMs while
calling for the use of trading in an even broader spectrum of environmental
contexts. But we suspect that the low-hanging fruit, where currencies serve as
effective proxies for environmental values, markets are rich with supply and
diversity, and policing is straightforward, has largely been picked.1 8 8 In short,
it will be difficult to replicate the acid rain trading program more than
infrequently. More realistically, informational, technological, and financial
limits will keep currencies sloppy, regulatory bodies will struggle to design
trading restrictions that reduce externalities while keeping markets thick, and
policing poor trades will require vigilant monitoring and a strong will to
intervene. The preceding discussion in the article considered how design
strategies could tackle these inherent challenges. As Parts I, II, and III
demonstrated, however, in some cases, perhaps many, currency and exchange
adequacy will not in and of themselves ensure trades that preserve public goods
and promote social welfare. Currency design and trading restriction strategies
may not eliminate all the important externalities.
The referee model of wholesale review-broad rules for conducting
multiple transactions-assumes that the rules work and simply need to be
enforced. By contrast, a retail review-individual review of each transactionis appropriate when one has little confidence, despite the currency and
exchange rules, that the market will select environmentally protective trades. 189
In this role the government defines the currency and sets the trading rules, but it
also retains the discretion to reject trades. 190 The government acts as arbiter,
trades would lead to a poorly functioning market. The closer a trade moves toward
becoming a risky investment, the less the potential interest among trading parties. See Hahn
& Hester, supra note 14, at 140 ("Because firms value certainty when considering major
investments, they are likely to find internal trading advantageous, even if emission credits
might be acquired at a lower cost through an external trade.").
187. See note 184 supra.
188. Even in the air pollution setting, experts are beginning to doubt the ease and
success with which the sulfur dioxide ETM model can be transported to other pollutant
markets. See TradingProgramsMay Cut Emissions, But No "SilverBullets," EPA Official
Says, 30 ENV'T REP. 1321 (1999).
189. The authors are grateful for Dick Stewart's suggestion of the retail/wholesale

terminology.
190. In this respect, ex post ETM review resembles the Hart-Scott-Rodino process at
the Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department, where private parties have an
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assessing private trades to ensure they satisfy the policy goals of the
program.191 Since habitat trades represent private resources that have a public
goods component, there may be a strong public interest at stake. An ex post
mechanism can therefore provide a critical safety net for trades that satisfy
currency and exchange adequacy yet result in loss of social welfare, i.e., trades
that ex ante approval would not catch. 192 The choice of general rules of trade
over case-by-case review will reduce transaction costs but, unless the rules of
exchange are carefully crafted, will not effectively detect trades where
environmental values are lost.
Put differently, if wholesale review resembles the government's oversight
of a commodity market, then retail review requiring substantive approval by the
government looks more like a barter market. When fungibility of commodities
cannot be assumed, as it can for markets in pork bellies, gold, or soy beans,
discretionary authority to evaluate individual goods becomes important. As
trades increasingly resemble apples for oranges, it becomes necessary for the
government to say, borrowing a phrase from Justice Potter Stewart, "I know an
equivalent trade when I see it."193 The challenge lies in devising a program

incentive to create mergers that concentrate market power. In practice, about ninety percent
of the 4000 mergers per year that fall under the Act raise few concerns, but about ten percent
get a serious look. If the government chooses not to approve the merger, it shoulders the
burden of justifying in court why it would be contrary to public policy. Few of these
challenges ever go to court, though, since the parties work out side deals where certain
interests are divested.
Interview with Jonathan Baker, former Director, Bureau of
Economics, Federal Trade Commission (Nov. 17, 1999).
191. The government can act even more directly as a market participant, offering to
swap federal for state or private lands, purchasing habitat from landowners, obtaining
commitments from polluters to reduce their emissions, or buying commitments from fishing
boats not to fish beyond certain limits. The private party determines for herself whether the
government benefit offered (money or land) is sufficient. See John P. Dwyer, California's
Tradable Emissions Policy and Greenhouse Gas Control, 118 J. ENERGY ENGINEERING 59,
61 (1992) (claiming that offset trades in California are subject to public review and agency
approval).
192. See generally Ashutosh Avinsha Bhagwat, Modes ofRegulatory Enforcement and

the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2000) (ex ante
regulatory powers shield agency discretion and should be used sparingly in substantive areas
where agency discretion can threaten important social interests); Mark Seidenfeld, Bending

the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51

ADMIN.

L. REv.

429 (1999) (examining the rationales for ex ante constraints versus ex post review of agency
decisions and arguing that ex ante constraints are often unworkable in contexts where
normative quality is important to the program).
193. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description [of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this
case is not that."). For example, one critic of federal land exchange programs, through
which public lands are traded for private lands, has observed that the trading parties'
assessment of trades is difficult because
[l]and exchanges are essentially barter-trade without a medium of exchange such as money.
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that enables the arbiter to "see" bad trades and provides the institutional
authority and incentives to do something about them.
This sort of review mechanism, though, poses two obvious problems. The
first is little different from the challenge we observed in Parts I and II. An
additional review layer adds to transaction costs through sheer administrative
expense, delay in approval, and added uncertainty for approval. In this regard,
it is instructive to note that in the early days of the bubbling and offset
programs, EPA generally insisted on ex post (retail) review of every trade
while state programs relied on ex ante policing (wholesale review). The EPA's
approach increased the transaction costs and uncertainty of final approval,
resulting in fewer than half the trades than would be permitted under more
generic state reviews. 194
Moreover, unless intelligently designed and monitored, there exists a very
real possibility that a retail review process could lead to overvaluation of
exchanged commodities as significant in magnitude as the undervaluation
prompting the initial concern. That is, any system put in place to catch trades
that undervalue public goods runs the risk of catching trades that are correctly
valued, as well, and unnecessarily requiring additional compensation.
Intelligent design, discussed below, can reduce these problems but not
eliminate them.
B.

InterestAnalysis

Even if one believes a retail review strategy is appropriate to ensure review
adequacy of nonfungible trades, the key question remains as to the proper kind
of oversight and approval process. The answers depend first on the likelihood
of such trades that need to be caught and second on our expectations of the
parties with a stake in the outcome-the agency, trading parties, and the public.
As to the first inquiry, the analysis in Parts I and H demonstrates that ETMs
with sloppy currencies and loose restrictions will systematically fail to capture
values represented by nonfungibilities. On balance, this will not reduce overall

Those who engage in land exchanges therefore face the problem of finding some way to
measure the value of different goods. Without the benefit of prices or some other standard,
people with different products have a difficult time determining whether a trade makes sense
for each person engaged in it-that is, whether it is fair.

Tim Fitzgerald, Federal Land Exchanges: Let's End the Barter, PERC Policy Series PS-18,
at 8 (June 2000), available at http://www.perc.org/psl8.pdf. The additional question we
suggest must be asked of ETMs is, fair for whom? As trading in habitat contexts affects
values of concern to groups outside of the trading parties, the evaluation of the fairness of
the trades is even further complicated by the barter nature of the trading market.
194. See Hahn & Hester, supra note 14, at 127-28; Richard Stewart, Emissions
Trading: Lessons from Domestic Experience, Remarks at Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Trading Policy Forum, in Denver, Colo. (July 31, 2000) (on file with authors). It is worth
noting, as well, that the wholesale strategy followed by the states was also employed by EPA
in its successful lead, CFC, and sulfur trading programs.
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environmental protection and social welfare so long as the externalities (both
positive and negative) are evenly distributed. The case study in Part III,
though, shows that this is not the case. Developers trading for wetlands will
always choose less expensive mitigation sites. These tend to be distant from
populations for the obvious reason that land prices are lower. But wetland
services such as flood protection, water purification, and detoxification are
more valuable when delivered to populations. Distant wetlands, ceteris
paribus, will provide less social welfare for the simple reason that their services
are delivered to smaller populations where their marginal contribution is likely
less valuable because other nearby undeveloped land may make additional
service provision redundant.195 While each case will present unique factors, as
a general rule the greater the nonfungibilities involved, the greater the
likelihood of unequal trades, and thus the potentiallygreater social welfare loss.
How large that potential loss may grow depends in large part on the
interest group dynamics inherent in ETMs. We observed previously that
trading in environmental commodities necessarily requires consideration of the
effect trades have on social welfare. If the public interest were consonant with
the interests of the trading parties and the government entity running the ETM,
then we could rest comfortably on the assumption that what is good for the
ETM is good for the public. And if deviations between the public interest and
the interests of the ETM participants varied randomly, we could console
ourselves that in the long run the differences would net out as a wash. But
there is good reason to believe that the institutional framework of ETMs will
cause the interests of ETM participants, traders and government alike, to
systematically deviate from the public's, thus squarely posing the problem of
having to devise some way of determining what the public interest is-not an
easy challenge in itself-and of identifying and correcting instances when
ETMs produce results in sharp conflict therewith. 196
195. Recall, too, that proponents of ETMs argue that trading's efficiency gains should
provide better protection at the same or less cost. This claim loses its force if the best one
can argue is that on balance the result of ETMs using crude currencies is a wash. And even
if one might argue that overall gains and losses in services balance out, some level of retail
review makes sense (given risk aversion to negative outcomes) as an insurance policy to
ensure that a wash remains the worst-case scenario.
196. Determining the public interest in objective terms would seem to require
assessing social welfare functions. In practice, relying on the Arrow Impossibility Theorem,
Michael Levine has argued this cannot be done.
[A]s hard as it is to determine whether two outcomes are equally efficient in the Pareto sense,
it is demonstrably impossible ... to construct a democratically derived and consistent social

welfare function that would allow one to assert objectively that one outcome is socially
preferred over another. Of course, it would be possible to choose outcomes preferred by a
particular firm or group with references to their preferences, but that would violate the
democratic condition which public interest theorists generally hold dear .... Unless a
democratic, consistent aggregation of the preferences of individuals in a group is possible,
there is no objective way to tell what is socially preferred (in the 'public interest').... [I]t is
best to describe those policies that would be ratified or adopted by a polity using its usual
political procedures as 'general interest,' rather than 'public interest' policies.
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Tradingparties.

In exploring the public choice pressures on institutional interests, let's start
with the trading parties and revisit the assumption posited at the beginning of
Part IV. We assumed the idealized case where there are no deficiencies in
currency adequacy and suggested that, beyond government oversight of
allocation and enforcement issues, the environmental protection goals should
be assured by a purely private trading regime. But this is only true if the parties
to the transaction value environmental protection. What if the currency does
capture metrics of environmental significance, but the trading parties are
indifferent, ignoring these values and acting instead on a different set of
interests? In that setting the ETM will promote environmental protection only
when environmental protection and the traders' interests happen to coincide.
Take the example of wetland mitigation banking. Throughout this article
we have described the exchange through the eyes of the public as one between
conserved habitat B and destroyed habitat A. But in the eyes of the trading
parties, the real exchange taking place is between the requirement to provide
conserved habitat B and the permit to destroy habitat A. The conserved habitat
is the price of the permit, pegged to the level of destruction. While the public
and environment are experiencing a trade of habitat, the developer is simply
paying for a permit.197 For private parties seeking to maximize profits, the goal
of the transaction is permission to develop at least cost, not to promote
environmental protection. As a result, the private parties to the trade are not
quality-conscious, so long as the trade results in permit approval. There is no
benefit in mitigating or restoring any more than is necessary. 19 8
Indeed, to keep costs down trading parties will seek to promote
nonfungible trades, pushing the market to the limit in order to exploit
differences of type, space, and time between the commodities for least-cost

Michael Levine, Regulatory Capture, in

NEw PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECoNOMICS AND

THE LAW 267, 268-269 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter Levine]. In our view, if a trade leads to an
overall loss of ecosystem services to a population, then it reduces social welfare and is likely
not in the public interest (depending on the benefit produced by development). Using
Levine's terminology, such a trade would not be in the general interest.
197. As far as the developer is concerned, her only transaction is paying a mitigation
bank in exchange for a permit from the Corps. She could care less about the services
provided by the restored wetlands, or even where they are, so long as she receives the permit
to develop. See Alyson C. Flournoy, Restoration Rx: An Evaluation and Prescription, 7
AaRz. L. REv. 187, 208 (2000) (observing that by making mitigation the "quid pro quo" for
the permit, permittees seek only enough mitigation success to obtain and retain the permit,
thus placing a heavy monitoring burden on the permitting agency).
198. See generally Marylee Guinon, No Free Lunch, 7 RESTORATION & MGMT. NOTES
2 (1989) (examining the frequency of under-reporting of costs in the restoration business and
the severity of resulting problems); Dennis M. King, Costing out Restoration, 9
RESTORATION & MGMT. NOTEs 15 (1991) (examining economic issues and expected results
of restoration projects).
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transactions. If a party can gain a permit to fill a hardwood wetland in a
growing suburb today in exchange for starting restoration of a cattail wetland in
a distant rural area at some point in the future, it surely will. In fact, the
regulated industries from which the habitat ETMs recruit traders increasingly
demand forms of contractualprotection requiring that the agencies treat the
barters they strike as final sales. 199 As explained earlier, trading parties can be
expected to desire certainty, simple currencies, and low transaction costs in an
ETM. Not surprisingly, that is how they are behaving.
Thus there seems little doubt that trading parties would prefer to retain the
"curtain" of the traditional permitting system, negotiating ad hoc trades in the
same closed agency-applicant format used to process permit applications.
Delegating some form of decision-making power to "the public interest" within
the permitting process raises the costs of uncertainty because there is no
assurance, a priori, that any trade will withstand review even if the agency's
guidelines are met. One might just say, "live with it industry, here are the new
rules," and hope that private parties grudgingly go along.2 00 But doing so
gravitates toward command-and-control models and hardly seems consistent
with the notion that ETMs provide market efficiencies.
2.

Agencies.

Absent strict oversight to ensure that environmental values form the basis
of exchange, analysis of the trading parties' interests suggests that the final
exchanges may well not be environmentally equivalent. What are the agency's
inherent interests in approving trades? We posit that the agency's and trader's
interests in fostering trades will often coincide such that, on the margins, it
leads to a market that is not environmentally quality conscious. The raw
evidence for this is clear. The case study in Part III demonstrated two trendsthe Corps' vigor in endorsing mitigation banks and the FWS's vigor in
promoting HCPs-both of which have been pursued despite crude currencies
and minimal public input. Why are these agencies so eager to promote trades

199. See generally Jean O. Melious & Robert D. Thornton, ContractualEcosystem
Management Under the EndangeredSpecies Act: Can FederalAgencies Make Enforceable
Commitments?, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 489 (1999) (analyzing whether contractual obligations
entered into by federal agencies are enforceable). This trend is part of what many scholars
perceive as a movement toward greater use of contract and quasi-contract instruments in
administrative regulation processes. See David A. Dana, The New ContractarianParadigm
in Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 35 (presenting motivations behind,
examples of, and legislative proposals for a contractual relationship between government
agencies and private parties); Daniel A. Farber, Triangulatingthe Future, 2000 U. ILL. L.
REv. 61; Jody Freeman, The ContractingState, 28 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. (forthcoming 2000).
200. In contrast to the recent FWS strategy in the Federal Register, see Federal
Guidance, supra note 130, where they effectively say, "live with it public, no radical
change."
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20 1
in the face of inadequate currencies and limited public participation?
To be sure, trading can deliver important environmental benefits. The odds
for long-term conservation of habitat are much greater if the regulated party
genuinely accepts the restrictions imposed by a wetland or endangered species
on his or her land, which will be more likely if the restriction is arrived at
2 02
through a quid pro quo bargain rather than prescriptive regulation.
Moreover, trading may allow the agency to get more environmental protection
bang for its buck than it practically could have gained through prescriptive
regulation.2 03 In an era of tight and often shrinking budgets this is a genuine
These explanations are sound, defensible environmental
advantage.
justifications often presented by government when promoting ETMs in habitat
protection settings.2 04 But there are additional interests at play here.
First, trading strengthens the agency's hand. Despite the agency's desire to
promote trades, the developer wants the trade, too. When it seeks to develop
wetlands or endangered species habitat, the developer faces uncertainty in
obtaining agency approval through a permit. In terms of financing, uncertainty
costs money. The agency can leverage the uncertainty of litigation or permit
approval to force a trade more to its liking. It is not uncommon for the FWS,
for example, to withhold issuance of the permit until its habitat swap conditions
are met. 205 Hence, some trades would not happen absent the agency's
2 06
aggressive interpretation of regulations to create trading opportunities.

201. One could equally ask why the Corps is pushing for further relaxation of the inkind, on-site requirements.
202. See Schoenbaum & Stewart, supra note 114, at 329-30.
203. See HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 104, at 3-7 to 3-8 (describing multi-species
focus), 3-19 to 3-26 (describing range of mitigation options); Ruhl, supra note 102, at 404
(multi-species), 393-96 (mitigation).
204. See, e.g., Hsu, supra note 102, at 10,598 (summarizing Secretary of Interior
Babbitt's stated rationales for supporting HCPs); U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T
OF INTERIOR, MAKING THE ESA WoRK BETrER: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TEN POINT PLAN

AND BEYOND 7 (1997) (describing agency's vision for HCP program).
205. See Ruhl, supra note 102, at 391-96 (explaining the practical leverage FWS has
over the HCP permit applicant in the negotiation of mitigation given its power to issue or
deny the permit).
206. This strategy flows from Gerd Winter's observation that "[t]he agency's basic
bargaining chip is its ability, either in law or in practice, to refrain from exercising its full
authority," and thus
even the failure to assert questionable power may be a bargaining chip. What an agency is
giving up is the possibility that a court will decide that it in fact has the power it pretends
to. ... Indeed, the ability to regulate at the border of its authority may be a reason why an
agency prefers bartering to efforts at full legal enforcement.

Gerd Winter, BarteringRationality in Regulation, 19 L. & Soc. REv. 219, 221-222 & n.3
(1985). For example, FWS's authority to prohibit development of habitat under the ESA is
far from certain in most circumstances, but the agency has used that uncertainty to lead many
developers to seek HCP permits in lieu of testing the bounds of the FWS power in court. See
Dana, supra note 199, at 47 (stating that one necessary characteristic of contractarian
approaches to environmental regulation, such as HCPs, is that the agency threatens
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In addition to wielding trades as a sword, agencies have strong incentives
to foster trades as a shield. It is no secret that endangered species and wetlands
have long served as political lightning rods for property rights groups. The
Corps and the FWS have become wary of conflict over these provisions as the
result of incessant sturm und drang in public fora. And for good reason, since
every congressional session witnesses new proposals to weaken the habitat
protections of the ESA and CWA. This combination of public attack and
political threat has led to real, pounding pressure on the agencies. 2 07 To a great
extent, then, habitat ETMs serve as political steam valves, dissipating public
attacks and blunting pointed legislation 20 8 and litigation.209 ETMs thus serve
as politically important defensive policies to ensure the viability of habitat
protection. As a result, and as a consequence of the Clinton administration's
high profile support of ETMs, the agency is invested in the programs and does
not want them to fail.
We therefore suggest that the policy entrepreneurs in agencies and the
business entrepreneurs of habitat development have sufficient overlap of
interests that both can benefit from increased trading in the habitat context. On
the margin, then, one would expect the agency's and applicant's interests to
coincide closely in promoting trades, even if that means papering over
nonfungibilities.2 10 A "culture" of trading emerges, in which agency and

application of regulatory power as a bargaining chip); Hsu, supra note 102, at 10,597
(suggesting that FWS could be even more aggressive than it has been in its legal positions,
thus providing more leverage for aggressive negotiation of HCPs); Ruh], supra note 102, at
356-64 (explaining why it is often uncertain whether an HCP permit is required or simply a
safe move for the developer and how the FWS can use aggressive legal positions to move
more developers toward opting in favor of the HCP approach).
207. Interview with Ray Ludwiszewski, former General Counsel, EPA (Feb. 24,
2000); see, e.g., Citizens for Private Property Rights website, http://hometown.aol.comf
proprts/cppr/home.html (describing the HCPs in San Diego County as "legalized land
theft"); American Land Rights Association website, http://www.landrights.org/Mission.htm
(comprising a 26,000 member organization committed to combatting "the excesses of
regulations such as the Endangered Species Act, wetlands, etc.") (on file with Stanford Law
Review).
208. See Hsu, supra note 102, at 10,596 (HCPs provide FWS "a situation where they
could 'bargain in the shadow of the law,' rather than take their chances with the legislative
orjudicial branches.").
209. See Gardner I, supra note 11, at 542-50 (describing wetlands mitigation banking
as a tool to avoid successful regulatory takings claims); Hsu, supra note 102, at 10,595 ("The
upsurge in HCPs can also be explained by an increasing threat of unfavorable precedent
being set in takings jurisprudence."). For a comprehensive treatment of the takings
compensation issue using the ESA and its HCP permits program as a case study, see
Thompson, The Endangered Species Act, supra note 102.
210. We have already discussed why trading parties prefer simple currencies. One
would expect that the optimal precision of the currency, from the agency's perspective,
would also be an imprecise currency. Because such a currency maximizes discretion, the
agency will be less exposed to judicial review. The economic theory of regulation describes
this as "slack," providing "a zone of freedom of action for regulators or legislators in which
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traders operate informally under norms of behavior they develop over time and
which are not always fully transparent. 2 1 1 To be sure, those norms could
coincide closely with environmental protection goals, as repeat players, such as
mitigation banks and developers who frequently enter the trading market, work
to stay on good terms with the agency.2 12 But once it has embraced the ETM,
the agency may develop values that are idiosyncratic of the trading program
and which may lead it to diverge from the public interest values embedded in
the regulatory program as a whole.2 13 This is particularly problematic in the
case of nonfungibilities because, as Bill Pedersen has succinctly observed,
"[m]arkets work best under simple trading rules. That gives those who design
markets an incentive to oversimplify environmental problems to make their
market mechanisms more workable." 2 14 One can therefore see why agencies
charged with administering ETMs have persuasive reasons to keep the
currencies sloppy and markets thick, and why they will also resist squelching
deals.2 15
3.

Public interest.

So what about the public interest? As a threshold matter, ETMs generally

they can operate with lessened fear of punishment by the polity for decisions that deviate
from those the polity would adopt on its own." Levine, supra note 196, at 269.
211. See Dana, supra note 199, at 47 (describing HCPs as part of the "new
contractarian paradigm" in environmental regulation, for which the default position in case
of unsuccessful negotiation is the command-and-control regulatory program); Freeman,
supra note 199 (describing the culture of informal negotiation that arises in contexts such as
HCPs); Hsu, supra note 102, at 10597-98 (proposing that because in formal legal terms the
ESA allows FWS only to regulate or not regulate, informal HCP mitigation negotiations
allow FWS to "escape from a binary world where either the FWS or the landowner is a
winner, and the other is a loser"); Ruhl, supra note 102, at 391-96 (describing HCP
mitigation as a "project-specific topic of negotiation").
212. See Freeman, supra note 199 (suggesting the repeat player factor may be strong
in this sense).
213. Seidenfeld, supra note 192, at 474-79 (describing the problem of idiosyncratic
agency values). See generally Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory
Capture, Public Interest, and the PublicAgenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
167 (1990) (examining the competing theories of why agencies act, or believe themselves to
be acting, in the public interest).
214. Pedersen, supra note 13, at 10,175. These assertions are empirically testable and,
while worthy of further research, they are certainly consistent with our findings in the
wetlands mitigation banking program.
215. It is worth noting, in this regard, the EPA's quiescence in vetoing mitigation
actions. There have been roughly 20 vetoes in the past 25 years. The most comprehensive
history and review of EPA's veto authority contends that the low number is due primarily to
resource constraints. A more probing political economy analysis might well uncover other
important factors such as low retum of political capital, low public salience of the program,
and inter-institutional costs of exercising the veto. William B. Ellis, Section 404(c): Where
is the Balance?,NAT. REsouRcEs & ENv'T, Summer 1992, at 25, 64.
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expand the scope of the public interest by expanding the scope of the affected
citizenry. In so far as the agency and applicant have clear incentives to keep
the market thick, this will necessarily result in more diverse sectors of the
public being touched by trades. In wetland mitigation banking, for example,
the mitigation bank community will usually be different than the development
project community. When delivery of ecosystem services are involved, as will
often be the case with habitat, these communities should have real and often
diverse interests in the trade negotiation and its outcome.2 16 Each community
will want to minimize the negative externalities it is forced to bear and
maximize the positives it retains.2 17
From an advocacy perspective, concerned sectors of the public will want to
ensure the possibility for meaningful review of trading outcomes, which in turn
requires development of an objective, verifiable record documenting the agency
rationale for the trade. The affected parties presumably will also seek the
opportunity for meaningful participation in approving and reviewing trades.
Assuming relevant interests are represented, their combined efforts to minimize
externalities can push trading outcomes toward a public interest outcome. If all
relevant interests are not represented, however, the self-interested efforts of
those that are involved may cause trading outcomes to deviate from the larger
public interest. The interest analysis thus leads directly to a procedural
analysis.
C.

ProceduralAnalysis

We do not mean to suggest in these preceding analyses that the Corps or
FWS have completely abandoned their statutory mandates or have been
captured by trading interests. There is good reason to believe, however, that
the confluence of agency and trading interests to promote ETMs, coupled with
ineffectual public participation, significantly increases the potential on the
margin for nonfungible trades that fail to provide adequate environmental
protection and promote social welfare. How should these objectionable trades
best be caught and corrected? There are five basic questions, and we believe
the last warrants the most attention.

216. It is a separate, though important, issue whether these communities are
knowledgeable, or really do care, about the loss of ecosystem services, particularly since
their effect is often indirect and delayed. See Salzman, supra note 63, at 894-96.
217. As one practitioner has observed in the public lands field, where trades between
public and private land parcels are common, "every parcel of public land has its own
constituency that will urge retention of that parcel in public ownership.... [M]any interests
are aligned to oppose any sale or other disposition of resources from the public domain."
Murray D. Feldman, The New Public Land Exchanges: TradingDevelopment Rights in One
Areafor Public Resources in Another, 44 RoCKY MT. MIN. L. INsT. 2-1, 2-38 (1998).
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Constrainagency discretion.

The option implicit in Parts I and II is to constrain discretion upfront. By
requiring application of sound currencies and trading rules that restrict
nonfungibilities, currency and exchange adequacy can minimize the likelihood
of substantive inadequacy. As we have shown, however, technical, practical,
and public choice constraints suggest that currency and exchange adequacy will
rarely be achieved, particularly in the habitat context. We are not suggesting
that work on these fronts to perfect currencies and exchange rules is wasted
effort. Indeed, there is large room for innovation in this area. If retail review
and its attendant problems-high transaction costs and overvaluation-can be
avoided by improved currency and exchange adequacy, that clearly is a
preferred alternative. But what do we do in the meantime, which we believe
may be a long time, with ETMs that have a strong potential to produce trades
that reduce social welfare? 218
2.

Inform agency discretion.

One might look to the example of NEPA and require greater impact
analysis prior to approval of each trade.2 19 Analyzing the trade in more detail
and allowing public comments would clearly slow down the process and
increase transaction costs, but it could also flag problematic trades where public
goods could be lost. At its best, such an approach would, in the spirit of
Calvert Cliffs, force the agency to take a hard look at each transaction prior to
approving it and give the public an opportunity to ferret out defects in the
trade.220 To reduce the transaction cost problem, one could imagine scoping
reviews that focused not on trade-by-trade but, rather, on a review over a series
of trades or time periods, or perhaps calibrating the impact review to the size of
the project. This would be a version of adaptive management-impact
planning that leads to better government decisions. Certainly the inherent
agency incentives to let trades go through in order to keep the market thick,
discussed above, could reduce the ex ante impact review to a post hoc
rationalization of preordained trade approvals, but this potential problem is
little different than that currently faced by NEPA. 22 1 Overall, however, it does

218. It is important to keep in mind, as well, that the current rules for wetlands
mitigation banking require trades that ensure equivalent value and function.
See
Memorandum of Agreement, supra note 116, at 9210 (stating that the Corps "will strive to
achieve a goal of no overall net loss of values and functions"). If these rules are not closely
followed, it is not clear why additional rules would be.
219. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a.
220. Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n,
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that NEPA requires an agency to consider
alternatives to its actions to the fullest extent possible).
221. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv.
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seem hard to 'square the model of project-by-project environmental
assessments, which routinely take many months or more to complete, with the
vision of a vibrant, ongoing market driven by multiple traders and transactions.
3.

Increasepoliticalaccountability.

A third option lies in increasing political accountability. One might argue
that if concerned citizens truly care about trading practices that reduce social
welfare, they will make their concern felt through the ballot box or traditional
channels of advocacy. In fact, this seems to be occurring in the case of spatial
nonfungibilities and environmental justice, hence the Executive Order on
Environmental Justice and the creation of EPA's National Environmental
Justice Advisory Committee.2 22 This approach seems unlikely to achieve
similar success in the case of habitat ETMs, however. Unlike the confluence in
environmental justice of racial equality and human health risks, habitat trades
concern social welfare loss from ecosystem services. While important, these
losses are often indirect and only appreciated after a natural crisis (e.g. flooding
along the Mississippi or crashing fisheries). Moreover, as the preceding
discussion argued, the balance of political pressure to reduce or promote trades
likely weighs toward even more trades, since they operate effectively as
political steam valves.
4.

Strengthenjudicialaccountability.

A fourth option would be to promote greaterjudicialaccountability. The
deferential standard of review for permitting decisions remains a strong hurdle
for those challenging habitat trades, particularly since neither the ESA nor
Section 404 speaks clearly enough to the issue to allow courts simply to apply
the statutory text.22 3 Courts have overturned a handful of HCPs, but the rarity

239, 239 (1973) ("I know of no solid evidence to support the belief that requiring
articulation, detailed findings or reasoned opinions enhances the integrity or propriety of the
administrative decisions. I think the emphasis on the redemptive quality of procedural
reform is about nine parts myth and one part coconut oil.").
222. Exec. Order No. 12,898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in
Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1997); EPA
Administrator Carol Browner created the National Environmental Justice Advisory
Committee (NEJAC) to provide "'independent advice to EPA on all matters relating to
environmental justice"' and to serve as a "'forum for integrating environmental justice with
other EPA priorities and initiatives."' Michael D. Mattheisen, The US. Environmental
ProtectionAgency's New Environmental Civil Rights Policy, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 183, 196
(1999) (citing OFFICE OF ENVTL. JUST., OFF. OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE,
U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 3

(1994)), availableat http://www.epa.gov/docs/oejpubs/94report/94report.txt.html.
223. See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 981-82 (9th
Cir. 1985) (applying the "'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
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of such decisions proves the rule.2 24 Thus, Congress or the agencies could set a
higher standard of judicial review, perhaps placing the burden on the applicant
to demonstrate no net loss of social welfare or services caused by the trade, or
providing liberal citizen suit rights to enforce trading performance standards
under strict standards of judicial review. But leaving it to litigation between
agencies, traders, and public interest groups to hash out the details imposes
high transaction costs and leaves the ultimate decision to a disinterested
observer. 225 In fact, if barter is a more accurate description of habitat trades
than is the commodity market model, then it is not at all clear we want a
disinterested observer making the decision on the trade's merits. Indeed,
because the trades will involve the loss of ecosystem services for some
communities and perhaps a gain for others, our concern is precisely that we do
want interested parties involved in assessing the impact of trades on
nonfungible values.
5.

Provide for more meaningful public participation.

To account for the concerns of interested parties requires consideration of
the fifth option, increased public participation, and a foray into administrative
law. As trading has spread into more and more environmental contexts, it is
becoming increasingly evident that the familiar institutional settings of
environmental decision making themselves are ill equipped to facilitate trading
and maintain some of the core values of environmental policy.
Most
environmental policy today is implemented through permitting regimes in
which a single regulated entity applies for authorization to carry out an
otherwise prohibited activity and can obtain that authorization only upon
demonstrating to a government agency that it has satisfied a long list of
accordance with law"' standard of judicial review to an HCP permit).
224. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1280-82 (S.D. Ala. 1998)
(holding adequacy of HCP off-site mitigation funding was not supported in the record); San
Bernardino Valley Audubon v. Metropolitan Water Dist., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 836, 844 (Cal.
App. Ct. 1999) (holding that state environmental impact review did not adequately consider
impacts of HCP using "habitat value units" as basis for habitat trading program). In the
wetlands context, see, e.g., Branhaven Plaza, L.L.C. v. Inland Wetlands Comm'n, 740 A.2d
847 (Conn. 1999) (holding that monetary and in-kind contributions are not acceptable
mitigation for wetlands damage when the use of the funds is not specifically directed for
wetland remediation activities).
225. Given the difficulty of selecting currencies that define nonfungible values and of
constructing markets that identify and weed out externalities, an evaluation of the
"goodness" of any particular trade is necessarily left to the reviewing body. Given how
value laden that decision can be for habitat trades, there are serious questions as to whether
judges will be any better at sorting out the bad trades in ex post proceedings than will be
other reviewing bodies in different ex ante or ex post mechanisms. The adversarial model
may appease those interested most in the rule of law, but it is doubtful that its transaction
costs are worth it in terms of improved substantive performance of the ETM. See
Seidenfeld, supra note 192, at 480.

684

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:607

emission limits, performance criteria, monitoring requirements, and other
prescribed standards.2 26 The setting within which this takes place, known
ubiquitously as "permit processing" and a trademark of command-and-control
regulation, involves the applicant and agency haggling over whether the litany
of standards has been met.227
Although the standards often leave some room for negotiation, generally
the agency and applicant know at the beginning of the process the realistic
outer bounds of the final permit, set in place through objective technical
standards or emission limits. Those limits are decided ahead of time through
the rule-making process from which the standards are derived, as well as
through well-known case law and agency policy. The applicant hires a team of
consultants who are familiar with those standards and laws to hash out the
issues with the agency's staff of experts and lawyers, and out of this process
pops a final permit for the public to behold.
Environmental permitting as just described has played a central role in the
successes achieved toward protection of public environmental values.
Ironically, however, the permitting process itself occurs mainly between the
applicant and the agency. For a program devoted to protection of public
values, the public is remarkably absent from the process. Environmental
permitting regimes have been premised on a fundamental tradeoff in this
respect: In return for the security of prescribed ex ante permitting standards
(developed by the agency through public notice and comment rule-making and
applied to each applicant in a permit proceeding), the public has yielded an
equal seat at the permit negotiating table. The public can usually provide
comments to the agency after a draft permit is negotiated between agency and
applicant, 2 28 and can seek judicial review of the permit once issued, but has
neither veto power in the first stage nor an easy time in the second under
standards of review that are deferential to agency decisions.2 29 The quid pro
quo has been, at least in theory, that the permit negotiation is bounded by the
standards adopted through notice and comment rule-making and enrolled in the
code books for all to see. Agency discretion is limited, variances are rare, and
226. The environmental law literature is replete with handbooks and other manuals
describing how applicants should prepare and pursue permit applications. See, e.g., THE
CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK 119-40 (Robert J. Martineau, Jr. & David P. Novello eds.,
1998); THE RCRA PRACTICE MANUAL 70-92 (Theodore L. Garrett ed., 1994).
227. See, e.g., Donna L. Kolar, Practical Advice for Permitting a Waste Disposal
Facility, NAT. REsouRcEs & ENv'T, Summer 1989, at 11 (describing the negotiation points
for hazardous waste permits); Mary Ellen Ternes & Ross A. Macfarlane, NegotiatingTitle V
OperatingPermits: A View from the Provinces, 13 NAT. RESoURCEs & ENv'T 417 (Fall
1998) (describing the negotiation points for Clean Air Act permits).
228. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1539(c) (public notice and comment requirement for HCP
permits).
229. See, e.g., Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 981-82
(9th Cir. 1985) (applying the "'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law"' standard of judicial review to an HCP permit).
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failure to abide by the standards is easily detected and constitutes reversible
error.
Enter trading, and that settled state of affairs is rocked to its core. Trading
appears in the habitat protection picture awkwardly wedged into permitting
programs as a form of "mitigation" and under cover of the reform flags of
flexibility, innovation, and efficiency, not as an integral part of permitting, not
as an independent process.2 30 Rarely do agencies, applicants, or public
advocates consider this as forcing trading into the permit setting.2 31 But that is
The heavy reliance on loosely worded
precisely what is involved.
nonlegislative rules means that agencies do not clearly circumscribe their
trading such that the public can know in advance that its interests are protected
at the table.2 32 In other words, the quid pro quo of notice and comment
rulemaking that provided the basis for permitting has not been duplicated in
habitat trading.
Permitting in the era of trading has thus become a hybrid creation. The
problem is not that wedging trading into permitting necessarily fails to deliver
mitigation values, but rather that the permitting regimes were not designed with
trading in mind and have evolved in ways that will make it difficult to squeeze
trading in without pushing out some of the fundamental institutional premises
upon which permitting regimes have evolved. The traditional permitting model
is hardly a market in the traditional sense of markets, but with the advent of
trading it is increasingly being used as the market mechanism for trading public
environmental values.
Our concern in this sense is straightforward: Placing the applicant and
agency in charge of trading public environmental values raises serious
questions as to whether the deal struck between the permitting system and the
public's participatory role-in which the public agreed to keep its nose largely
out of "permit processing" in return for bounded permit issuance standards-is
still a good deal for the public. The traditional permitting system works fine
for the agency and applicant even in the era of trading; it is the public whose
interests are difficult to square. It is thus no surprise, for example, that
230. As the wetlands mitigation banking case study explained, mitigation banking is
designed to satisfy the Corps' so-called sequencing approach to Section 404 permit
application evaluation, which places compensatory mitigation behind avoiding and
minimizing impacts to aquatic habitat. See text accompanying notes 115-126 supra. HCPs
are based on specific statutory criteria requiring the applicant seeking the permit to
demonstrate that it "will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the
impacts of such taking." 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii). In the absence of a viable habitat
trading program, therefore, developers would be left with avoiding and minimizing impacts
as their only compliance options.
231. Neither the EPA/Corps Federal Guidance nor the FWS HCP Handbook use the
term "trading" at any point to describe the mitigation program.
232. Though published or noticed in the Federal Register, neither the EPA/Corps
FederalGuidance nor the FWS HCP Handbook was promulgated as a notice and comment

rule.
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environmental groups have begun to complain that mitigation decisions in the
HCP program are taking place without following "biological standards"-in
other words, not according to the traditional permitting system-and
environmental groups have called for more public participation as a result.2 33
In this respect, consider the following description of the HCP permitting
process by Defenders of Wildlife.
Citizens from various stakeholder groups have no formal role in the HCP
process except through the public comment period and, for some plans,
through the National Environmental Policy Act or requirements of state or
local law. Often, by the time public meetings occur or official drafts are
released for comment, however, both the regulated interests and the services
have invested so much money and time in plan development that they are
[C]itizens (including those representing the
unlikely to change course ...
environmental community) generally have not had a seat at the negotiating
table in many major recent negotiations despite the fact that conservationists
(in addition to FWS) represent the public's interest in protecting endangered
species....
For the vast majority of plans ... public participation was not adequate,
given the plans' large effects on public resources. The most glaring examples
are large-scale, single-landowner plans that significantly affect public
resources.... While those plans did have public meetings and/or formal
comment periods, the conservation strategies resulted from private
negotiations with largely token attempts at listening to the public's concerns.
In addition, numerous small-scale HCPs reviewed here involved exclusive
negotiations between the landowner and FWS.... This lack of public
participation has resulted from an absence of formal requirements to involve
the public and the limited leverage of citizens who do not have a direct
financial stake in negotiations. 2 34

Defenders of Wildlife's assessment, based on a study of over twenty HCPs,
comports with the general experience of one of this article's authors who, when
in private practice, regularly represented a wide variety of public and private
entities seeking HCP permits.2 35 It does not differ substantially, either, from
233. See, e.g., DEFENDERS oF WILDLIFE, FRAYED

SAFETY

NETS

59-61, 80-81 (1998)

(summarizing Defenders of Wildlife's critique of HCP program).
234. See id. at 41, 43-44.
235. J.B. Ruhl has since described the mitigation negotiation process in terms
consistent with the Defenders of Wildlife's public participation findings. See Ruh], supra
note 102, at 385-86 ("In practice ... FWS and NMFS have delayed public notice until the
time when the HCP has undergone that formative negotiation step."). In the typical singleowner, large-scale HCP project setting for which the Defenders of Wildlife expresses the
most concern in this regard, the developer and FWS haggle over the amount of take the
project will cause and the amount of mitigation land the developer must trade in return.
Once that issue is settled, the developer enters the real estate market to find the least
expensive tract of land that will satisfy the mitigation requirements, which usually are
specified based on habitat type and location, and seeks the agency's approval of the trade.
Unlike the wetlands mitigation context, most HCP mitigation is through preservation at
trading ratios of 3:1 or higher, though occasionally mitigation involves habitat enhancement
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descriptions of some air pollutant ETMs.2 36
D. Design Impasse?
This shortfall of meaningful public input described above is particularly
problematic if inherent agency and trader institutional interests encourage
approval of trades with significant, and unexamined, nonfungibilities. The
interests of the agency, applicant, and public change fundamentally as
mitigation under permitting programs gradually becomes synonymous with
trading. Trading of nonfungible commodities, if it is to thrive and promote
social welfare, is an open-ended game requiring robust markets and plenty of
room for negotiation that considers the multiple values exchanged. That does
not square easily with the relatively closed permitting system. Simply put, as
more public values are up for grabs in trading regimes, the public ought to
rethink whether it wishes to continue to limit its checks on the process to notice
and comment and deferential judicial review. Thus, we believe the most
fundamental design challenge trading poses to environmental policy lies not in
currency adequacy (finding the second-best currency) or exchange adequacy
(structuring a viable market that restricts nonfungibilities), but in review
adequacy and confronting the pressures trading places on the institution of
environmental permitting.
Identifying this problem, though, makes its resolution no easier. What role
exists for the public between the largely ineffectual practice of commenting on

and management. These significant issues are almost always settled by the time the draft
HCP permit is submitted for public comment. Thus, in the authors' experience, having
allowed environmental groups and other public advocates a "seat at the table" during the
negotiation phase would have substantially altered the HCP habitat trading process. See also
Holly Doremus, PreservingCitizen Participationin the Era of Reinvention: The Endangered
Species Act Example, 25 ECoLOGY L.Q. 707 (1999) (examining the growing tension between
the HCP and other ESA reform programs and public participation values).
236. Many of the air pollutant ETMs employ ex ante approval mechanisms and thus
leave no opportunity for public input on trades. Compare the Defenders of Wildlife's
account of public involvement in HCP approval with the following description of ETMs in
California's South Coast Air Quality Management District (AQMD).
Most states have permitting procedures through which affected community members can

advocate for pollution control requirements on facilities. However, pollution trading allows
facilities to avoid those permit requirements-usually without the knowledge or involvement
of the affected community. Pollution trades made pursuant to Rule 1610 and RECLAIM are

not subject to public review or comment. In fact, the public faces numerous difficulties
finding out what companies are trading to avoid compliance with pollution control standards.
For instance, RECLAIM credits can be purchased from independent brokers, without any
environmental agency or public oversight. A company wishing to increase or continue its

pollution need only purchase the required credits on the open market, without any public
review or comment. In this way, the democratic will, as represented in permit and regulatory
requirements imposed after full public review and comment, can be reversed by a simple

economic transaction.
Drury, supranote 45, at 278-79.
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trades that effectively are fait accompli and absolute veto power? Currently,
parties seeking to develop habitat review the regulations and guidelines when
preparing their application. There may be room to haggle when seeking a
permit as issues come up, but, equally, there is a shared expectation that if the
trading party meets its side of the bargain the agency will too. By the time of
public input, the agency has made its findings and the deal has largely been cut.
Hence, the calls from environmental groups for something more. But what?
At one extreme, we could put trades in the democratic hands of the public,
leaving the deals struck by agency and traders to ratification or veto by popular
vote. The democratic model pushes public participation to the forefront, where
interested parties can play a direct role. Mass public participation can serve
many interests-including increasing agency accountability, minimizing
concentrations of power, and facilitating the flow of information to citizens and
decision makers.2 37 But at some point the introduction of more and more
participation from broader and broader segments of the public gives rise to
serious concerns about the potential for interest group interference with
program goals, grandstanding, and dissemination of misinformation-what
some call "participation run amok." 2 38 The democratic model may appease
those interested most in participation, but in its purest form it is tantamount to
giving the public the whole table, not just a seat.
Another alternative could be patterned on calls for more collaborative
forms of decision making.2 39 For example, an independent panel comprised of
persons with no investment in the trading program could be modeled on
architectural review boards or regional planning boards used in land use
contexts to act as the arbiter of trades.2 40 To serve the goal of public
participation, the panel could be comprised not only of scientific experts, but
also representatives of the full range of public interests involved in the trading
program. Most trades would be handled through the routine of agency-trader
haggling, but the agency, trader, or any member of the public could flag
controversial trades for deliberation and final resolution by the panel. As the
early experience of bubbling made clear, however, the review requirement
cannot be open-ended. 24 1 Even more faithful to the collaborative model, all
trades could be hashed out by stakeholder groups composed on an ad hoc basis
to be representative of the various interests at play in each trade and operating

237. Jim Rossi, ParticipationRun Amok: The Costs of Mass Participationfor
DeliberativeAgency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 182-87 (1997).
238. See id. at 211-40. Not to mention the immense transaction costs and likely low
level of interest among potential participants.
239. Jody Freeman, CollaborativeGovernance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA

L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1997) (advocating increased use of "collaborative governance" structures).
240. John S. Applegate, Beyond the Usual Suspects: The Use of Citizen Advisory
Boards in EnvironmentalDecisionmaking, 73 IND. L.J. 903 (1998).
241. See note 194 supra.
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under rules of consensus. 24 2 The result of this form of trading by mediation
would be an agreement the traders could take as final and presume to be secure
from attack by other interested parties.
Such collaborative approaches, however, merely beg the question of
institutional choice, for meaningful consent requires institutions through which
local public interests can give their consent. How are the representatives of
local interests selected for the expert panel or the stakeholder group? Are they
drawn from the city council, the planning board, a referendum, universities,
citizen advisory panels, lottery? 24 3 To whom are they accountable? How does
one deal with the problem of the persistent objector, obstreperous NGOs, or
other strategic behavior in which citizen participation may block real
environmental progress? And regardless of the structure, greater public
involvement still requires analyzing the appropriate role of government as
decision maker, as well as the appropriate level of intervention, since different
regulatory entities behave differently. 244 Collaborative models, in other words,
have their own institutional baggage to handle, and we, like many others, are
not confident they offer more hope than the adversarial and democratic models
in cutting through the obstacles for using ETMs in habitat trading contexts. 245
Apparently finding no satisfactory solution either, the Department of
Interior has responded to the design dilemma with a measure that it touted as
meeting the concerns of meaningful participation, but which in fact provided
the public no rights of participation in the permitting process that it did not
already have.246 The agency apparently had no insights into what additional

242. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The
Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 795-801 (1984) (advocating
involvement of parties to a legal dispute in a problem-solving endeavor as a means of
overcoming intransigence and refusal to relate to the needs of others).
243. In the idealized setting, the same people would be affected by developed and
restored wetlands. In this case, it would make sense for them to determine the adequacy of
the trade. Once the costs and benefits are no longer uniformly shared, however, difficulties
arise in reaching agreement.
244. See Hahn II, supra note 23, at 111-12, on the effects of having different levels of
government implement selected policies. "It might seem, for example, that if the problem is
local, then the logical choice for addressing the problem is the local regulatory body.
However, this is not always true. Perhaps the problem may require a level of technical
expertise that does not reside at the local level, in which case some higher level of
government involvement may be required.... [T]he level of oversight can effect the
implementation of policies."
245. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Regulatory Stakeholders: Limits on
Collaboration as the Basisfor Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 411 (2000).
246. See Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat
Conservation Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 FED. REG. 35,342,
35,346-47, 35,456 (June 1, 2000) (FWS expands the public comment period on most
proposed HCP permits from 30 to 60 days and states it "will strongly encourage potential
applicants to allow for public participation during the development of an HCP," but does not
specify what such participation might entail or what the agency might do if the applicant
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public participation it could provide without transforming the permitting
process into something different. By the same token, the environmental groups
have failed to define exactly what form of participation they desire over and
above that level. Presumably, they have the same concerns that have been
raised in the commodity trading-style ETMs, where trading is shielded from
any public input,247 but no one expressing concerns with either context has
cogently described a union between ETMs and public participation that does
not result in one subjugating the other.
The seeds of a design impasse are thus apparent, though its solution is not.
ETM critics argue that bargains struck in approving trades are often
inappropriate, insufficiently considering public interests.
The preceding
analysis of commodities, currencies, and exchange restrictions in Parts I, II, and
III has shown why this occurs. But it is apparent that each of the three interests
involved-agency, traders, and public-has something different in mind in
response to the question of what the proper institutional approval design should
look like. Each, in its own way, envisions a "permit-plus." For all interests,
the ideal "plus" is an efficiently operating ETM that consistently delivers
appropriate levels of environmental protection at lower cost. Where that Holy
Grail is not easily attained, the interests diverge.
For agencies, the "plus" is ultimate discretion to approve or disapprove
trades. The rules of permitting constrain agency discretion, both through the ex
ante standards promulgated in the rules and through ex post citizen suits and
judicial review. But prescriptively dictating too specifically the standards for
trades, or subjecting the agency to strict review after trades are struck, denies
the agency the room to maneuver and barter. 248 Thus, agencies that want to

refuses to allow it).
247. Drury, supra note 45, at 279.
248. See Freeman, supra note 239 (describing why the trend toward contractarian
models of regulation requires the agency have space to work out the content of negotiations);
Winter, supra note 206, at 228-29 (describing agency implementation processes generally as
barter systems in which the agency requires discretion to maneuver). Readers familiar with
local land use and zoning law may observe that bargaining has long been a tradition in that
setting. But local land use decisions fall into two categories: legislative and quasi-judicial.
Legislative acts such as comprehensive rezonings often do involve raw political bargaining,
but they are decided by legislative bodies-e.g., the city council-where politics rule the
day. Many land use permits, however, are decided in administrative settings where rules of
procedure, criteria for decision, and standards of judicial review ostensibly are more tightly
bounded and room for negotiation is more limited, such as is the case for variance and
special exception procedures.

JULAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS,

LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAw 173-76 (1998) (describing generally the differences
between legislative and administrative actions in local land use authorities); Carol Rose,
Planningand Dealing:PiecemealLand Controlsas a Problem ofLocal Legitimacy, 71 CAL.
L. REv. 837 (1983) (describing the origins of the distinction and the role bargaining has
played in various settings). While bargaining undoubtedly occurs in practice even in the
administrative land use setting, the insertion of trading into environmental permitting
introduces a level of informal bargaining in the permitting setting not heretofore officially

Dec. 2000]

CURRENCIES AND COMMODIFICATION

691

barter will stake out room by keeping the rules of agreement loose and
unbounded. The FWS, for example, has authored hundreds of pages of
informal "guidance" for developing HCPs, but very few formal rules.2 49 In
describing the agency's need for broad discretion in the same terms an inspired
artist might use, the FWS guidance document explains that the agency chose
not to "establish specific 'rules' for developing mitigation programs [because]
that would limit the creative potential inherent in any good HCP effort." 250
For traders fearful of the discretion the agency wields in that setting, the
"plus" is a contract fixing the terms of the barter and protecting the trader from
subsequent reneging by the agency. Traders argue that these contractual
protections are necessary to encourage their commitment of land and other
financial resources to the long-term habitat protection solutions the agency
seeks to attain through trading.25 1 Thus, for example, many of the recently
developed HCP policies are geared toward assuring the applicants that the
government will keep its side of the bargain. 252 However, putting aside
constitutional doctrines that may limit the effectiveness of such a contractual
remedy,253 any trend toward contractarian approaches to environmental
protection simply exacerbates concerns that the agency may assume
undemocratic, idiosyncratic values that move public interest norms to the
sidelines. 254
For the public fearful of both the agency's unbounded discretion 255 and the

endorsed in land use or other regulatory settings controlling land development.
249. Compare HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 104 (extensive informal guidance), with
50 C.F.R. pt. 17 (limited formal rule structure). This would be predicted by the economic
theory of regulations. See Levine, supra note 196.
250. See HCP HANDBOOK, supranote 104, at 3-19.
251. Melious & Thornton, supra note 199, at 491.
252. See id. at 491, 501-04 (discussing the No Surprises, Safe Harbors, and Candidate
Conservation Agreements policies in this context).
253. See id. at 514-22 (discussing the application of the Winstar doctrine regarding the
extent of government sovereign immunity in contract settings).
254. As Jody Freeman has argued, the growth of "The Contracting State" challenges
the dominant administrative law theories.
Although most administrative law scholars would surely acknowledge that informal
negotiation, bargaining and exchange pervade the regulatory process, none of the several

competing theories of administrative law-public interest, pluralist, civic republican and
public choice-advances the normative claim that regulation ought to be the product of
explicit contracting between agencies and stakeholders. . .. Perhaps an agency cannot easily

occupy both a contractual and hierarchical [i.e. regulatory] position with respect to
stakeholders simultaneously. One might reason, for example, that to act as a contractual
partner an agency might need to surrender its unique role as a trustee or guarantor of the

public interest.
Freeman, supra note 199.
255. Indeed, there is good reason to believe environmental groups fear agency
discretion more than traders do, and that controlling discretion is more important to
environmental groups than achieving effective regulatory strategies. See generally John
Scholz, Cooperative Regulatory Enforcement and the Politics of Administrative
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possibility that traders may get too good a deal at the public's expense,256 the
"plus" is a seat at the negotiating table. As noted previously, however, while
many environmental NGOs have complained about the direction in which
wetlands mitigation banking and HCPs are headed, and have demanded a seat
at the table to correct the alleged problems, none have described what power
comes with that seat. Presumably, they seek not only information and process
transparency, but also some mechanism for exerting direct influence over the
trading outcomes. Exactly what the scope of that power must be to satiate their
participation demands, and how they propose it be exercised, remains unclear.
What is clear is that groups like Defenders of Wildlife want to take away
some of the protections applicants currently receive in the permitting process.
Whether this amounts to a veto power or simply reserving the ability to change
the terms of the trade as the public representatives see fit is less certain. Also
clear is that traders are seeking protections they do not currently receive in the
permitting process. They seek some finality to the trade, though the exact form
is uncertain. Through it all, agencies want the flexibility to barter with a free
hand, and yet the power to override the will of the public and the traders when
the trade does not strike the agency as a good deal. This state of affairs thus
has all the makings of an intractable design problem.
Permitting is not about discretionary agency trading. Permitting is not
about private contracting. Permitting is not about the public ratifying or
vetoing the permit. It is an understatement, therefore, to observe that it will be
difficult to accommodate all these "plusses" at the same time. In all cases, the
bigger the "plus" in permit-plus the less it looks like permitting. 257 The "plus"
risks swallowing the assumptions on which permitting is based and
overshadowing its own trading function. This is not to suggest that there is no
longer a role for permitting in the habitat protection context. Rather, the
question is whether we continue to allow agencies to wedge ETM mechanisms

Effectiveness, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 115 (1991).
256. Environmental groups have aggressively opposed the ESA reforms designed to
provide HCP applicants more "assurance" that the agency will not change the terms of the
agreement except in limited circumstances. See Ruhl, supra note 102, at 402-03.
257. For example, recent policies liberalizing trading between public land and private
land holdings-i.e., efforts to keep the market fat-have significantly unsettled the process
for permitting private development projects planned for formerly public land. One
practitioner in that field observes that
the new land exchanges short-circuit the normal project permitting and evaluation process.
An almost premature value judgment is made, before the full comprehensive review and
rational planning exercises under NEPA and other federal authorities, of whether a particular
project should proceed in a certain area. There is not a full opportunity to examine
mitigation measures that might be used to offset development impacts, nor is there an
opportunity to evaluate and gather in one place an analysis of the potential environmental
impacts of a project and provide agency decisionmakers with a range of how to proceed with
project approval and permitting. Significantly, this short-circuiting of the normal project

permitting process also results in the loss of public involvement.
Feldman, supra note 217, at 2-41.

Dec. 2000]

CURRENCIES AND COMMODIFICATION

693

into habitat permitting programs, or, if we are committed to making ETMs
work in highly nonfungible settings, whether we design an independent
institution within which the trading takes place.
Our preceding description of the contending models to ensure review
adequacy may well bring to mind haggling in a bazaar, and we believe this is
an entirely appropriate image to consider. In valuing nonfungibles that cannot
easily be captured in currencies, the commodity vision of ETMs breaks down.
Absent adequate currencies that capture important values and adequate rules of
exchange that minimize externalities, we are left only with barter to identify
trades that promote environmental protection and social welfare-an imprecise
yet ultimately exacting process. This leaves us with no shortage of decisionmaking models for ETMs that operate in the habitat trading context and
elsewhere where nonfungibilities run high. But none escape the basic tradeoff
between the interests at stake.
Currency and exchange inadequacies prevent us from knowing in advance
which trades fail to satisfy basic program demands of environmental protection.
When we lack confidence in the ETM operating independently, the question of
assessing "fair" trades has to be left in the hands of some reviewing body. Is it
an agency with ultimate discretion? Is it the public with power of veto at the
polls? An expert review panel? A court? Each alternative improves one
interest's position at the expense of another's, or depends on unrealistic
behavioral assumptions, or both.
V. CONCLUSION

In this article, we have demonstrated the central roles that nonfungibilities
and currencies play in determining the structure and success of environmental
trading markets. The standards of currency adequacy, exchange adequacy, and
review adequacy provide a comprehensive framework through which to
analyze and understand the various tradeoffs inherent in the design of ETMs.
They also reveal the particularly difficult challenges of institutional design.
Ultimately, a meaningful permit-plus approach for habitat-based ETMs
requires institutional analysis of decision-making bodies at fundamental levels.
It requires a root-level examination of regulatory theory to design the most
appropriate structures that systematically improve protection of public interests
currently overlooked and, at worst, actively ignored. The needs for such a
research initiative are clear. The commodity model of trading cannot, we
believe, sufficiently satisfy the demands posed by the trading of nonfungible
environmental amenities. This is not to say such markets are necessarily
inefficient or undesirable; but when significant values remain unaccounted for
in the trades, barter becomes the more appropriate model and the need for a
more rigorous evaluation process presents itself.
Crafting this process
represents a serious and difficult challenge for environmental law, particularly
as the trend toward diversification of ETMs into broader contexts continues.
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On whose shoulders should this challenge be carried? We have no quarrel
with the general proposition that trading can be efficient and thus the public has
good reason to promote and finance research into better currencies and
exchange rules for ETMs. But it ought not be the public's burden to assume
the risk of inadequate trades while that research program is underway. The
sulfur dioxide program, blessed as it is with a relatively fungible trading
commodity, has satisfied the challenge, and perhaps other ETMs can do so as
successfully. But the burden should be on proponents and practitioners to
answer persuasively three fundamental questions.
Is the currency capable of capturing what we care about? Answering this
requires not only a technical consideration of measurement capacity but a clear
judgment by the body politic of the proper environmental protection goal (e.g.,
no net loss of wetland acres or services?). Will exchange restrictions be
sufficient to dampen significant externalities? This brings into play how one
decides the proper balance between market constraints and thick markets. And,
as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, are there mechanisms in place to
catch trades that reduce environmental protection or social welfare?
Exchanging environmental apples for oranges may be a beneficial policy
choice, but let us be honest about what the ETMs are trading. Given current
knowledge and financing, we recognize that the burden of answering these
questions may prove difficult for ETMs involving highly nonfungible
environmental features. The magnitude of the challenge, however, makes it no
less important.

